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This research employs Salisbury's (1969) exchange 
theory to examine interactions between interest group 
lobbyists and congressmen on matters concerning agricultural 
legislation. The relationship between exchange inducements 
and policy output are also analyzed. Before, however, 
discussing exchange theory and goal attainment. Chapters 
I and II review agricultural policy and interest group 
literature, respectively.
Agricultural policy is a substantive area that demands 
attention for study for several reasons. First, agricultural 
policy can change the world. What happens to the price of 
pork can affect consumers' demands. A determination of 
United States wheat prices does influence foreign buyers 
and other nations' policies. Second, agricultural policy is 
now used in international ideological and power struggles.
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For instance, the United States may trade food for peaceful 
reasons, for oil, to gain access to new markets, or to 
express international policy as with the 1980 grain embargo 
against the Soviet Union. The European Economic Community 
was formed for economic protection. As a part of this 
economic protectionism, the European Economic Community may 
protect some of its own agricultural commodities while being 
antagonistic toward nonmembers' agricultural products.
Third, United States balances of trade payments have become 
more and more dependent on agricultural exports. Especially 
from 19 72 to 19 74, agricultural exports served to mediate 
the impact of the international oil cartel. During this 
period, oil import costs rose from $6 billion to $26 billion; 
at the same time, agricultural exports increased from $9 
billion to $22 billion. Fourth, since World War II, foreign 
nations have developed international economic communities 
that can have an impact on our domestic agricultural policy 
system. This means we must view our agricultural policy 
decisions as a part of a global agricultural policy system. 
Fifth, world population projections and present distribution 
problems bring United States agricultural policy to the 
fore for perusal. Decisions must be made whether to expend 
nonrenewable resources all at once to provide comfort to 
the globe's present population, or whether renewable 
resources (agricultural products, for example) should augment 
the availability of nonrenewable products. It is this
balancing of nonrenewable and renewable products that brings 
agricultural policy into this particular discussion. Sixth, 
at the same time that global demands are being made on all 
agricultural policy systems, but especially on the United 
States system, the perpetual problem of low, variable 
prices must be dealt with. Study concerning this issue 
would involve determining the extent of government subsidi­
zation of the agricultural community to insure global welfare. 
Seventh, the domestic agricultural policy system involves 
a plethora of actors. For example, our system involves 
commodity groups, general interest groups, and public 
interest groups. We should be studying agricultural policy 
to determine how these groups feel agricultural policy should 
be approached. Eighth, the agricultural policy system 
provides a setting involving people and institutions across 
time (O'Rourke, 1978: 4-5) and, thus, is useful as a sub­
stantive area from the study of which general hypotheses 
regarding policy making may emerge.
The primary theme of United States agricultural 
policy from the 1930s until the passage of the 1973 farm 
bill was the maintenance of farm incomes. Emphasis then 
was on efficient production, economy of farm scale, soil 
conservation, and price supports. From 1973 through 1976, 
because of prospects for foreign food exports, the main 
emphasis of agricultural policy has been on increased 
production. The result of this change was that some of
the nation's farmers faced hardships as the availability 
of some agricultural products exceeded the demand for such 
products. In 1977, farm legislation reinstated the concept 
of income maintenance. Income maintenance, to date, how­
ever, has been tempered to the extent that budgetary respon­
sibilities have prevailed (Browne, 1978: 3).
This author perceives the agricultural policy as 
being composed of two large areas: domestic and foreign. 
Though these areas of agricultural policy are not unrelated, 
the categorization is useful. Within each of these subareas, 
more specific policies take shape. The examination of 
these two areas is the task of this chapter.
Domestic Agricultural Policy
Domestic agricultural policy is composed of the 
following policy subareas: price supports, food distribu­
tion, regulation, conservation, education, research, rural 
development, and farm credit policies. Each of these sub- 
areas has undergone evolutionary changes since the beginnings 
of this country and throughout the aging of the U.S. Depart­
ment of Agriculture (USDA).
A concomitant aging process has occurred in the farm 
community itself. In 1945 there were 5.9 million farms, 
in 19 78, 2.7 million farms. The 1945 farm labor force 
(farm operators, hired workers, and unpaid family workers) 
was approximately 11 million, the 1978 figure was about 4 
million workers (U.S. Congress, 1978a, p. xi) .
Considering acreage and assets, in 1950 farms 
averaged about 210 acres and $43,000 in total assets. In 
1978, farms averaged nearly 400 acres and $106,000 in total 
assets (these dollars are based on 1967 prices) (2-3) .
Given the historical trends, it is projected that there 
will be around 2.5 million farms in 19 80, 2 million in 
1990, and 1.6 million or fewer in the year 2000. Gross 
sales in 1990 are to be $100,000 or more for 20 percent of 
all farms and less than $20,000 for about 50 percent of 
the farms (25).
But agricultural policy does not just deal with
farmers;^ it also has applications for nonfarm populations.
In 19 70 there were about 53.9 million people living in 
2rural areas or approximately 26.6 percent of the total 
population. The absolute rural population was about the 
same as in 1960; however, since the total population 
increased, the portion of the total population that was 
rural decreased from 30.1 in 1960. Agricultural policy is 
important to all of the rural population, not just the farm 
population, because agriculture has affected rural, urban, 
and metropolitan economies (Marshall, 1974: 18-19). Like­
wise, nonrural areas have influenced rural areas in the 
sense that the nonrural areas provide a source of liveli­
hood for those leaving the rural areas (22).
To cope with this diverse agricultural population, 
rural and nonrural, a wide variety of programs and services
have been developed (see Appendix A). A review of some 
of these is presented forthwith.
Price Support Policy
Talbot and Hadwiger (1968) have stated that concerns 
surrounding price supports,^ one of the main agricultural 
policy areas of the last three decades, include who the 
program is for, to what extent will price supports be 
provided, what guidelines must be met in order to qualify, 
and who is empowered to direct the program. They also 
state that price support policies involve a wide variety 
of mechanisms, such as the use of Section 32 funds^ to buy 
up meat for the federal school lunch program. That is to 
say, price support policies are not limited to direct price 
supports for basic and nonbasic commodities (208-208), 
even though other authors have considered price support 
policy to refer strictly to direct governmental support of 
farm commodities. The discussion here of price support 
policy considers both direct and indirect mechanisms.
Price supports have been in use since the early 
1920s (Anderson, Brady, and Bullock, 1978; 376). They, 
however, were used only after it became apparent that the 
traditional philosophy of government nonintervention in 
economic matters was failing. Demands for price supports 
arose during the 1920s because post-war European importing 
nations had too few dollars with which to purchase American 
products. Thus, American farm prices remained depressed
for nearly two decades; the substitution of tractors for 
horses only made matters worse as production increased at 
an even more rapid rate. The result of the continually 
depressed farm market was a nation that came to perceive 
government contracts as a means to remedy inequities 
created by open markets (Cochrane and Ryan, 1976; 22).
Early Forms of Price Supports. Initially, in 1921 
and 1922, price supports took the form of protective tariffs. 
Despite their intent, however, these price supports were 
little more than symbolic as farm production greatly exceeded 
public demand (Anderson, et al., 1978: 377). Beginning in 
1924, the concept of using a government corporation to buy 
surplus commodities was developed in the McNary-Haugen bills. 
Under this plan, surplus grains purchased by the government 
corporation would have been exported and sold at world mar­
ket prices; any losses incurred were to have been recovered 
by taxing domestic farm commodities. Though this form of 
price supports was considered in five sessions of Congress, 
it never became legislation (Anderson, et al., 1978: 377); 
Cochrane and Ryan, 1976: 22-23). In 1929, a Federal Farm 
Board was established. As a price support mechanism, this 
board was to assist farmers by supporting farmers' coopera­
tive marketing organizations via finance loans that were 
to be used to buy surplus commodities (Cochrane and Ryan, 
1976: 23; Rasmussen and Baker, 1972: 19-20; Rasmussen and 
Baker, 1969: 70).
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Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. The next major 
effort at price supports came about with the passage of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. This legislation 
provided for production controls in order to reduce the 
surplus of farm commodities. If a farmer did volunteer to 
reduce his basic crop acres,^ he became eligible for cash 
benefits which were financed by taxing the first processor 
of an agricultural commodity (Anderson, et al., 1978: 377; 
Rasmussen and Baker, 1969: 70-71). The amount of the proces­
sor's tax was to be equal to the difference between the fair 
exchange and the market value (Talbot and Hadwiger, 1969:
264). To further reduce agricultural products on the mar­
ket, commodity loans were provided for farmers, and the 
government made direct purchases of surplus commodities 
(Anderson, et al., 1978: 377). Overall, the objective of 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 19 33 was to obtain parity 
prices^ for agricultural commodities. Parity is a concept 
that relates relative purchasing power. Specifically, 
parity is the price a farmer wants for his commodities in 
order to insure that he has the same fair or just buying 
power as farmers had from 1909 to 1914 (Talbot and Hadwiger, 
1968: 10).
Further price support approaches were introduced in 
1934 by the Bankhead Cotton Control Act and the Kerr 
Tobacco Control Act. These two acts used market quotas to 
determine the amount of cotton or tobacco that could be
marketed without being taxed. Producers who did not 
participate in the programs, by reducing their acreage, 
had to pay sales tax on their products. Also, these two 
acts introduced the use of référendums to determine whether 
the programs would be extended beyond the first year of 
operation. Two-thirds of the cotton and three-fourths of 
the tobacco producers had to vote to sustain each program 
in order to insure their continuance past the initial year 
of implementation. Marketing agreements were used beginning 
with fluid milk in 1933. Later such agreements also were 
applied to fruits, vegetables, tobacco, rice, and peanuts 
(Rasmussen and Baker, 1969: 71-72).
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936. 
In 19 36, after the Supreme Court declared the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 unconstitutional because of the act's 
production control provisions, the Congress passed the Soil 
Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936. This 
legislation attempted to maintain farm income by paying 
farmers for taking soil-depleting crops out of production.
It just so happened that the soil-depleting crops were those 
in excess supply. The real intent was to provide financial 
support using the guise of payments for soil conservation 
(Anderson, et al., 1978: 377-378; Rasmussen and Baker, 1969: 
73-74; Talbot and Hadwiger, 1978: 264-265).
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Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. USDA's basic 
price support legislation was enacted in the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938. This legislation emphasized the 
regulation of marketing rather than the production of agri­
cultural commodities. The primary commodities covered were 
tobacco, corn, wheat, rice, and cotton. Producers were pro­
vided quotas based on acres or units of the commodity. If 
the producer overproduced, then he was penalized; if the 
producer reduced his production and not his allotted acreage 
guidelines, he became eligible for commodity loans, parity 
payments, and/or soil conservation payments. Mandatory 
marketing quotas for corn, cotton, rice, and tobacco could 
be implemented if two-thirds of the producers agreed in a 
referendum. Payments were also to be made for retirement 
of land and the legislation continuing the Soil Conservation 
and Domestic Allotment Act. Parity prices and parity 
income were goals of the legislation. Finally, surplus 
disposal programs were possible as reserves accumulated as a 
result of nonrecourse loans. Disposal programs included a 
food stamp program for those on relief, free distribution 
of food, school lunch programs, and subsidization of cotton 
and wheat exports (Anderson, et al., 1978: 378; Rasmussen 
and Baker, 1969: 74-75).
Wartime Measures. Due to World War II needs, the 
early 1940s were marked by government urging increased 
production. Farmers were inspired to follow government's
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beck given increased prices and appeals to patriotism. Almost 
overnight the concern for excessive supplies dissipated. In 
December, 1940, USDA called for farmers to farrow as many 
sows in 1941 as in 1940. April, 1941, brought a USDA 
announcement that hogs, dairy products, chickens, and eggs 
would be supported at above market prices. Cotton, corn, 
wheat, rice, and tobacco had their loan rates increased up 
to 85 percent of parity in May, 1941. These same rates 
were extended beyond 1941 for cotton, corn, wheat, peanuts, 
rice, and tobacco. Coming on the heels of the May, 1941, 
announcement was the Steagall amendment in July, 1941. This 
stated nonbasic commodities whose production was to be 
increased would receive prices of at least 85 percent of 
parity. Again, in October, 1942, price supports increased 
with corn, cotton, peanuts, rice, tobacco, and wheat and 
Steagall's nonbasic commodities to receive no less than 90 
percent of parity. Steagall's nonbasic commodities included: 
manufacturing milk, butterfat, chickens, eggs, turkeys, 
hogs, dry peas, dry beans, soybeans for oil, flaxseed for 
oil, peanuts for oil, American Egyptian cotton, Irish 
potatoes, and sweet potatoes. Even more lucrative prices 
were ahead. Price support increases came in June, 1944. 
Cotton's price support was increased to 92.5 percent of 
parity while the parity level for corn, rice, and wheat was 
set at 90 percent. At first, this would appear to be no
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increase for corn, rice, and wheat. This is not so. In 
1942, even though the support prices for corn, rice, and 
wheat had been raised to 90 percent parity, the legislation 
provided the President could use an 85 percent level for 
these commodities if he felt their prices were causing 
increased poultry and livestock prices. He could take 
such action in the interest of national defense.
Other measures used to increase farm income during 
World War II involved relaxing penalties for production 
beyond acreage allotments as long as the harvest was war 
crops. Marketing quotas were used throughout the war on 
barley and flue-cured tobacco and until mid-1943 on fire- 
cured and air-cured tobacco. Marketing quotas were used 
for wheat until early 1943. The purpose of the quotas was 
to induce producers to provide crops needed for the war 
effort (Anderson, et al., 1968: 37 8; Rasmussen and Baker, 
1969: 77-79).
Agricultural Act of 1948. The Steagall amendment 
of 1941 had declared that no new commodity legislation could 
be enacted until two years after hostilities had ceased. 
Since President Truman officially declared war had ended on 
December 31, 1946, all previous commodity legislation did 
not expire until December 31, 1948 (Cochrane and Ryan,
1976: 24). Major debate of the Agricultural Act of 1948 
(Hope-Aiken bill) focused on whether to have high, fixed 
support prices or to have lower, flexible supports.
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High, fixed supports were advocated by most Democrats 
in Congress while Republicans generally favored the sliding 
scale. Ultimately, a compromise was reached. Clifford 
Hope (R KS) , chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, 
who had proposed price supports at 90 percent for basic 
commodities until June 30, 1950, instead had his legislation 
approved until January, 1950. The Truman administration, 
along with most Republicans, favored Senator Aiken's (R VT) 
bill that embodied price supports from 60 to 90 percent of 
parity depending on whether supplies were high or low, 
respectively. With the exception of tobacco, the sliding 
scale would have applied to all basic commodities when 
quotas or allotments were in effect. The Aiken portion of 
the 1948 legislation was to become effective January 1, 1950. 
Because of the Agricultural Act of 1949, however, the Aiken 
portion of the 1948 legislation was never effectuated 
(Matusow, 1967: 139-144; Benedict, 1953: 472-475).
Also notable was the modernization of the parity 
formula. The 1948 legislation revised the pattern of 
relationships of the commodities' parity prices. Changes 
in productivity of commodities since the original base 
period of 1910 to 1914 were reflected by using market 
prices of commodities during the most recent ten-year 
period (Benedict, 1953: 475-476). Included in the new 
parity formula were wages paid hired farm laborers and war­
time payments made to producers as found in the prices of
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commodities and in the index of prices received. Applica­
tion of the new parity formula was not inclusive of all 
commodities. Whichever was higher, the old parity price 
or new parity price, was to be used for basic commodities 
through 1954. If the new parity formula price was more 
than 5 percent below the old parity price, a transitional 
parity equal to the old parity price less 5 percent was to 
be used until the transitional parity became less than the 
new parity formula price (Benedict, 1953: 475-478).
Of lesser importance, the 1948 legislation permitted 
loans for cooperatives to be used for construction of 
storage facilities (Rasmussen and Baker, 1969: 81). Though 
the Commodity Credit Corporation was directed not to provide
nprice supports of nonbasic commodities (except potatoes ) 
that were perishable in unprocessed form, the Secretary of 
Agriculture was authorized to provide supports by using 
Section 32 and school lunch funds. Furthermore the 
Commodity Credit Corporation could support prices through 
loans, purchases or payments on processed and storable 
nonbasic commodities (Benedict, 1953: 477-478).
The Brannan Plan of 19 49. Harry S Truman had always 
favored flexible support prices, but the 1948 election 
analysis indicated farmers voted for the Democrats because 
farmers were determined to have high, fixed price supports. 
This seeming contradiction has been explained as being a
15
result of positions taken by Democratic congressional candi­
dates and of the Production and Marketing Administration's 
campaigning for high, fixed supports while Truman stumped 
for low, flexible supports (Matusow, 1967: 191-192). The 
Truman administration's 1949 agricultural policy proposals 
reflected the farmers' demands for high, fixed prices and 
more. This plan, revealed on April 7, 1949, came to be 
known as the Brannan Plan and was to cause great debate over 
solutions to the farm problem. Eventually the controversy 
surrounding the Brannan Plan catapulted Secretary of Agri­
culture Brannan into the national limelight, to the extent 
that Brannan's very name stirred political antagonisms 
(Matusow, 1967: 191-193).
Several aspects of the Brannan Plan contributed to 
the political uproar surrounding the plan. First, the plan 
was proposed without consultation of farm groups or agri­
cultural representatives in Congress. Second, Brannan 
attempted to steer away from the parity price concept, 
which farmers felt so akin to, and attempted to develop an 
income standard to determine a fair return for farmers. It 
just so happened that the Brannan Plan based its income 
standard on the period from 1939 to 1948, some of the most 
lucrative years farmers had ever had. Since the income 
standard was a moving base, dropping one year and adding 
another each year, agriculture could look forward to high
16
prices for some time to come. Certainly, this was a 
political stroke of genius by Brannan as farmers would 
probably tend to vote for the party that gave them the 
best deal. For this reason it was opposed by Republicans. 
Also, the prices would continue to be high thus providing 
incentive to provide greater production control, an approach 
the supporters of Aiken's flexible price supports despised. 
Third, government bankruptcy was the cry of those who 
opposed paying producers for the difference between the 
market price and the support level for perishable commodi­
ties. Brannan's intent was to insure that perishable 
commodities, such as potatoes, would no longer spoil in the 
fields. With the exception of the Farmers Union, major farm 
interest groups, still reeling from costly production and 
marketing controls of World War II, refused to face the 
possibility of such controls again. They claimed that 
income payments would only cause continued overproduction 
and an ever mounting taxpayers' bill would accrue from 
income payments. Fourth, controversy surrounded the 
limitation on the size of farm operation for receiving 
income support. Brannan proposed income support for not 
more than 1,800 units of product for any one farm. One 
unit equaled 10 bushels of corn, 8 bushels of wheat, or 
approximately 50 pounds of cotton. Any farm producing more 
than the maximum amount would not receive support on the 
excess (Matusow, 1967: 195-208; Christenson, 1959: 49-50; 
Benedict, 1953: 484-490).
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Agricultural Act of 1949. Despite the bitter 
struggle over the Brannan Plan, Brannan was a winner of 
sorts. He had favored inflexible supports at 100 percent 
of parity; the Agricultural Act of 1949, though providing 
flexible supports, set the supports higher than the 1948 
legislation. For instance, tobacco, corn, wheat, and rice 
had supports ranging from 75 to 90 percent for supplies 
ranging from 130 percent to 102 percent of normal production, 
This is in contrast to the 1948 scales that provided for 
price supports of 60 to 90 percent and for a range of 
130 percent to 70 percent of normal production. The 1948 
legislation was even more directed toward Brannan's high 
supports when one considers that the 1950 crop would have 
support levels of 90 percent of parity if marketing quotas 
or allotments were in effect. Similarly, a support level 
of 80 percent was set for the 19 51 crop. Failure to 
approve marketing quotas (except tobacco) would result 
in the support level decreasing to 50 percent of parity 
(Benedict, 1953: 481-482). The 1950 crops were bound to 
have controls given the overabundance of commodities 
(Matusow, 1967: 214-215).
Parity was revised in 1949. New inclusions involved 
wages paid to hired farm labor, interest, taxes, and war­
time subsidy payments made to producers to keep consumer
18
prices low. Since the Democrats had regained control of 
both houses in 1948, they made a bid to retain future farm 
votes by providing that the parity price of any basic 
commodity could not be less than the same parity price as 
computed under the Agricultural Act of 1948. This stipula­
tion was to apply from 1949 through 1953. In effect, this 
meant whichever was higher, the 1948 or 1949 parity formula 
price, would be used through 1953. Senator Aiken's 1948 
sliding scale, therefore, was negated by the Democrat's 
1949 legislation.
By and large, the remainder of the 1949 legislation 
was routine. One new section, 417, was added to the Farm 
Credit Act of 1933. Banks for Cooperatives and the Central 
Bank for Cooperatives could make loans for up to 80 percent 
of the cost of construction for storage facilities. These 
loans were to be made to cooperative associations.
Overall the 1949 act meant high support prices 
through 1954 (around 90 percent parity). This was inter­
preted as a return to the policies of around 1940, which 
eventually lead to overabundance, the same situation that 
faced this nation in 1948 (Benedict, 1953: 483-484). 
Finally, henceforth, the Democrats were known as the party 
that subscribed to high support prices (Anderson, et al., 
1978: 379).
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Korean War Measures. As a result of legislation 
passed in June, 1952, to amend the Defense Production Act 
of 1950, basic commodities were supported at 90 percent 
parity or higher through April, 1953. This stipulation 
was contingent on producers not disapproving marketing 
quotas. July, 1952, brought another extension of 90 per­
cent parity for basic commodities. This legislation extended 
the high support prices to the 1953 and 1954 crops if the 
producers had not voted against marketing quotas. Which­
ever was higher, the parity price based on the old or new 
formula, was to be used as the effective parity price 
through 1955. Finally, extra long staple cotton had become 
a basic commodity for price support purposes under the 
July, 1952, legislation (Rasmussen and Baker, 1969: 82).
Agricultural Act of 1954. In January, 1953, Ezra
QTaft Benson became the Secretary of Agriculture. Benson 
was a proponent of eliminating government control of agri­
cultural programs. (Schapsmeier and Schapsmeier, 1975: xvii), 
but was willing to support low, flexible price supports (71). 
This philosophy was reflected in the Agricultural Act of 
1954 as price supports for basic commodities had a spread from 
82.5 percent parity to 90 percent for 1955. With the exception 
of tobacco, which had a 90 percent of parity price support.
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after 1955 basic commodities' price supports ranged from 
75 to 90 percent. Wool also received a price support of 
from 60 to 110 percent of parity as provided by the 
National Wool Act (Rasmussen and Baker, 1969; 83). To 
reduce surplus agricultural commodities, the Agricultural 
Trade Development and Assistance Act was passed in July,
1954. Better known as Public Law 480, this legislation 
permitted reducing surpluses by providing food aid to 
friendly less-developed nations (Cochrane and Ryan, 1976:
32) .
Agricultural Act of 1956. Agricultural surpluses 
continued to mount through 1956 despite lower, flexible 
prices. To offset this tide, the Eisenhower administration 
proposed the Soil Bank concept in the Agricultural Act 
of 1956. This plan involved two types of reserves that 
were to reduce acreage for production (Cochrane and Ryan,
19 76: 77). In return for farmers setting acres for the 
Acreage Reserve Program and Conservation Reserve, farmers 
received payments (Rasmussen and Baker, 19 69: 84). The 
Acreage Reserve Program was in effect from 1956 through 
19 58, the Conservation reserve from 1956 to 1972. Generally, 
both programs failed to solve agriculture's problem of 
overproduction (Cochrane and Ryan, 1976: 78).
Price Support Programs in the 1960s. The election 
of President Kennedy marked an abrupt reversal of the previous
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eight years of Republican agricultural philosophy. The 
Kennedy administration proposed to reduce the ever-present 
problem of surpluses by expanding surplus disposal channels 
and by relying on government control to reduce production.
Food distribution to the needy was expanded, a food stamp 
program was proposed, further expansion of Public Law 480 
was legislated, and Kennedy sought expanded commercial exports. 
A system of mandatory supply and management devices was pro­
posed to meet the problem of high surpluses. These plans were
long term; however, the immediate crisis was the excessive
gcost of storing government surpluses. To reduce the 1961 
corn and grain sorghum surpluses, the Feed Grain Act of 1961, 
was passed. This provided a price support of not less than 
64 percent parity for corn if producers participated in 
the program. Participation meant setting aside 20 per­
cent of the acres a producer had planted for these crops 
in 1959 and 1960. The program did reduce production, govern­
ment surpluses, and program costs despite an increase in 
corn yields in 1961. Dealing with the 19 62 crops, the 
Act of 1962 was enacted. With the exception of wheat, 
producers were to voluntarily divert acres of feed grains 
from production. In return, producers were to receive 
guaranteed price supports and land diversion payments 
(Cochrane and Ryan, 1976: 79-81; Rasmussen and Baker, 1969: 
84-85) . To determine whether wheat producers were to 
receive high support prices and mandatory acreage allotments
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or low support prices (at only 50 percent of parity) and 
no controls on the wheat acres to be produced, a referendum 
was held in 1963. The wheat producing voters soundly 
defeated the high support price and mandatory acreage 
allotment plan (Hadwiger, 1970: 250; Hadwiger and Talbot, 
1965: 299-315). The Agricultural Act of 1962 extended the 
1954 legislated National Wool Act for four more years and 
Public Law 480 through December 31, 196 4 (Rasmussen and 
Baker, 1969: 85). Finally, the Agricultural Act of 1964 
was passed. Proponents of high support prices and mandatory 
acreage allotments for wheat sought and received passage 
of legislation that provided support prices and voluntary 
compliance with acreage allotments for wheat; that is, no 
referendum could be used to mandate a wheat producer's 
participation in the wheat program (Cochrane and Ryan,
1976: 81-82).
The Food and Agricultural Act of 1965 marked the end 
of the Kennedy-Johnson agricultural legislation. It 
extended from 1965 through 1969 and was typified by low 
price supports, production payments, and land diversion 
payments. Commodities provided for included wheat, feed 
grains, milk, wool, and cotton (Cochrane and Ryan, 1976:
82; Rasmussen and Baker, 1969: 87-88). A new aspect of 
agricultural policy was the establishment of a cropland 
adjustment program. This permitted producers to convert 
cropland to land for the purpose of conserving water, soil,
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wildlife, forest resources, open spaces, national beauty, 
recreational resources, or to prevent air or water pollution. 
In return for these conversions, producers could enter 
into five- and ten-year contracts that provided for producer 
payments up to 40 percent of the value of the crop that 
could have been harvested from the land (Rasmussen and 
Baker, 1969: 88).
Agricultural Act of 1970. The 1970 Agricultural 
Act came at a time with a Republican in the White House who 
contended, just as Benson had in the 19 50s, that the less 
government intervention in farm programs, the better.
Included in President Richard Nixon's farm program were 
pricing and price supports near the market level. Direct 
income payments instead of high price supports were 
another feature.
New to the jargon of farm legislation was the con­
cept of "set-aside." Set-aside was really akin to the old 
Democratic method of keeping land out of production, but 
with a proviso that all other land could be planted to 
whatever the producer wanted. Producers who did set aside 
acres of wheat, upland cotton, and feed grains qualified 
for price supports.
Loans were another component of the Nixon legislation. 
Parity was still used to determine some price supports.
Small cotton producers received special attention. Other
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price supports involved milk, wool and mohair products, 
and beekeepers.
When the Agricultural Act of 1970 was signed, the 
set-aside and freedom-to-plant provisions remained intact. 
Loan and price support levels were very similar to those 
found in the 1965 act. A new feature provided a limitation 
of $55,000 per commodity per person on the amount of pro­
gram payments. The limitation applied to wheat, corn, 
and feed grains.
An aspect of the 1970 legislation that has had 
long-term influences on agricultural policy was a program 
for beekeepers. This program enabled beekeepers to collect 
for damages^^ done to their colonies that had been damaged 
or destroyed by harmful agricultural chemicals. Of course, 
beekeepers had to show proof of damages. The significance 
of this is that for the first time indemnities could be 
collected due to the side effects of farm production 
(O'Rourke, 1978: 138-142; Cochrane and Ryan, 1976: 83).
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973. 
Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz was basking in the 
limelight when the Agriculture and Consumer Protection 
Act of 1973 was passed. The Soviet grain deal of 1972 
had increased prices, and in many areas of the world improved 
economies provided optimism that there would be unprecedented 
demands for many of the United States commodities. Butz
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called for increased production in 1973, coupled with 
decreased set-aside payments to egg on increased production. 
Possible excessive surpluses in the future were ignored. 
This was the setting when the 1973 legislation was placed 
on the books.
Effective for the 1974 through 1977 crop years, the 
1973 legislation provided only incremental changes from the 
1970 act. For wheat, feed grains, and upland cotton there 
were no marketing quotas. Loans and target prices were 
applicable only to production from allotted acres. Set- 
aside provisions were included in the legislation. Unpre­
cedented disaster payments were permitted for allotment 
acres when there were abnormally low yields, crop failures, 
or natural disasters.
A revision of the 1970 legislation concerned limits 
on payments. The 1973 legislation specified the maximum 
amount of payment limitations that could be received was 
$20,000 per person (it was $50,000 per commodity per person 
in 19 70). As in 19 70, the Secretary of Agriculture was 
empowered to define "person."
A new concept "target price" was written into the 
legislation. The target price was used to determine the 
payments to be paid to individuals and were set by Congress. 
The difference between the target price of a commodity and 
the market equaled the payment (O'Rourke, 1978: 144-147).
In effect, the parity concept was dead. Congress would
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develop procedures for determining the loan rates and 
target prices for subsequent crop years. Congress estab­
lished the loan rates and target prices for 1973 without 
the use of a formula (Cochrane and Ryan, 1976: 84). As 
a result of needing to update the target prices for wheat, 
feed grain, cotton, and dairy products, the legislation 
provided for studies to determine the annual cost of 
production of these commodities (target prices were to 
vary as cost of production varied) .
A cotton insect eradication program was to be 
established even though scientists and economists said the 
program was not feasible. Public Law 480 was to continue 
to provide commodities to be sold, donated, or bartered. 
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands' residents 
became eligible for the Food Stamp program. Eligible 
strikers were to continue to receive food stamps. Finally, 
a new rural environmental program was established. This 
program permitted the Secretary of Agriculture to make 
contracts with eligible landowners and operators of land.
The contracts were to be for purchasing perpetual easements, 
conservation practices, and anti-pollution practices 
(O'Rourke, 1978: 148-150).
Emergency Farm Act of 1975. In August, 1973, the 
Agricultural and Consumer Protection Act was passed.
October, 1973, brought the Arab oil embargo. This lead to 
speculation that 1974 domestic agricultural costs would
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increase (e.g., fuel and fertilizer). On top of all this, 
prices of all major crops and livestock in the United States 
appeared to be declining. In this environment, the 
Emergency Farm Act of 1975 was passed and then vetoed by 
President Ford. Congress failed in its effort to override 
Ford's veto. Any pretense of attempting to protect the 
consumer was thrown to the wind with the development of the 
1975 legislation. The Congress set out to save farmers 
by seeking higher target prices for wheat, feed grains, 
and cotton. The idea was to provide farm income through 
government deficiency payments. Furthermore, the Secretary 
of Agriculture continued to call for full production, and 
set-asides were not required for 1975 through 1977 crop 
years. Loan rates and target prices were increased only 
modestly. Costs of production continued to increase for 
farmers. In the end. United States economy stabilized, 
as did farm prices and costs. Meanwhile, foreign demand 
became strong relative to United States farm products 
(O'Rourke, 1978; 152-155).
Food and Agriculture Act of 1977. The 1977 Food and 
Agriculture Act was one of the most technical and compre­
hensive measures considered by Congress recently. Included 
in the legislation were 18 separate titles. These involved 
subject matter such as commodity support programs, food 
stamp programs. Public Law 480, rural development, federal 
grain inspection, wheat research, and nutrition education.
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Events preceding this extensive legislation included 
tighter farm credit, depressed commodity prices, and 
prospects for a bumper wheat and corn crop at a time when 
surplus stocks were already excessive (Peters, 1978: 23).
The main controversy surrounding the 1977 farm bill 
was how high target prices should be. When the target 
price concept came into being in 1973, market prices were 
as high or higher than target prices; therefore, few 
deficiency payments were made to producers (Link, 1977:
2029). But, in 1977, farm prices were depressed, and 
Senate and House Agriculture Committees were seeking target 
prices higher than those of the 1973 legislation. There­
fore, the total outlays for deficiency payments as a result 
of the 1977 legislation were likely to be high. If 
deficiency outlays were too high, they would come into con­
flict with the guidelines for the total agricultural expendi­
tures as set according to procedures of the Budget and 
Impoundment Act of 1974 (Porter, 1978: 20-21) . Eventually, 
the final legislation provided for higher target prices.
Wheat, feed grains, cotton, and rice were to have 
target prices based upon cost of production through fiscal 
year 1981. Peanuts, soybeans, and sugar beets were also 
to receive preferential treatment. As usual, loans were 
provided for several commodities. Included in the cost of 
production for determining target prices was to be costs 
of machinery, overhead, and variables, but the cost of land
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was not included. Finally, the formula determining the 
cost of production for a crop year was to be based upon 
the previous two crop years' costs.
New to the 1977 legislation was the idea of producer 
held wheat and feed grain reserves. The Secretary of 
Agriculture could acquire the reserves by using three- to 
five-year price support loans. As a part of the deal, 
producers would be paid to store their commodities. Legis­
lated was a proposal for the President to negotiate with 
other nations to develop an international emergency food 
reserve. To assist producers in emergency situations, the 
Secretary of Agriculture was provided the authority to buy 
commodities when a domestic national disaster occurred, 
plus he could effectuate an emergency feed program in areas 
he determined required emergency attention.
As in the 1973 act, the beekeeper's indemnity program 
was extended; however, another indemnity program was imple­
mented. This program provided indemnity payments to dairy 
farms for losses caused by nuclear radiation, fallout, and 
residues of chemical or toxic substances. Milk price 
supports were maintained at a level of not less than 80 
percent of parity through March 31, 1979. Thereafter, milk 
price supports would be flexible, ranging from 75 to 90 
percent of parity. Wool and mohair received a price support 
as well.
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The controversial payment limitations had a change 
in the 1977 act. This legislation increased the payment 
limitations (it had been set at $20,000 per person in 1973) 
for wheat, feed grains, and cotton to $40,000 in 1978; 
$45,000 in 1979; and $50,000 in 1980 and 1981.
Allotments, disaster payments, set-asides, food 
stamps, and Public Law 480 also were all extended. The 
program providing for on-the-farm storage of grain was 
created. Under this program, which extends through 1981, 
a producer can receive up to $50,000, at a rate of no more 
than 7 percent interest, for construction, to equip, or to 
remodel structures for storage of dry or high moisture 
grain, soybeans, rice, and high moisture forage and silage 
(Link, 1977: 2030-2032).
Emergency Farm Act of 1978. Emergency farm legis­
lation, Public Law 95-279 passed in May, 1978 (U.S. 
Congress, 1978b: 138). Sparked by farmers' displeasures 
with low prices and the Carter administration's attitude 
toward the farm price problem (Wehr, 1978b: 815) , Congress 
provided increased target prices for wheat, feed grains, 
cotton, and rice if a producer had set-aside acres.
Included also was a new borrowing authority of $25 billion 
for the Commodity Credit Corporation, up from a previous 
authority of $14.5 billion (Wehr, 1978c: 1153).
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Food Distribution Policy
Food distribution policy is another major area of 
domestic agricultural policy. Included in this discussion 
are the earlier background of today's food stamp program, 
the contemporary program, and whether the food stamp program 
is a surplus food program or a welfare program.
The present-day food stamp program has a heritage 
which extends as far back as the Great Depression.
Originally, food commodities were directly distributed to 
needy people. Not until the food stamp program of 1939 to 
19 43 did this nation use a stamp program to provide food 
for eligible recipients. A full-fledged food stamp program 
was not implemented again until 1964. In general, food 
stamp legislation since 1964 has made the program more 
accessible to a larger number of people and has reduced 
this nation's emphasis of providing food directly to needy 
people.
Commodity Distribution in the Depression. As alluded 
to above, the food stamp program had its origin in the 1933 
Agricultural Adjustment Act which provided for the support of 
farm prices by limiting agricultural production and reducing 
surplus farm commodities on the market (Agricultural Adjustment 
Act, 1933-34; Sec. 2, 8, 32, 34). Faced with an overabundance 
of farm products, 1935 amendments to the 1933 act attempted to 
increase the consumption of farm products by authorizing the 
Secretary of Agriculture to purchase farm commodities or their
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products. The act's intent was to divert farm commodities 
or their products from the natural avenues of the market­
place. In order to carry out the intent, the Secretary of 
Agriculture was authorized to use 30 percent of the gross 
receipts from all customs (Agricultural Adjustment Act, 
1935-1936: Sec. 32, 774-775) . Needy families and school 
lunch programs were the main outlets for the purchased farm 
commodities (U.S. Congress, 1977a; 1-2) .
Early Food Stamp Plans. The first food stamp pro­
gram resulted from the continuing need to consume surplus 
farm products. From May, 1939, until early 1943, a food 
stamp program was undertaken to provide services for 
families on relief, WPA workers, and any other people 
deemed to be needy by relief agencies. This program ended 
because United States war efforts required increased food 
supplies. Ironically, this country's food supply became 
so depleted during World War II that food was rationed.
Pilot Programs of the 1960s. Not until 1961 was a 
food stamp program implemented again, and then on only a 
limited basis (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1962: 31). 
During the Kennedy administration, eight pilot programs 
were initiated to determine the effects of the food stamp 
program on surplus food supplies and on the spending habits 
of food stamp program recipients. More specifically, the 
pilot program was to indicate whether the supply of surplus
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farm products would decrease, whether the people involved 
in the pilot program would have improved nutritior,, and how 
the pilot program participants would spend their "bonus
dollars."12
Evaluations of the pilot program indicated that food 
stamp participants increased their purchases of meats, 
dairy products, poultry products, fruits, and vegetables. 
These expenditures were considered conducive to diminishing 
the agricultural problem of overproduction. Furthermore, 
more of the low-income families who participated in the 
program had "good" diets compared to those families which 
were not participating. (A good diet was one which provided 
a family with 100 percent or more of the needed amounts of 
each of eight nutrients recommended by the National Research 
Council [30]). Finally, the pilot program found that 85 
cents to 95 cents of every bonus dollar was spent on food 
items (U.S. Congress, 1977a: 5-6) ; the remaining 5 to 15 
percent was spent on nonfood purchases. Because the pilot 
program indicated that participants increased their food 
purchasing power, the pilot program was used as supportive 
evidence by the proponents of the Food Stamp Act of 1964 (3).
Food Stamp Act of 1964. The Food Stamp Act of 1964 
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to set up and 
finance a food stamp program when requested by a state. 
Furthermore, the act forbid the federal distribution of 
food to households wherever food stamp programs were
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operating. Finally, objectives of the legislation were to 
increase the use of surplus farm products and to improve 
the nutrition of low-income households (The Food Stamp Act 
of 1964, 1964: Sec. 4, 704).
Administratively, the 1964 food stamp program was 
designed so the federal government set the purchase criteria 
for issuing the allotted stamps and paid for the cost of 
the bonus stamps. State governments were required to 
establish income, resource, and assets requirements for 
determining eligibility for the food stamp program (The 
Food Stamp Act of 1964, 1964: Secs. 5, 15, 16, 704-709). 
Because eligibility was partially based on income and not 
just on whether an individual was receiving welfare, many 
more low income people became eligible. Another significant 
aspect of the legislation was requiring the states to set 
the income and asset criteria. A consequence of these 
state responsibilities was a wide range of eligibility 
regulations among the states; therefore, very low partici­
pation occurred in many areas of the nation (U.S. Congress, 
1977a: 3-4). Furthermore, federal guidelines created 
prohibitive purchase requirements. In 1967, hearings on 
malnutrition and hunger in America found that the Pood 
Stamp Program's purchase requirements for stamps caused 
financial hardship on many families. Thus, these families 
were unable to purchase food stamps (U.S. Congress,
1967: 217). Together, the federal and state actions
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caused an overall shortcoming of the food stamp program—  
inequitable allotment of food stamps (U.S. Congress, 1977a: 
4) .
Amendments of 1971. In 1971, several key changes 
occurred in the food stamp program. Briefly, these involved 
the following: national uniform income resource eligibility 
standards were implemented; purchase requirements were 
reduced for participants, especially low-income families; 
total coupon allotments were set at such levels that all 
participants were insured enough stamps so they could main­
tain nutritionally adequate diets; and state agencies were 
directed to seek out and inform eligible food stamp partici­
pants of the availability and benefits of the program (Food 
Stamp Act, Amendments, 1970: 2389-2394).
Overall, the 1971 amendments provided the framework 
for our present-day food stamp program. Perhaps even more 
significantly, the amendments meant more participants 
qualified for the program and increased benefits to partici­
pants. Also, the amendments decreased state control and 
increased federal participation. Together, these changes 
resulted in an increase of federal expenditures for the food 
stamp program (U.S. Congress, 1977a: 7).
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973. In 
1973, Congress extended the program through fiscal 1977 
(Agriculture and Consumer, 1973: Sec. 16, 248) and required 
all states to implement the program by fiscal year 1975
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(Sec. 10, 248) . At the time of the extension, the program 
cost $2.2 billion with 12.2 million participants, the 
latter being up from 9.4 million in fiscal year 1971 
("Efforts to Revise," 1976; 607).
Food Stamp Act of 1977. In 1977, Congress provided a 
four-year extension to the federal food stamp program. The 
most salient part of the legislation was the elimination of 
the requirement for food stamp participants to pay for 
a portion of their stamp allotment (U.S. Congress, 1977b: 
Secs. 4, 7, 8, 961-96 8). Total USDA food stamp program 
spending limit for fiscal 1980 has been set at $9.5 
billion. The fiscal 1980 participation was expected to be 
about 21 million recipients (Donnelly, 1980: 1312-1314).
Surplus Food Program or Welfare Program. The food 
stamp program has been described as serving the following 
purposes: income transfer, welfare supplementation, welfare 
equalization, supplemental social insurance, disaster 
relief, and supplemental feeding (Berry, 1978: 153).
Today, one of the main controversies surrounding the food 
stamp program is whether the program is a surplus food pro­
gram or a welfare program; consequently, there is consid­
erable debate whether the food stamp program should remain 
in USDA or transferred to the Department of Health and 
Human Services.
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Several reasons have been given for moving the food 
stamp program out of USDA. Charges have been made that 
several secretaries of agriculture have indicated a dislike 
for welfare. Families that accept food stamps generally 
have a need for other income as well. Functionally the food 
stamp program fits the Department of Health and Human 
Services better than USDA.
On the other hand, several reasons can be provided 
for keeping the food stamp program in USDA. Some groups 
seem to have better access to USDA than to the Department 
of Health and Human Services. Also, the support for a food 
stamp program may wane if its overt purpose becomes income 
maintenance rather than to supply food for hungry people.
A more selfish reason on the part of USDA and the agri­
cultural community in general for retaining the food stamp 
program does exist. If the program were to be transferred, 
the political clout of USDA would be considerably reduced; 
without the food stamp program, USDA would primarily be 
supported by producers, a diminishing clientele (Hadwiger, 
1976: 163).
Regulatory Policy
Regulatory policy has long been an aspect of agri­
cultural policy. Grain inspections, to be reviewed first, 
is one of USDA's most salient regulatory areas. Other 
major areas that are or have been regulated include livestock 
marketing, commodity exchanges, cooperatives and corporations, 
and farm labor.
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Meier (1979: 72) has stated regulatory policy con­
sists of "immediate coercion to prevent individual conduct 
from transcending acceptable bounds." He has adapted his 
definition from the classic work of Lowi (1972: 300) who 
developed a policy taxonomy that included distributive, 
constituent, redistributive, and regulatory policies. 
Agriculture regulatory policy is nothing new. Gaus and 
Wolcott (1940: 13) stated that when USDA became a Cabinet 
level entity with a secretary, USDA's primary function was 
research, but as early as 1889 the department's first 
regulatory functions had already been bestowed upon it. In 
fact, in 1873 USDA attempted to regulate the treatment of 
cattle that were being transported. This regulatory effort 
was directed toward the railroads, but the regulation was 
largely ignored (1940: 22).
Other early regulatory activities centered around 
the inspection and grading of agricultural products, with the 
primary benefactors being consumers. A concern for unclean 
American meat and unhealthy live animals was exemplified 
by the passage of the Meat Inspection Act of 1906. This 
act amended earlier legislation of 1890 and 1891. In the 
same year, the Food and Drugs Act was passed. Expressed 
in the legislation were concerns about the nutritive char­
acteristics of food. Did colored lard, for instance, have 
the same nutritional value as butter, or did sugar syrup 
have the same nutritional value as honey (Rasmussen and 
Baker, 1972: 14-16)?^^
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Grain Inspection. Two regulatory acts relating to 
grain were passed in 1916 and are in force yet today.
These were the Federal Warehouse and United States Grain 
Standards Acts.
The Federal Warehouse Act was in part an attempt by 
the federal government to enable farmers to use stored 
grain for credit. USDA was to license all warehouse 
operators. If their storage facilities for certain grains 
were adequate, they were financially responsible, and they 
would operate a warehouse that was open to all users. In 
return for complying with these regulations, the federal 
government would issue federal warehouse receipts to farmers 
that could be used as collateral for bank loans. This act, 
therefore, really had two objectives: to restore grain 
warehouses across the nation and to get the maximum use 
from a producer's credit potential (Benedict, 1953: 154-155), 
The states, under the supervision of the federal government, 
carried out state warehouse regulations until 1931 (U.S. 
Congress, 1976: 103). Since that time, federal warehouse
legislation has superseded state regulation. Today, the 
Federal Warehouse Act still provides for the federal 
licensing of employees of warehouse owners; therefore, 
federal regulatory activities are still supervisory in 
nature (105).
Due to total state regulation prior to 1916, there 
was varied application of warehouse and grain inspection
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regulations across the nation. But this patchwork regula­
tion was only a part of the problem. Of more concern was 
who controlled the inspection of grain prior to 1961. 
Generally, inspection was controlled by boards of trade.
These boards of trade were, in turn, controlled by purchasers 
at major terminal markets. Because of the influence of 
these purchasers, the inspection, handling, and grading of 
grain favored the purchasers of the major terminals.
Farmers and shippers had to accept lower grade assignments 
for their grain and resulting lower prices. The real losers 
were the ultimate purchasers, domestic or foreign, who 
received a poor quality commodity, but the commodity was 
indicated to have been inspected as a high grade of grain.
To insure the integrity of the United States grain 
inspection and grading system, therefore, the United States 
Grain Standards Act was passed. Under USDA supervision, 
state and private agency personnel were to be licensed to 
carry out the intent of the legislation. The act included 
requiring official inspection and certification of grain, 
prohibiting official inspection personnel from having 
conflicts of interest, and prescribing certain penalties 
for violations of the act. Until 1968, the act provided 
for inspection and certification of all grain, shipped or 
delivered for shipment, transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce channels. After 1968, only grain exports had to 
be inspected and certified (U.S. Congress, 1976; 100-102).
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Major amendments to the United States Grain Standard 
Act occurred in 1976. Initial impetus to revise the act 
stemmed from the illegal activities of individuals and 
companies in New Orleans and Houston in 1975. These illegal 
grains trading activities included bribing inspectors and 
shipping inferior grain ("Compromise Grain," 1976: 381) . 
Following these disclosures, the General Accounting Office 
conducted a thorough investigation of USDA's grain inspection 
system at the request of Senators Hubert Humphrey (D MN) 
and Thomas S. Foley (D WA). Among other conclusions, the 
General Accounting System found the grain inspection system 
should be brought under direct control of USDA, the 
inspectors should be under uniform standards, and USDA 
should have the authority to directly control elevators that 
could easily circumvent federal regulations due to complex 
operations (U.S. Congress, 1976: ii). The Congressional
Budget Office (1976; 14) cited conflict-of-interest cases
as a reason for tightening federal regulations. For 
example, one board of trade had six of its seven members 
on its inspection committee, and these same six individuals 
were officials or employees of grain firms being regulated 
by that inspection committee.
The Congressional Budget Office's report on USDA's 
grain inspection system was released in February, 1976; by 
October 21, 1976, the grain inspection system had been 
revised. Legislated was a new Federal Grain Inspection
43
Service within USDA that was to be headed by an adminis­
trator appointed by the President and approved by the 
U.S. Senate. With the exception of qualified state 
inspection agencies in place as of July 1, 1976, all direct 
inspection at export locations was to be conducted by federal 
inspection. This included all United States and Canadian 
ports handling United States grain. State, local, and 
private agencies, who had met federal requirements, were to 
inspect inland locations. These requirements forced 
agencies to have accurate record-keeping, rotate their 
inspectors, and recruit, train, and supervise based on set 
standards. To curb the conflict-of-interest situations 
inspection agencies could not (with one exception) have 
any connection with the grain trade. The exception was 
allowed if the head of the Federal Grain Inspection Service 
decided the conflict did not compromise the integrity of 
the inspection service. A report of such waivers had to 
be submitted to the House and Senate Agriculture Committees 
within 30 days of such actions. For the first time ever, 
any grain that was being sent to export locations from 
interior points and all grain that was to be sent overseas 
had to be officially weighed and certified by federal or 
state personnel. Elevator personnel could do the official 
weighing and certifying, but only under close physical 
supervision by official inspectors. Finally, the 1976 
legislation stipulated criminal and civil penalties for
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violations of the regulations. Criminal penalties 
included one year in prison and $10,000 in fines for the 
first offense and five years in prison and $20,000 in 
fines for any other violations. Civil penalties up to $75,000 
could be imposed for infringing the regulations ("Compromise 
Grain," 1976: 381-382).
Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921. The Packers and 
Stockyards Act of 1921 was another forerunner of present 
USDA regulatory activities. This insured that the free 
market system prevailed when marketing companies handled 
the farmer's product. An attempt was also made to have 
fair commissions paid by the producers. In general, the 
act tried to establish fair business practices (Rasmussen 
and Baker, 1972: 83). Originally the Packers and Stockyards 
Administration administered the 1921 act; however, in 1977 
its responsibilities were placed within the Agricultural 
Marketing Service, where it is today (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, 1977: 2).
Commodity Exchanges. Until recently, a major area of 
USDA regulation has been of private commodity exchanges. 
Originally commodity exchanges were a part of twelfth 
century medieval trade fairs. During that time, contracts 
for commodities specified what the quality of the commodities 
would be when they were delivered. These regulations rela­
tive to selling for subsequent delivery were eventually 
codified into the Law Merchant. In essence, the contracts
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of the twelfth century were the precursors of today's 
futures contracts.
Futures contracting was introduced in the United 
States from England, developing extensively from 1850 to 
1900 (Purcell and Valdez, 1976: 557-558). During that 
period, private associations such as the Chicago Board of 
Trade were established. As was the tradition of these 
private associations,^^ disputes concerning the buying and 
selling of commodities were to be resolved by merchants 
though, in theory at least, this private law making would 
be guided by the courts (Lurie, 1975: 1115-1116). The 
purpose of the futures market was to reduce the risk of 
producers, dealers, and processors when they bought and 
sold commodities. This was done by shifting the risk of 
price fluctuations to speculators using the process of 
hedging. Hedging permitted producers, dealers, and proces­
sors to contract in advance for the sale of their goods, 
thus reducing the uncertainty of price fluctuations. The 
speculator, on the other hand, accepted the risk of price 
fluctuation. He will buy commodities based upon the 
assumption of future prices, but will sell if he feels prices 
are going to be depressed. The speculator's profit or 
loss, therefore, is theoretically based on his ability to 
judge price movements (Purcell and Valdez, 1976: 559-560).
As was noted earlier, the development of commodity 
exchanges and the process of futures trading occurred
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rapidly during the last half of the 1800s. This was a 
result of the increased mechanization of farming, increased 
farm production, and the development of railroads and the 
telegraph. To accommodate this expanding production and 
ability to transport the commodities from the producer to 
the consumer, central marketing mechanisms were established—  
commodity exchanges (558) .
Theoretically, futures contracts should have 
alleviated fluctuating prices and risk in general for the 
producers, dealers, and processors, but especially for the 
producers. Life should have been less of a gamble for the 
farmer in the late 1800s, but this was not the case. The 
railroads and warehouses in Chicago joined together to 
squeeze the producers. That is, railroads would charge 
extra cents per bushel if grains were not stored in certain 
elevators. Eventually, farmers faced even more problems, 
as increased prices led to increased production which, in 
turn, caused low prices. To top it all off, the farmers 
resented being manipulated by the speculators^^ (Lurie,
1975: 1120-1121). From 1890 to 1920 farmers sought legis­
lation to regulate the exchanges, but to no avail (Lurie, 
1978: 103). The regulation of the exchanges was being 
sought as a result of the failure of the exchanges to 
regulate speculative excesses and abuses. In 1921, Congress 
enacted the Futures Act. This legislation was to regulate 
the commodity exchanges, but was declared unconstitutional
46
by the Supreme Court because it was based on the taxing 
power of the Constitution. The next year Congress passed 
the Grain Futures Act. This legislation was based on the 
interstate commerce clause and was upheld as being consti­
tutional. Though the act later proved to be ineffectual, 
the legislation attempted to regulate the exchanges rather 
than individual speculators. Requirements of the act 
included having the exchanges federally licensed and dec­
lared as contract markets. In order to meet their require­
ments, an exchange had to accept primary responsibility for 
controlling speculative excesses and abuses; the act also 
provided some government action if speculative excesses 
did occur. This legislation was ineffectual because there 
were no legal provisions specifically written to prevent 
abuses by large traders or to permit unethical practices 
(Purcell and Valdez, 1976: 558-559).
In 19 36, an attempt was made to strengthen regula­
tion of the exchanges, specifically to insure that they, 
in turn, would curb abuses and excesses of speculators.
The enactment contained provisions for federal regulators 
to limit the amount of future contracts traded each day. 
This measure was to provide a more open market based upon 
supply and demand; ironically, while this provision did 
stabilize the market, it also foreclosed any opportunity 
for the commodity market system to operate in a laissez 
faire atmosphere reminiscent of the nineteenth century.
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The Secretary of Agriculture was given broad powers to 
apply the regulations of the act. If there was a violation, 
either in the past or subsequent to the passage of the act, 
the Commodity Exchange Commission (composed of the Secretary 
of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, and Attorney General, 
or their designated representatives) could issue cease-and- 
desist orders. Such orders were subject to court appeal.
To induce compliance with federal regulations, the 1936 act 
stated that if a board of trade or a director, officer, 
agent, or employee of such a board refused to obey federal 
regulations, a fine of not less than $500 nor more than 
$10,00 0 could be levied. Furthermore, imprisonment of up 
to one year could be imposed separately or in conjunction 
with a fine. Finally, each day that an order was disobeyed 
was declared to be a separate offense. Clearly, the boards 
of trade were being closely regulated.
Not until 1968 were any major changes made in the 
regulating of commodity exchanges. Then, after rapid 
expansion of futures trading following World War II, Congress 
began to take steps to increase federal control even more.
The 1968 legislation permitted the Secretary of Agriculture 
to disapprove a rule or regulation created by an exchange 
that was in violation of federal law. To insure the intent 
of Congress was followed, the Secretary of Agriculture 
could force the exchanges to apply all regulations that 
were not disapproved by the Secretary. Finally, the
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exchanges had to preserve the minutes and records of all 
their business meetings so that the discussions held at the 
meetings could be clearly discerned.
Subsequent to the 1968 legislation, the futures 
market rapidly increased, both in amounts and monetary 
value. From 1968 to 1969, trading increased by 20 percent; 
from 1969 to 1970, there was an increase of 22 percent; 
from 1971 to 1972, trading was up to 26 percent. Finally, 
the 1973 volume increased by 40 percent. Meanwhile, the 
legal staff to carry out the enforcement of the federal 
regulations did not increase despite a doubling of futures 
contracts from 1969 to 1973. Concomitant with this was 
the reduction of enforcement of regulations by the exchanges. 
The attitude of the exchanges was that if they could not 
have internal control of affairs, then why bother to take 
the time to insure regulations were being met by speculators. 
To make matters even worse, there were clear violations 
involving illegal practices at exchanges. According to 
Barton (1976a:153) the Commodity Exchange Authority was 
dismantled because of alleged charges of having permitted 
commodity exchanges to corner the market on soybeans, 
wheat, and other commodities intermittently from 1972 to 
19 74. This caused prices to artificially increase. Barton 
also felt the reform movement within Congress during 1974 
might have contributed to the creation of the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission. The net result was the transfer
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of 300 personnel from USDA, formerly with the Commodity 
Exchange Authority, to the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, a new independent regulatory agency. This 
agency was to regulate all futures trading. USDA representa- 
tation on the commission was to be strictly a liaison who 
could attend and observe all proceedings, but was not to be 
a voting member of the commission. The new commission could 
by itself or through the Attorney General use litigation to 
seek redress from an exchange or individual who violated 
federal regulations. To assist in enforcement of the 
regulations, the act provided for penalties from $10,000 to 
$100,000 (Lurie, 1978: 104-107).
Dubnick (1979: 42) has speculated that as a result 
of the wholesale movement of employees from USDA to the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, conflict of interest 
would exist. But given the varied clientele of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (not just agricultural 
producers), the agricultural producers' special treatment 
would probably wane in the future.
Cooperatives and Corporations. Regulation in the form 
of not being coerced to do something has been a part of 
agricultural policy since the 1920s. In 1890, the Sherman 
Antitrust Act was passed, largely in response to the consoli­
dation of industrial corporations during the late 1800s.
To the chagrin of farmers, their marketing associations, 
which were created to overcome the organized buyers of farm
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commodities, were not excluded from the antitrust legis­
lation. With the passage of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 
1914, however, agricultural cooperatives that did not have 
capital stock or did not seek a profit became exempt from 
antitrust legislation. On the other hand, the Clayton 
Antitrust Act was not all that helpful to the farmer since 
most cooperatives had capital stock at the time. Not until 
passage of the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 were capital 
stock cooperatives exempted from antitrust legislation.
Since that time the courts have indicated that cooperatives 
are not totally exempt from antitrust legislation. Coopera­
tives themselves are precluded from forming monopolies.
Because of the definition of farmer in the 1922 
legislation, this act has had an effect on the farm structure. 
As then defined, a farmer was any person who worked to 
produce agricultural products. As a result, corporations, 
legally recognized persons, that produced farm products had 
been exempted from antitrust legislation (Hlavacek and 
Troll, 1978: 527-531). The net result of this legislation 
has been a burgeoning number of corporations, from 8,200 
in 1957 to 28,090 in 1974. Though the corporations 
accounted for only one percent of all farms, their sales 
accounted for 15 percent of total cash receipts. Since 
many farm corporations are family farm operated, it is 
unlikely that generally farmers would believe all corpora­
tions should be abolished. Data indicate that in 1969,
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of 21,500 farm corporations, 90 percent were family corpora­
tions (not more than 10 shareholders) . This 90 percent 
accounted for 80 percent of the corporate farm sales.
Farmers are concerned with the nonfarm interests that invest 
in farming, because the nonfarm interests use a corporate 
structure for profits, capital gains, tax breaks, or further 
control within the agricultural community.
In 1969, the remaining 10 percent of the farm corpora­
tions, 1,797, provided 2.9 percent of total corporate sales.
A majority of these corporations were located in California, 
Texas, and Hawaii. Some of these corporations were formed 
to insure a market for feed, breeding stock, or other farm 
inputs. Other corporations were formed to obtain a stable 
supply of raw materials for processing. This vertical 
integration^^ has served the purpose of providing conglom­
erates with increased market and coordinating power. Success 
in farming for the conglomerates has been best where pro­
ducts have been perishable, there has been a need for 
technical management and equipment, and a product's brand 
name has been involved (U.S. Congress, 1978a: 18-20).
O'Rourke (1978: 128-130) said the crux of the issue 
surrounding large conglomerates in agriculture is a concern 
with who will control agriculture. If family farms were on 
equal footing with conglomerates, everything would be fine, 
but family farms do not have as much survival power as do 
conglomerates. For instance, conglomerates have greater
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financial assets that could possibly permit them to with­
stand a poor crop year when an individual farmer would not 
have the same borrowing power. As noted earlier, conglom­
erates farm to control markets. If a processing firm owns 
a farm, therefore, not only is the market controlled, but 
comparative data on costs, returns, and yields are controlled, 
These comparative data, not as easily accessible as when 
there is a separation of producer and processor, can be 
monopolized by the firm in bargaining sessions with farm 
input suppliers. Finally, O'Rourke was concerned about 
family farmers since conglomerates would probably outbid 
family farmers for land. Whoever owned the land, as a 
consequence, would control agriculture.
Farm Labor. To a lesser degree, regulation has 
occurred in other areas of agricultural policy. Until 
December 31, 1947 (Craig, 1971: 54), USDA had at least 
partial responsibility for regulating Mexican labor. 
Responsibility for Mexican labor was originally located in 
USDA's Farm Security Administration; this responsibility 
was transferred to the War Manpower Commission in June, 1943 
(46-47). Regulation of the transporting and employment of 
farm workers was retained by the Farm Security Administra­
tion. The regulations required that adequate housing and 
health and sanitary facilities be provided for farm workers. 
But the authority of the Farm Security Administration was 
weakened by Public Law 45 because of pressure from farm
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organizations. This legislation limited the scope of 
federal control over farm labor and limited the appropria­
tions for the program; it also transferred the control of 
the program to the Extension Service. (The Extension 
Service became a part of the Conservation, Research and 
Education Agency in 197 8 [U.S. General Services Administra­
tion, 1978; 127]). The program terminated in 1947 (Coalson, 
1977: 67-69).
Other Regulated Agricultural Concerns. Pesticides, 
which came under control of the Environmental Protection 
Agency in 1970, were originally a responsibility of USDA 
(Dubnick, 1979: 31-33). Other regulatory policy, though 
never agricultural policy in the sense that it was a 
responsibility of USDA, has affected the agricultural 
community. Among these are regulations concerning the use 
of federal lands (15-21), minimum wage requirements, and 
workers' health and safety (26-30).
Conservation Policy
Conservation policy for USDA formally had its major 
beginnings during the Depression years; soil erosion due to 
winds was USDA's concern at that time. More recently, 
conservation efforts by USDA have involved developing drain­
age systems, stripcropping practices, irrigation systems, 
flood control projects, forest conservation, and resource 
conservation and development. These topics will be 
discussed in this section.
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Beginnings of the Soil Conservation Service. A con­
centrated effort to curb soil erosion resulted from dust 
storms in 19 34 and 1935. These storms picked up topsoil 
in the central states of the nation and deposited it as far 
away as the Atlantic coast. In April, 1935, a permanent 
national agency, the Soil Conservation Service, was 
established. It was to provide technical assistance to 
farmers to mitigate erosion. There had been smaller pro­
grams before, but this marked an important expansion of 
conservation efforts.
Within the Bureau of Chemistry and Soils, in USDA, 
agronomic problems were dealt with as early as 1894. That 
same year, this bureau published a farmer's bulletin docu­
menting techniques for preventing soil erosion. More 
evidence of a concern for erosion came with the development 
of a division of soil erosion in the Bureau of Chemistry 
and Soils in 1908. Another bulletin on erosion was pub­
lished by USDA in 1917 (Morgan, 1965; 1-2). Though it was
17intended to be in USDA, the Soil Erosion Service was 
set up under the Department of Interior in 1933. Thus, 
a national soil erosion program was in place; it was to 
have two objectives. Demonstrations were to be used to 
show that erosion on croplands could be curbed, and the 
underpinnings of a permanent program were to be developed 
(Morgan, 1965: 10-11).
The Soil Conservation Service took over soil erosion 
responsibilities from the Soil Erosion Service. From the
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experience of the Soil Erosion Service, it became apparent 
that soil erosion demonstration projects could not practi­
cally be provided for all communities across the nation; 
farmer participation would be required to insure continua­
tion of soil erosion adaptation. Using Texas wind erosion 
districts as models, USDA developed farmer-controlled soil 
conservation districts in 1934. Through these local 
governing units, the Soil Conservation Service has adminis­
tered its programs.
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936. 
Another effort to control erosion was made by USDA through 
provisions of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment 
Act of 1936. Farmers were paid on a cost-sharing basis 
for using soil-conserving techniques. Soil surveys have 
been a useful tool for conservationists. Once these surveys 
have been completed, soil conservationists can then 
develop plans as to what means soil conservation (for 
example, a drainage system, stripcropping, etc.) should be 
used on a tract of land.
In the 1950s, drought and wind erosion again became 
a problem for the Great Plains Region. To combat this, 
legislation was enacted that permitted the Secretary of 
Agriculture to contract with farmers to use acreage for 
grassland rather than low-grade cropland. These contracts 
were to be no longer than ten years; the Soil Conservation 
Service was to provide technical assistance on a cost-sharing 
basis.
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Agricultural Conservation Program. Under the Agri­
cultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, the 
Agricultural Conservation Program was developed in 1936. 
Provisions of the program included cost-sharing for farmers 
in the liming and fertilization of land shifted to grass, 
planting vegetative cover, and developing irrigation systems 
designed to conserve water and reduce erosion. Locally 
elected farmer committees created the plans that eventually 
were submitted to state and national levels for approval. 
This program came into conflict with the Soil Conservation 
Program because of the overlap in their efforts. More and 
more the funds for this program have been used to conserve 
water, reduce water pollution, preserve wildlife, and for 
recreation and beautification. Finally, in 1971, the 
program was renamed the Rural Environmental Assistance 
Program.
Watershed Protection. Conservation also has included 
watershed protection. In 1954, the Watershed Protection 
and Flood Prevention Act was passed. This enabled local 
organizations to apply for federal assistance for small 
watershed protection and flood control projects. These 
plans required state approval. Even more extensive assis­
tance was provided through technical assistance, loans, or 
cost-sharing to build flood-preventing dams. These have 
formed reservoirs for many locales.
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Dam Projects. Dam projects have been interesting 
because of the amount of inter-agency cooperation. Reservoir 
construction has been the responsibility of the Soil Conser­
vation Service. Forestry responsibilities have been directed 
by the Forest Service. Farmers Home Administration has 
provided loans to local organizations. Water and sediment 
analysis has been provided by the Agricultural Research Ser­
vice (this became a part of the Conservation, Research, and 
Education Agency in 1978 [U.S. General Services Administra­
tion, 1978: 127]), and economic impacts of projects have 
been determined by the Economic Research Service (this also 
became a part of the Conservation, Research, and Education 
agency in 1978 [U.S. General Services Administration, 197 8: 
127]).
Forest Conservation. Protection of our nation's
forests has rested with the Forest Service in conjunction
with the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Manage- 
18ment. Conservation practices that have been carried out 
by the Forest Service include selling mature timber to 
private interests, replanting of areas damaged by forest 
fires, and controlling grazing. Care has been taken to 
restore lands damaged by domestic use such as road building 
or mining activities. Improvement of wildlife habitat 
has been carried out to protect game and fish; management 
of hunting and fishing also has been used as a conservation 
practice to protect game and fish.
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Resource Conservation and Development. Finally, 
resource conservation and development has been conducted by 
USDA. This program has involved recreational development, 
irrigation, drainage, and flood control projects, or timber 
and grassland work. Cost-sharing has been provided to local 
communities to carry out the projects. The function of the 
program has been to encourage economic development of rural 
communities through the wise use of natural resources. As 
with the reservoir projects mentioned earlier, these develop­
ment projects have involved several USDA agencies, specifi­
cally the Soil Conservation Service, Forest Service, Economic 
Research Service, and Extension Service (Rasmussen and Baker, 
1972: 88-99) .
Education Policy
Long a part of USDA's undertakings, education for the 
public has been presented in several ways. One means is 
through the Extension Service. Other sources of education 
via USDA include public information made available by the 
Consumer and Marketing Service, plus formal education for 
federal career employees and blind people. In this section, 
each of these is discussed.
Extension Service. Primary responsibility for educa­
tion in USDA has rested with the Extension Service (Rasmussen 
and Baker, 1972: 84). Created by the Smith-Lever Act of 
1914, this agency began agricultural education by using
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county agents. At its beginning, the Extension Service 
was closely tied to the American Farm Bureau Federation. 
County agents felt it was necessary to organize farmers 
into farm bureaus so that farmers could compete with 
organized business and labor.
Financing of the Extension Services was critical to 
the American Farm Bureau Federation because frequently 
state aid for the Extension Service was based upon farm 
bureaus being organized in a locale, with the county agent 
working through the farm bureau. In the early stages, 
therefore, the American Farm Bureau dominated the Extension 
Service in many instances (5-7).
Extension programs have been centered around agri­
cultural production, marketing, home economics, nutrition, 
4-H programs, and rural development. The procedures have 
involved federal Extension Service personnel assisting 
state extension specialists; in turn, state specialists 
have aided individuals and county and area agents. Popu­
larity of the extension concept has grown to the extent 
that it has been adopted in foreign countries where govern­
ment specialists offer technical advice to farmers.
Public Information. Public education has also been 
offered in the form of public information. Sources of 
public information have included the Consumer and Marketing 
Service. This agency has produced data on supply, demand, 
and agricultural prices. Office of Information specialists
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have reached the public through visual presentations, 
press releases, radio and television programs, and publi­
cations. A National Agricultural Library (in 1978, this 
became a part of the Conservation, Research, and Education 
Agency [U.S. General Services Administration, 1978: 127]) 
located at Beltsville, Maryland, has served both domestic 
and international needs relative to agricultural literature.
Other Educational Endeavors. In 1921, USDA began a 
Graduate College. This institution has provided contemporary 
courses for federal career employees. Correspondence 
courses have also been available as well as educational 
television courses. For the blind student, a nature trail 
was initiated in 1968 in Washington, D.C. Also, in 
Colorado a trail for blind people was developed. Finally, 
some publications of USDA's library have been printed in 
braille.
Research Policy
Research undertakings have long been a part of USDA's 
activities. These research efforts may be described as many 
and varied. After reviewing USDA's early research efforts, 
plant, animal, insect pollution, food and nutrition, and 
utilization research will be discussed. The final portion 
of this section relates research adaptation, forest research, 
overseas research, economic research, and research supporting 
cooperatives. Finally, the pros and cons of USDA's research 
will be briefly stated.
61
Early Beginnings. As with USDA's regulatory heritage, 
the roots of its research reach back to this nation's early 
days. Formally USDA was established in 1862, but agricul­
tural research actually began with the colonists heeding 
advice from the American Indian on how to plant corn, beans, 
and potatoes. Both George Washington and Thomas Jefferson 
performed experiments on their farms. Washington, in fact, 
developed a strengthened strain of wheat. Benjamin Franklin
persuaded the State Department to have its overseas consuls
19send back seeds.
The decade of 1830 to 1840 was critical to the new 
awareness for the need of increased food production and a 
need for federal aid for the agricultural community. During 
this decade railroads linked the producer to the population 
centers of the East. Furthermore, the threshing machine, 
mower, reaper, and steel plow were invented during this 
time (Moore, 1967: 3-5). Finally, from 1837 to 1842 the 
worst depression prior to the Civil War occurred. It 
crippled the farm community. The depression's severity was 
marked by interest rates as high as 30 percent.
Up to 1862, agricultural interests were located in 
the Patent Office. But agriculture had been given new 
status in 1839 with the creation of the Agricultural Division 
of the Patent Office. That same year the first federal 
appropriation to agriculture was made in an amount of $1,000 
(Harding, 1947: 9-10). Since appropriations at that time
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were available until spent, another appropriation did not 
come until 1842. Appropriations from 1842 to 1845 were in 
amounts of $1,000, $2,000, $2,000, and $5,000, respectively 
(Moore, 1967: 5). No appropriation was made in 1846, in fact, 
work was momentarily discontinued. Beginning with renewed 
funding in 1847, appropriations were never terminated again. 
From 1837 through 1840, Commissioner of Patents Henry L. 
Ellsworth requested funds for collection and distribution 
of seeds, plants, and statistics. In 1841, he emphasized 
the need for the use of chemistry in improving crop produc­
tion (Harding, 1947: 10-11). It was not until 1856, how­
ever, that experimentation was actually mentioned in an 
appropriations bill. In sum, the actual agricultural 
scientific work done in the Patent Office from 1839 to 1862 
was limited to distribution of seeds and publications 
compiled from collected data. The Division of Agriculture's 
greatest contribution during this period was making this 
nation aware of the need for increased knowledge about 
farming (Moore, 1967: 5-6).
Plant Research. Plant research is one of the 
primary research areas of USDA. The primary agency that 
has had this responsibility is the Agricultural Research 
Service. But cooperation with agricultural colleges and 
state experiment stations has also been required to carry 
out plant research. Examples of successful research efforts 
have included development of red winter wheat at the Kansas
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State experiment station and discovery of phytochrome, a 
plant protein molecule.
Animal Research. To improve dairy research, USDA 
developed its own dairy herd. Research results indicated 
that breeding with certain sires increased milk production. 
Other animal research has been done to determine what 
poison weeds exist. This has been especially important to 
sheep raisers.
Insect Research. Insect control had long been an 
area of research interest for USDA. The heydays of insect 
control began with the development of the insecticide DDT 
in 1939 (Rasmussen and Baker, 1972: 63-65). With the 
advance of the environmental movement in 1960, however, the 
uncontrolled use of insecticides began to wane. Passage of 
the National Environmental Act in 1969 ended the regulation 
of agricultural chemicals by USDA. The Environmental Pro­
tection Agency became the sole guardian of agricultural 
chemicals (Maney, 1978: 163-164).
Pollution Research. USDA began to analyze crops, 
soils, and water for pesticide contents in the early 1960s. 
Air pollution came under scrutiny in the late 1960s. The 
Agricultural Research Service, Forest Service, and state 
experiment stations have examined the ramifications of air 
pollution for plants and trees.
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Food and Nutrition Research. Food and nutrition 
research received early support from Wilbur 0. Atwater in 
1869, who was the first director of the Office of Experiment 
Stations. Atwater created a program for food and nutrition 
research in USDA and the state experiment stations. It 
has been primarily conducted by the Agricultural Research 
Service. This agency has analyzed the contemporary diets 
of Americans and developed nutritious foods; it has also 
helped eliminate food hazards. An example of Agriculture 
Research Service's work was determining the nutritional 
qualities of fats and carbohydrates.
Utilization Research. An effort very beneficial to 
the producer has been utilization research. This has 
improved the likelihood that crops will be marketed by 
aiding in development of alternative outlets. Research has 
been conducted at five regional laboratories, four of these 
authorized by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. The 
fifth laboratory was begun in 1964 in Georgia. Other 
research efforts have been located in field stations at a 
dozen other locations. Several examples of this type of 
research were the development of potato flakes, penicillin, 
and frozen orange juice concentrate.
Research Adaptation. Adapting technology to agri­
culture practices has been a part of USDA's research effort, 
too. The laser beam has been used to agriculture's advan­
tage for installing subsurface drains, construction of open
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ditches, and leveling land. An earth-removing machine, 
for instance, can cut at the desired soil grade level based 
upon the laser beam's detection of the desired grade.
Aerial photography also has become a part of USDA's arsenal 
as has infrared photography and remote sensing. Remote 
sensing, for example, has been used to determine estimated 
crop production and for detecting forest tree diseases 
(Rasmussen and Baker, 1972; 67-72).
Forest Research. Forest research began in 1876.
At that time, $2,000 was appropriated to study how to pre­
serve and renew forests. In the more recent past, forest 
research has taken place in regional experiment stations; 
these were begun in 190 8, strewn throughout the United States 
and Puerto Rico. Research has also been conducted at 
forestry schools and state agricultural experiment stations, 
which were begun at the turn of this century. The McSweeney- 
McNary Act of 1928 served as the backbone legislation for 
cooperative research efforts among private organizations, 
universities, forestry schools, and state experiment stations 
(Frome, 1971: 131-134). Other research and educational 
activities have been funded under the aegis of the Mclntire- 
Stennis Act of 1962 (Rasmussen and Baker, 1972: 73).
Like so many other areas, forest research can be 
viewed as having both basic and applied components. Basic 
research has focused on genetics, fire, insects, diseases, 
tree physiology, soils, and water. Research having a more
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applied thrust has been directed toward wood utilization 
and air and water pollution. Control of air pollution 
emitted by the Tennessee Valley Authority's Kingston steam 
plant, for example, resulted from work carried out to curb 
the decline of eastern white pine trees. Exotic trees have 
been developed that have the characteristic of clean, 
straight trunks, producing up to 40,000 to 50,000 board 
feet of timber per acre (Frome, 1971: 131-139).
Overseas Research. Research conducted overseas by 
USDA was begun in 1958. Financing for this research has 
been provided through foreign currencies derived from the 
sale of surplus commodities. This research has included 
developing markets for this nation's agricultural products 
and basic research. Basic research projects have been under­
taken in agriculture, forestry, agricultural economics, and 
human nutrition. The actual research has been carried out 
by foreign agricultural colleges and experiment stations 
using limited United States grant monies. Primary respon­
sibility for overseas research has been with the Agricultural 
Research Service.
Economic Research. Economic research has been carried 
out by the Economic Research Service, previously called the 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Of all of USDA's research 
agencies, this agency has been involved in the most contro­
versy. It was especially subject to attacks in the 1930s
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and 1940s when the agency examined the agricultural power 
structure and the values of the industry.
Forecasting research, also called outlook work, has 
been one facet of the Economic Research Service's under­
takings. This research has provided farmers with the 
results of economic research that has permitted them to 
determine what to produce and market in the near future. 
Outlook conferences have been attended by agribusiness, 
state college, farm organization, and farm press representa­
tives since 1923.
Production research has aided producers in identifying 
the best production techniques for commodities. As a part 
of this, the Economic Research Service has concerned itself 
with vertical integration, the control of a product from 
production to consumer by one firm or person. Also, economies 
of size in farming have been studied.
Several other economic research efforts have been 
conducted by USDA. Economic development research has 
stressed human needs and economic opportunities. Studies 
analyzing minority groups, population shifts, standards of 
living, community services, and employment opportunities 
have been exemplary of economic development research.
Economic research also has examined the use of natural 
resources.
On an international level, economic researchers 
strove to walk a tightrope between commodity needs and
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international development. More to the point, they have 
tried to measure the impact of United States trade on 
recipient countries' economies.
Research for Cooperatives. Agricultural research 
supporting cooperatives has been a formal function of USDA 
since 1913 and has assisted rural people in organizing such 
cooperatives. These research undertakings have examined 
marketing associations, farm supply cooperatives, and ser­
vice organizations. Generally, research projects have been 
geared to the requests of cooperatives themselves. The 
advantages and disadvantages, for example, of consolidating 
several dairy cooperatives might be studied.
Statistics. The Statistical Reporting Service was 
created in 1961 to disseminate statistics about production 
and distribution of food and fiber. As noted earlier, the 
government appropriated $1,000 to collect agricultural 
statistics. A Division of Statistics was authorized in 
1863 to provide statistics on major crop production, live­
stock numbers, and farm prices. Then, the Crop Reporting 
Board was set up in 1905; this became a part of the Statis­
tical Reporting Service in 1961 (Rasmussen and Baker, 1972; 
73-79) . Finally, in 1977 the Statistical Reporting Service 
was merged into the new Economic Research and Statistics 
Service (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1977: 2).
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Evaluating USDA's Research. USDA research has not 
been without its friends and foes. One of the classic works 
to support USDA research efforts is Harding's Two Blades of 
Grass. He stated early in his book that "research performed 
by Department of Agriculture scientists has been almost 
incredibly valuable to the American public, both in scienti­
fic advancement and in monetary terms" (1947: viii-ix). 
Hightower (1973: 22) on the other hand, raised the crucial, 
basic point as to whether the achievements of USDA's 
research outweigh the failures. He thought not. Hightower 
went so far as to indict the land grant colleges' mechani­
zation research as "designed intentionally" to force most 
farmers off their land, for the benefit of agribusiness (37). 
Some work has been done on the systems involved in the 
agricultural research establishment (public and private 
organizations). McCalla (1978: 87-88) believes that at the 
project, program, and department levels funding beyond the 
general operating costs will dictate to a large extent what 
kind of research is conducted by the establishment, that is, 
what commodities will be researched or whether it will 
be basic or applied research. Agencies such as the 
National Science Foundation, Environmental Protection Agency, 
or commodity groups, foundations, and firms are likely to 
have the funds to provide flexible resources for the 
research organizations. Because of this funding capacity, 
these groups will probably have the most influence on
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agricultural research at the micro level. Finally, whether 
Hightower or Harding is correct is one question, but Olson 
(1978: 248-249) has also raised a very critical point.
Olson contends that USDA's basic and applied research are 
for naught if policy research is not conducted. Policy 
research would deal with the consequences of technological 
advancements, that is, changes in social and value structures.
Rural Development Policy
Rural development policy began during the Depression 
and continues today. Originally begun to assist poverty 
stricken farmers, today rural development policy encompasses 
both farm and nonfarm populations. Discussion on rural 
development policy will be on: programs from the 1930s 
through the present day, concluding with the likelihood of 
success of today's rural development policies.
Federal Emergency Relief Administration. Rural 
development policy has expanded since its formal beginnings 
outside of USDA's authority in 1934. At that time, the 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration provided federal 
level support for rural development. In its infancy, this 
nation's rural development policy was concerned with the 
poverty of farmers. The entire nation was fighting poverty 
and depression. Emphasis of the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration was not solely on short-term relief, as had 
been the case of relief programs before the agency's
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establishment, but rather on long-term rehabilitation. 
Indicative of this philosophy was a program of loans and 
grants to farmers that were to supplement direct payments. 
This was begun in 1934 (McConnell, 1953: 85-86). In 1933, 
a Division of Subsistence Homesteads had been created in 
the Department of Interior. This program enabled poor 
families, agricultural and nonagricultural, to be given 
land to build homes on. Handicrafts and other means of 
supplementing income were also taught to the program parti­
cipants (Benedict, 1953: 326-327).
Resettlement Administration. Later, in 1935, yet 
another agency quasi-independent of USDA was set up. This 
was called the Resettlement Administration, and to it were 
transferred responsibility for the loans and grants program 
and the subsistence homestead project. Administrative 
materials for the new agency came from three sources: rural 
rehabilitation from the Federal Emergency Relief Adminis­
tration, subsistence homesteads from the Department of 
Interior, and land policy from USDA. Primary focus of 
this agency was on transplanting farmers from marginally 
productive lands to good lands that could provide them with 
a living. Limiting the success of this program was the 
availability of land and the constant tug of war among the 
agencies that provided administrative support (McConnell, 
1953: 86-87) . Eventually, the Resettlement Administration 
dismantled due to the personality of its director, Rexford
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20Tugwell (88); too much presidential guidance at the 
expense of Congress; and charges that the program was too 
socialistic (Benedict, 1953: 327).
Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenancy Act of 1937. At the 
termination of the Resettlement Administration, the Bankhead- 
Jones Farm Tenancy Act of 1937 was passed. This legislation, 
to many people, provided the legislative base for a rural 
poverty program. Included in the legislation was authori­
zation for short-term rehabilitative loans and for retire­
ment of submarginal land programs. The primary emphasis 
was on enabling tenants to become landowners. But the 
purposes of the legislation were doomed from the beginning. 
There were no appropriations for the rehabilitation portion 
of the legislation; the other two aspects of the act received 
only meager funding. The Farm Security Administration was 
constituted shortly after the passage of the Bankhead-Jones 
Farm Tenancy Act; this agency then took the place of the 
Resettlement Administration (McConnell, 1953: 88).
Farm Security Administration. Albertson (1961: 272)
has stated the Farm Security Administration "was the aorta
of the New Deal heart." The goal of the Farm Security
Administration was to remedy the disparity between the
prosperous and poor farmers. To achieve this goal, the
program primarily involved extension work in the traditional
sense. Other undertakings included supervising loans and
21small grants, farm debt adjustments, and organizing market­
ing and purchasing cooperatives.
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A small effort of the Farm Security Administration 
was the farm loan program. Loans were provided for 40 
years at 3 percent interest. This was to enable tenants 
to purchase family size farms. Given that this program 
had originated in the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenancy Act and 
referred to the shibboleth "family size farm," the entire 
Farm Security Administration was frequently defended by 
discussing the farm loan program.
Though eventually considered a failure, the resettle­
ment projects were an attempt to do something for other 
than just those families on small farms. The Greenbelt 
project attempted to assist in suburban housing and community 
development. Another kind of resettlement project involved 
placing industrial workers in communities where they could 
augment their income by part-time farming. Attempts were 
even made to place industry in the rural areas. Most of 
these industrial placement projects were cooperatives, for 
the purpose of buying and selling. Individuals who opposed 
these cooperatives said they were similar to Soviet kolkhozes,
Finally, the Farm Security Administration operated 
a program for migratory labor. This was very limited, 
providing only minimum shelter and sanitary facilities to 
migratory labor, primarily in the West. The importance of 
this program was its acknowledgment of a rural population 
that probably never would settle on family-size farms 
(McConnell, 1953: 90-93). McConnell noted that the signifi­
cance of the Farm Security Administration was not its array
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of programs, but "the sheer fact that the agency held the 
torch of rural welfare" (90).
The Farm Security Administration had its death knell 
in 1946 (McConnell, 1953: 111). This happened after inten­
sive lobbying against it by many farm interest groups, 
especially the American Farm Bureau Federation. The program 
offended those that wanted to maintain indebted farmers in 
the North and West and poor blacks and whites in the South 
for cheap labor (Albertson, 1961: 273) . During the days of 
the Farm Security Administration, concerns for rural poverty 
was not a strong suit for the American Farm Bureau Federa­
tion. In fact, during the 1930s and early 1940s, rural 
poverty was mentioned by the American Farm Bureau Federation 
most often when the group referred to government support of 
prices (McConnell, 1953: 98). A thorn in the side of the 
American Farm Bureau Federation was its lack of influence 
over the Farm Security Administration, despite the Farm 
Security Administration and its predecessor, the Resettle­
ment Administration (only from December 31, 1936, to 
September 11, 1937 [Gaus and Wolcott, 1940: 232]) having 
been in USDA (1953: 125).
Partially replacing the Farm Security Administration 
in 1946 was the Farmers Home Administration. This new 
agency continued two programs of the dismantled Farms 
Security Administration. The farm ownership program, begun 
under the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenancy Act of 1937 and the 
water facilities program were transferred from the Farm
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Security Administration; the Farmers Home Administration 
also acquired responsibility for production loans (McConnell, 
1953: 111).
Eisenhower Administration's Program. During the 
administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower, a rural development 
program was created. The program strove for equal opportunity 
for the poor. USDA's Cooperative Extension Service coordinated 
the program (Rasmussen and Baker, 1972: 120). Decentrali­
zation was a characteristic of the program as local develop­
ment committees directed existing agencies in efforts to 
increase farm output, job possibilities, vocational education, 
and farm output for defense purposes (O'Rourke, 1978: 188). 
Cochrane and Ryan (1976: 33) have assessed the impact 
Eisenhower's rural development had as "small."
Kennedy Administration's Program. Under President 
John F. Kennedy rural poverty was given some attention—  
more than during the Eisenhower administration, but less 
than during President Lyndon Johnson's administration.
Kennedy's Rural Area Development program was similar to 
Eisenhower's Rural Development Program. In addition, how­
ever, there were two other programs. An Area Development 
Administration program was created to provide loans, 
technical assistance, and retraining for commercial and 
industrial enterprises. The other program was the Acceler­
ated Public Works Program. This was to provide the rural 
poor public employment. An important philosophical change
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occurred during the Kennedy years. Poverty riddled farmers 
and their plights came to be recognized as distinct from 
commercial farmers and their problems. Since that time, 
federal assistance for commercial farmers has been based on 
some criterion other than poverty.
Johnson Administration's Program. President Lyndon 
Johnson’s undertakings to stymie rural poverty were primarily 
through the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Under this 
enactment, youth programs, community action programs, and 
work assistance programs were the primary foci. The 
meagerness of Johnson's war on rural poverty is reflected 
in the portion of the Economic Opportunity program's first 
budget. Of $1 billion appropriated, only 4 percent was for 
rural assistance.
Rural Development Act of 1972. Under Presidents 
Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, the Office of Economic 
Opportunity was dismantled, beginning in 1969 and ending 
in 1975. Nixon had assumed the real motive for Johnson's 
community action programs was to increase Democratic 
influence at the local level; consequently, he was highly 
suspicious of its intent. Thus, the demise of the Office 
of Economic Opportunity was anticipated from the very 
beginning of the Nixon administration (O'Rourke, 1978; 189- 
190). Rural poverty, however, was not ignored at this 
time. In 1972, the Rural Development Act became law. Under 
the administration of USDA, authority was provided for
77
increased research for small farmers. Loans and grants 
also were to be given to community corporations, coopera­
tives, nonprofit organizations, profit-making organizations, 
and government agencies that worked with the rural dis­
advantaged. The act was a shift from USDA's post war support 
for agribusiness (Marshall, 1974; 84).
Despite the promise of the 1972 Rural Development 
Act there was little coordination of rural development 
efforts through 1977. Senator Dick Clark (D lA) described 
rural development in 1977 as having important shortcomings 
when he stated:
The fact remains that a number of important 
authorities of the act have not been implemented 
at all, including the authority for funding 
local comprehensive planning . . . .
Other authorities have never been adequately 
funded and have huge backlogs of applications 
ceilings. Administrative support and technical 
assistance are bottlenecks for programs even 
when funds are adequate.
Perhaps equally important with adequate funding, 
the programs have never been woven together 
very well in our judgment. In concept at least, 
the business and industrial loans, the community 
facilities loan and grant program and the housing 
programs make a package and would be designed 
most effectively in concert. Comprehensive 
planning around new jobs and increased require­
ments for facilities and housing would lead to 
smoother and more effective development . . .
Also we have made little real progress in 
reaching the poor with these programs (U.S.
Congress, 1977c: 2-3).
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Present-Day Program. Even in 197 8, rural develop­
ment continued to be administered through several entities. 
For example, housing programs were administered by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, USDA, and the 
Veterans Administration. Business loan programs were con­
ducted by the Department of Commerce's Economic Development 
Administration, USDA, and the Small Business Administration. 
Likewise, funding for community facilities could be acquired 
through use of general revenue sharing funds, Department of 
Housing and Urban Development community development block 
grants, or USDA's 5 percent community development loan 
program (U.S. Congress, 1978c: 3). The extent of funding 
for rural development by agencies other than USDA was not 
necessarily small in amount. For fiscal years 1975 through 
19 77, for instance, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development provided $1,522 million for nonmetropolitan 
areas. Of this three-year amount, $614 million was allocated 
to communities less than 10,000 in population (37).
Some of Senator Dick Clark's charges, however, were 
being answered. As early as 1977, the Carter administration 
formally had reorganized USDA so the Rural Development Ser­
vice was placed in the Farmers Home Administration. More­
over, the reorganization called for a name change, and that 
chosen was the Farm and Rural Development Administration 
(U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1977: 3).
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Several broad objectives have been formulated by 
USDA in 1978 to deal with rural development. First, there 
are to be improved rural economies and decreased rural 
unemployment. Second, access to rural services for rural 
residents is sought. Third, USDA's efforts are to be 
targeted toward the neediest residents and communities. 
Fourth, rural development policies are to be formulated and 
implemented using an ongoing process involving the private 
sector, and local, state, and federal levels of government 
(U.S. Congress, 1978c: 10) .
Section 603 of the Rural Development Act of 1972
mandated that the Secretary of Agriculture was to provide
leadership and coordination in conducting rural development
policy, establish goals, and to report on the progress
toward the rural development goals (39) . As mentioned
earlier, to assist in this undertaking, this nation's rural
23development efforts are located in the Farmers Home 
Administration. Farmers Home Administration was chosen as 
the focal point of this nation's rural development policies 
because of its available administrative structure, consid­
ered to be as extensive as any development agency, public 
or private (11). Also, rural development was not a new 
mission to Farmers Home Administration. A large portion 
of Farmers Home Administration's community facility funds 
have been loaned for health and medical care facilities. 
Finally, symbolically, placing the rural development
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responsibilities in Farmers Home Administration recognizes 
that rural development includes both farm and nonfarm 
populations. This stems from the fact that Farmers Home 
Administration had long administered USDA's economic and 
community development programs (43).
Possibilities for a Successful Comprehensive Rural
Development Policy. But is a comprehensive rural development
policy really possible given the plethora of programs and
agencies involved? Alex P. Mercure, Assistant Secretary
for Agriculture for Rural Development, indicated obstacles
to coordination of rural development efforts:
. . .  I have found that some [conflicts between 
programs] stem from legislatively mandated pro­
gram purposes which are in conflict, some from 
'turf' considerations, and, of course, some from 
the occasional perversity of human nature. In 
addition, in the rural development context, some 
stem from inadvertent and conscious urban bias 
(U.S. Congress, 1978c: 33).
Further, the former Rural Development Service requested the 
National Academy of Public Administration to assemble 
several of its members (among those involved were George H. 
Esser, Allen Schick, Harold Seidman, and James L. Sundquist) 
to examine alternatives for the Secretary of Agriculture to 
coordinate rural development efforts. Their analysis 
revealed that coordination of peer agencies' rural develop­
ment programs by the Secretary of Agriculture would probably 
fail since he was given no legal authority to enforce 
coordination. Success was also likely to be limited because
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the effort was to cut across all levels of government.
The past relationships of the involved federal executive 
agencies to state and local governments might pose problems. 
For example, USDA has traditionally worked with state and 
local levels of government, but the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development generally by-passes the state level and 
works with the cities, towns, or multi-jurisdiction agencies. 
Finally, the report indicated that success could best be 
achieved where there were agreed upon objectives among the 
federal executive agencies involved, and where the objectives 
could be attained shortly after agreement on them (U.S. 
Congress, 1978c: 102-107).
Rural development efforts appear to have been given 
new life under the Carter administration by its providing 
an administrative apparatus to carry out the 1972 Rural 
Development Act's mandate. However, given the inherent 
bureaucratic infighting, lack of legal authority for 
coordination by the Secretary of Agriculture, and the mani­
fold programs and agencies involved, success of the national 
rural development efforts probably will be limited at best.
Farm Credit System
A discussion of capital and credit policy for agri­
culture must include several agencies and institutions that 
provide extensive coverage for rural America, plus public 
policy that in effect aids rural America in its financial 
endeavors. An example of the former is the Rural
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Electrification Administration, of the latter, incorpora­
tion that affects agricultural investments. This section 
and the next two discuss the primary channels through which 
rural America acquires capital and credit.
Federal Credit System and the Farm Credit System.
The Federal Credit System has historically been a major 
contributor of agricultural capital and credit. In fact, 
in 1977 when farm debt rose from $16 million to $118.7 
million by January 1, 1978, the Farm Credit System provided 
approximately 33 percent of the $16 billion increase. This 
was about the same portion provided by the Farm Credit 
System as in 1976, but considerably less than the 42 per­
cent parcel in 1975. The decline in the Farm Credit 
System's amount has been attributed to increased shares by 
commercial banks, life insurance companies, farm machinery 
dealers, and the Commodity Credit Corporation (U.S. Congress, 
1978d; 3558).
Components of the Farm Credit System. When we speak 
of the Farm Credit System, we are referring to that user- 
owned and controlled system composed of Federal Land Banks, 
Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, and Banks for Cooperatives 
Controlling and examining the system is the independent 
executive agency known as the Farm Credit Administration, 
under the control of the Federal Farm Credit Board. At 
the local level, over 500 Federal Land Bank Associations 
provide long-term first mortgage loans for the Federal Land
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Banks, over 400 Production Credit Associations provide loans 
for periods up to seven years for the Federal Intermediate 
Credit Banks, and the district Banks for Cooperatives pro­
vide funding to more than 3,000 marketing, farm supply, and 
business service cooperatives. District located Banks for 
Cooperatives receive their financing from the Central Banks 
for Cooperatives located in Denver, Colorado.
As a user controlled and owned system, people at 
the local level have a great deal to say about who manages 
the Farm Credit System. Farmers and ranchers elect boards 
of directors for the Federal Land Bank Associations, Produc­
tion Credit Associations, and their local cooperatives.
Local cooperatives, of course, own the district Banks of 
Cooperatives. These three boards then select two members 
each to serve on the district Farm Credit Board (there are 
12 Farm Credit Districts). A seventh member is appointed by 
the Governor of the Farm Credit Administration.
To direct this entire system, as mentioned earlier, 
is the Federal Farm Credit Board. This 13-member board is 
assembled by having the President of the United States 
appoint, subject to Senate confirmation, one person from 
each of the 12 Farm Credit Districts. Each appointee must 
be selected from three candidates who have been selected 
by the boards of directors of the Federal Land Bank, 
Production Credit Association, and cooperatives that use 
the Bank of Cooperatives in each district. The thirteenth
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board member is selected by the Secretary of Agriculture 
(Hoag, 1976: xiii-xiv). Atypically of most federal agencies, 
the chief executive officer of the Farm Credit Administra­
tion, the Governor, is not subject to presidential appoint­
ment. Instead, the Governor is appointed by and responsible 
to the board (U.S. Congress, 1978d: 3554).
Finances for the Farm Credit System. The Farm Credit 
System is financed by the sale of consolidated bonds and 
discount notes^^ via a fiscal agent who is employed by all 
37 banks involved in the system (3550). Costs incurred by 
the Farm Credit Administration are not paid by the general 
public. The borrowers foot the bill for the costs that are 
prorated back to the system. A large part of the costs of 
the Farm Credit Administration involves paying about 250 
of their personnel. Half of these 250 are examiners and 
auditors who oversee the loaning process throughout the 
country (3551).
Historical Background of the Farm Credit System. The 
roots of the present system extend back considerably beyond 
the Farm Loan Act of 1916 that provided for land banks that 
ultimately were to be farmer owned, plus joint stock land 
banks to be owned by private investors (Hoag, 1976: 213).
The advent of the system can be traced to the early 
colonial days of this nation. The Land and Loan Bank of the 
Carolines, operating in 1712, has been given the distinction
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of being the first farm credit bank in America. Eventually, 
12 of the 13 original colonies had Colonial Land Banks. 
Similar to the present-day system, however, was the borrowing 
of Connecticut's land owners from 1732 to 1762. They 
received mortgages and purchased stocks from the New London 
Society United for Trade and Commerce. From the mid-1700s 
until the early 1900s, this type of credit system was almost 
completely absent from our credit schemes (209).
The cooperative credit approach was not used for 
about 150 years for several reasons. In the early stages 
of this country, when a farmer had financial difficulties 
he could easily pack his wagon and head West for new prairie 
land. In 1848, the lure of gold in California provided a 
quick source of income, and another place to go. During the 
Civil War, times were good for those who stayed home in 
the North and provided food supplies for the soldiers. The 
Homestead Act of 1862 added a new source of land when times 
got tough.
Not until after the Civil War did American farmers 
need credit. Then the increased production of the farmer 
began to surpass the availability of sound American dollars. 
That is, the American dollar was not being printed relative 
to the demand for it, because there was a scarcity of gold 
to back the dollar. As a result, the farmers and rural 
communities were hard pressed for a source of credit (Hoag,
19 76; 210). At the same time, rural America began to exert
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itself by calling for the use of abundant silver to replace 
gold to back the dollar. Indeed, debt relief was the focal 
point of this movement (Morgan, 1970: 162-164). Compounding 
the farmer's problems was the introduction of farm mechani­
zation that led to further needs for farm credit (Hoag, 1976: 
211). Combining the use of improved fertilizers with the 
new mechanization caused previously mentioned overproduction; 
in turn, the overproduction meant lower farm commodity 
prices (Morgan, 1970: 151).^^ Rural credit was difficult 
to acquire because banks frequently favored urban invest­
ment. State and local financing generally was used only for 
urban improvements. Resentment of this urban favoritism 
was evidenced in the exclusion of merchants, professionals, 
stockholders in corporations, and business clerks from farm 
organizations (158).
To combat the credit crunch, farmers began to 
organize cooperative societies in the 1880s. Farmers felt 
that if they pooled their resources they could buy seed, 
fertilizer, and machinery in large quantities, thus, reducing 
the price per individual. Though some cooperatives did 
succeed, most failed. The lack of success was attributed to 
inadequate farm capital and to management inexperience 
(Morgan, 1970: 152).
In the 1900s, farm credit received its first hearings 
with the appointment of the Country Life Commission by 
President Theodore Roosevelt in 1908. After holding hearings
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in 40 states, before an estimated 12,000 people, the Country 
Life Commission recommended that there be a rural free 
delivery system, more educational efforts for rural America, 
creation of more cooperatives, and implementation of a 
cooperative credit system (Hoag, 1970; 211).
Farm Loan Act of 1916. By 1916, the beginnings of 
the cooperative credit system were authorized with the 
passage of the Farm Loan Act. The structure and approach 
to the new farm credit system were patterned heavily after 
the German farm mortgage system called landchafts that had 
been used since 1769 (American Institute of Banking, 1934: 
425-431). The new Farm Credit System, as noted earlier, 
was made up of land banks and joint stock land banks 
(Hoag, 1976: 213) . The actual chartering of the last 
Federal Land Bank was on April 3, 1917 (216). Because of 
the 1930s depression, the joint stock land banks were all 
liquidated by 1933 (221-223) .
Agricultural Credits Act of 1923. Though the 1916 
legislation had provided farmers with long-term credit, it 
was not until the passage of the Agricultural Credits Act 
of 1923 that farmers were provided some short-term credit. 
This problem stemmed from the fact that commercial banks 
could not grant loan extensions of 30 to 90 days during 
financial crises, such as from 1920 to 1921. Commercial 
banks' loan capacities were based upon deposits; therefore, 
if the banks needed deposit funds, they could legally demand
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the loan be paid. But farmers found it very difficult to 
get crops and livestock to market in less than a 30- to 
90-day period in order to pay off the loan. The Federal 
Intermediate Banks were created in 1923 to assist in filling 
this void of short term financing. At their inception, the 
Federal Intermediate Credit Banks were provided capital by 
the United States Treasury. Not until 1956 did users begin 
to become owners of the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks 
(Hoag, 1976: 223-225).
Farm Credit Act of 1933. With the emergency credit 
situation during the early 1930s, the Farm Credit Act of 19 33 
was passed. This provided the last link in the Farm Credit 
System chain. Legislated were 12 Production Credit Corpora­
tions that were to provide capital and training for local 
Production Credit Associations. The Production Credit 
Associations were to institute a local network of lending 
agencies for short-term financing purposes (237) .
Though the 1929 Agricultural Marketing Act had 
established the Federal Farm Board to finance and promote 
cooperatives, the depression of the 1930s curtailed much of 
the funding for this effort (229-230) . Not until the 
passage of the Farm Credit Act of 1933 did cooperatives 
receive a financial boost. This act created 12 district 
Banks for Cooperatives and a Central Bank for Cooperatives. 
These Banks for Cooperatives were to provide financing and 
advice for purchasing and marketing cooperatives (239).
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Present-Day Farm Credit Institutions. Today, the 
Federal Land Bank Associations provide funding to purchase 
farm property, rural homes, real estate for farm-related 
businesses, machinery, livestock, and for refinancing 
existing mortgages. Production Credit Associations insure 
financing for the production of farm commodities, production 
and harvesting of aquatic products, and buying, maintaining, 
or repairing rural homes. Finally, Banks for Cooperatives 
enable local cooperatives to have credit for their parti­
cular needs. When a Bank for Cooperatives does not have 
the financial capacity to fund a cooperative, the Central 
Bank for Cooperatives will assist the district banks (U.S. 
Congress, 1978d; 3550-3551).
Rural Electrification Administration
An appropriate place for discussing the Rural Electri­
fication Administration is relative to USDA capital and 
credit policies since rural electric cooperatives are member 
owned. The Rural Electrification Administration was begun 
in 1935 by executive order. It became an independent agency 
when the Rural Electrification Act was passed in 1936. In 
19 39, the Rural Electrification Administration became a part 
of USDA (Halcrow, 1977: 408).
The Rural Electrification Administration was heavily 
sponsored by Senator George W. Norris (I NE); a powerful 
legislator of his time. But Senator Norris's efforts did 
not go unchallenged. Privately funded public power companies
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opposed and still oppose the Rural Electrification Adminis­
tration. At the time of the original legislation the 
private power companies wanted the federal government to 
allocate them the federal funds to do the work necessary to 
extend electricity to all rural areas. Initially, the 
federal government did provide funds on a long-term coopera­
tive loan basis to public power companies. In 1935, however, 
legal entanglements between the federal government and 
public power companies over power sites, water flow rights, 
and utility franchises caused rural electrification to be 
slowed down. Rather than wait for the issues to be resolved, 
Congress directed the Rural Electrification Administration 
to fund and support the development of rural electrification 
cooperatives to carry out the broad goal of providing 
electricity to rural America (Halcrow, 1977: 411-412).
It was hoped that rural electric cooperatives would 
borrow from the Rural Electrification Administration once 
they were established. Loans from the Rural Electrification 
Administration should have been attractive to the rural 
electric cooperatives as they were for a maximum of 35 years 
and at low interest. As a part of the loan agreement, 
rural electric cooperatives were to extend electricity to 
all customers within their operating area to the extent that 
the cooperatives had the capacity to do so (.408-409) .
Two amendments since 1935 have expanded the respon­
sibilities of the Rural Electrification Administration. In
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1949, it was authorized to provide loans for extending rural 
telephone service. The 1973 amendment created a Rural 
Electrification and Telephone Revolving Fund of approximately 
$5 billion. All financing of the fund comes from Rural 
Electrification Administration borrowers. A critical part 
of the 1973 act was the stipulation that Congress, not a 
President's administration, would determine the maximum loan 
ceilings for rural electric insured loans and rural telephone 
insured loans. The Office of Management and Budget, there­
fore, no longer sets the limits for insured loans; thus, 
funds that had been previously impounded by the Office of 
Management and Budget will be included in the future 
(Halcrow, 1977: 408-410).
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
To aid farmers in coping with the natural elements, 
insects, and plant disease. Congress passed the Federal 
Crop Insurance Act in 1938. The legislation set up a govern­
ment corporation called the Federal Crop Insurance Corpora­
tion. Drought in the 1930s was the primary impetus in 
establishing federal crop insurance since its main purpose 
was to provide protection from such catastrophes. This was 
essential in order to prevent financial ruin of farmers and 
to assist in providing stability to farmers' lives.
The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation was to 
formulate policy and provide research and experience for
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formulating federal crop insurance. It was authorized to 
set premiums per acre on a county-wide basis. Coverage 
for insured crops was to be a certain percentage of a farm's 
historical yield (for instance, 50 or 70 percent). The 
premiums were to cover crop losses, but not operating, 
administrative, or crop adjustment costs of the Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation. An appropriation of $12 million was 
provided for the first fiscal year. To manage the corpora­
tion, a borad of five members was appointed by the Secretary 
of Agriculture (Halcrow, 1977: 425-426).
During more than 40 years of operation, federal crop 
insurance results have been mixed. From 1935 through 1945 
the only crops covered were wheat and cotton; only $350,000 
was appropriated in the 1945 Agricultural Appropriations 
Act. These were the worst years for federal crop insurance. 
In an attempt to save the program, legislation was passed 
to enable the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation to add 
coverage of other crops. Premiums for the new crops were to 
be based on experience. For the time period 1948 through 
1956, six years were experienced when indemnities surpassed 
premiums. From 1956 through 1961, good crops were generally 
the norm. Beginning in 1958 and 1959, farmers could claim 
coverage for additional new crops by endorsement (426-427).
As of 1978, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation 
provided crop insurance for 1,522 counties in 39 states. 
Twenty-six different commodities were covered in 1978, and
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the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation anticipated providing 
$2.3 billion of crop insurance in 1979. Indemnities are 
paid wherever crops fail; it does not matter how widespread 
the failure is in order for farmers to receive indemnities—  
county, township, or an individual farm. Justification for 
federal crop insurance lies in its ability to provide 
economic stability for farmers and, indirectly, for all of 
the rural economy especially when crop losses occur in 
successive years as in 1976 or 1977 (U.S. Congress, 1978d: 
3528-3530).
Corporations
Forming corporations has its advantages in securing 
capital and credit. The Farm Credit Act of 1971 permitted 
lending to farm corporations strictly on a credit basis.
Prior to the 1971 legislation, federal law necessitated 
considering personal and corporate liability for loans.
Farm corporations, however, are ineligible to borrow from 
the Farmers Home Administration; even if they could, few 
would meet borrowing requirements (Halcrow, 1977; 418-419).
Incorporation also means credit advantages in other 
respects. First, there is continuity of operation. The 
corporation does not expire with the demise of stockholders 
and employees. Commercial lenders prefer to deal with 
organizations that have a permanency about them. Also, the 
ability of a corporation to borrow is generally not 
diminished by individual liabilities. This is very important
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to the agricultural industry in times of ever expanding 
capital needs.
Finally, incorporation frequently means tax advantages. 
Using 1977 rates, for example, could lead to a tax advantage 
in the following manner: If a farmer had $60,000 of taxable 
income, he would pay $26,390 in taxes. He would pay this 
amount in taxes even though $20,000 of the $60,000 was used 
for personal living expenses and the remaining $40,000 was 
invested in the farm business. Suppose the farm operation 
is incorporated. The farmer would then collect $20,000 as 
a salary for himself and he would leave the remaining 
$40,000 in the corporation or invest it in the farm busi­
ness. In this case, the individual would pay a total tax 
bill of $13,530, combined individual and corporate income 
taxes. Because of incorporation the net savings would be 
$12,860 (Halcrow, 1977: 421). For example, tax law that 
might permit this comes from the 1976 Tax Reform Law,
Public Law 94-455. The standard method of taxing corpora­
tions permitted a 20 percent rate on the first $25,000 of 
corporate income, 22 percent on the second $25,000, and 48 
percent on the remainder. For 1977, individual taxes were 
14 percent on the first $1,000 of income and up to 70 per­
cent on income over $200,000 for jointly filing married 
taxpayers. Before the 1976 act, the corporate income tax 
rate had been 22 percent on the first $25,000 and 48 per­
cent on the remaining income (Halcrow, 1977: 419).
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Gift and Estate Taxes
Even though only 2 percent of either federal or 
state revenues are derived from gift and estate taxes, they 
are important in determining the future economic structure 
of agriculture. With the passage of the Tax Reform Act 
of 1976 came a new tax schedule that combined the previously 
separated gift and inheritance tax schedules. The overall 
result was to reduce gift and inheritance taxes. Revision 
came about because from 1941 to 1976 the average farm size 
had doubled and the average capital per acre increased 10 
times. Taxable estates, therefore, increased substantially 
for individual operators. These conditions provided 
incentive for real estate to be farmed by tenants rather 
than owner operators, a process inconsistent with tradi­
tional American farm policy. Revision of the gift and 
inheritance tax schedules was the response to reverse the 
trend toward more farm tenancy (Halcrow, 1977: 423-425).
Summary
Concerning the capital and credit policies, the Farm 
Credit System appears to provide credit to all sizes of 
farmers and ranchers. Incorporation could be an advantage 
to both family farmers and nonfarm owners (large investors 
having considerable income from nonfarm sources or corpora­
tions) . Revision of the gift and inheritance taxes would 
appear on the surface to be a plus for the small family 
farmer. That is, he/she is more likely to be able to
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transfer his/her operation intact at death because of 
reduced tax loads. Halcrow (1977: 425), however, warns that 
the reduced transfer taxes could encourage investors outside 
of the agricultural industry. An apt description of the 
agricultural capital and credit policy discussed above 
indicates several financial beneficiaries; however, the 
jury is still out on the impact that this extensive capital 
and credit system has on the overall agricultural structure.
Foreign Agricultural Policy
As with the domestic side of United States agri­
cultural policy, its foreign agricultural policy has many 
programs and approaches. Cochrane and Ryan (1976: 266-279) 
discussed such foreign agricultural policy tools as grants 
and donations, loans, credits, bartering, foreign currency 
sales, and export subsidies, just to name some items in 
the United States foreign agricultural policy repertoire.
No longer do we consider what happens in the inter­
national arena separate from and non-causal of what trans­
pires in the domestic arena. Hjort (1978: 7) has stated 
that until the 1970s, domestic agricultural policy had been 
treated as separate from foreign agricultural policy. With 
the advent of the 1970s, however, and its attendant world­
wide crop shortages, increased United States grain supports, 
and increased food prices, came an awareness that what 
occurs in the Soviet Union, for example, may just have an 
impact on United States domestic agricultural policy. This
97
has been most recently exemplified by the 1980 grain 
embargo against the Soviet Union. Let us examine the 
linkages more closely.
It is fairly obvious when one analyzes the data that 
foreign demand, especially during the 1970s, has augmented 
the income of American farmers. For instance. United States 
agricultural exports have increased from $3.2 billion for 
1950-1955 to $22.4 billion for 1975-1976. As a portion of 
the world agricultural exports. United States share has 
gone from 12.3 percent for 1951-1955 to 16.3 percent for 
1975-1976. Beginning in the year 1973-1974, United States 
and the world's agricultural exports began to decline as a 
share of the total exports for the United States and the 
world, respectively. This decline in agricultural exports 
as a part of the total has been attributed to worldwide 
crop shortages and increased United States reserve stocks.
More recent comparisons further confirm the dependency 
of the American farmer on foreign markets to maintain farm 
prices. From 1969-1971 to 1975-1976, 82 percent of the 
increase in world grain exports was accounted for by the 
United States. Of this share, 90 percent of it was composed 
of wheat exports. For 1975-^1976, United States exports 
amounted to 50 percent of world grain exports.
As we have seen, farmers in particular have gained 
because of United States trade, but so has the general 
public. The extensive exportation of agricultural products
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has provided impetus for more farm investments; this, in 
turn, has meant more nonfarm employment, income, and 
purchasing power. With a foreign market's increased demand 
comes a demand for more agricultural output. The farmer 
then needs more fuel and fertilizer, for instance, to 
increase production. Like a chain reaction, this leads to 
more jobs in industry and transportation, and so one thing 
seems to lead to another. In quantitative terms, farmers 
produced one out of each three acres (for a total of 100 
million acres) for export in 1975, 76 million acres for 
1963-1965, and only 31 million acres for export in 1953.
Agricultural exports also are critical to our balance 
of trade. These exports have become especially significant 
because of increases in oil imports. The net farm exports 
for fiscal years 1975 and 1976 was around $12 billion, a 
rapid increase from $1 billion for fiscal years 1968 and 
1970. In the 1950s, the agricultural trade ledger indicated 
a negative balance, but today the agricultural balance of 
trade shows a positive figure (Mackie, 1977: 23-24).
In the second quarter of 1978, agriculture's net 
contribution to the United States balance of trade rose 
to over $3.8 billion. This was a record level for any 
quarter (Manfredi, 1978: 29).
Finally, a concern for exports should be important 
to our American producers in case foreign markets are 
diminished for whatever reason. Prices for agricultural
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products do not decrease proportionately to decreases in 
demand for them; in fact, a given reduction in quantity 
demanded has a much greater than proportional effect in 
lowering prices. Prices, therefore, would have to decrease 
substantially to sell extra United States agricultural pro­
ducts in our markets if our exports should decline under 
free market conditions, and this would lead to excessive cuts 
in total farm income (Mackie, 1977: 24, 29).
United States International Food Assistance
Late 1800 and Early 1900 Efforts. As a beginning
point for discussion of United States International use of
agricultural products, we will examine food assistance 
27efforts. This nation took one of its first steps in pro­
viding overseas disaster relief on May 8, 1912. Venezualians, 
victims of an earthquake, were assisted by $50,000 that was 
to be used for purchasing food. Another effort of food 
assistance that eventually led to Public Law 480 (hereafter 
referred to as the Food for Peace Program) was privately 
donated food supplied by United States during the Soviet 
Union famine of 1891. In 1902, the United States assisted 
the people of the French West Indies when Mount Pelee erupted. 
Congress permitted the use of naval vessels to distribute 
food, medicine, and clothing during this destitution.
Relief was provided for victims of the Sicilian 
earthquake in 1908. President Theodore Roosevelt did not 
even seek prior authorization for providing $300,000 worth
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of supplies, including food and clothing. On numerous 
occasions between 1890 and 1915, we provided relief for 
famine in India and China. So frequent were our efforts 
that the United States government considered financing 
technical assistance to assist in overcoming the causes of 
the famines (McGovern, 1964: 12-14).
In 1914, the United States provided major food relief 
in Belgium. It was estimated that starvation was prevented 
for 10 million people because of this undertaking. This 
action occurred after the Germans had invaded Belgium and 
northern France.
Post World War I to Post World War II Programs. Sub­
sequent to World War I, massive relief was delivered to more 
than 200 million people in European countries. After a 
substantial crop in 1919, assistance was sent to 10 million 
starving children in eastern Europe. Aid also was given to 
the Soviet Union after famine began ravishing that country 
in 1921. In a ten-year period, from 1914 to 1923, the 
United States had provided around 34 million metric tons of 
food and supplies for famine riddled areas. A total of $5.2 
billion was expended for 23 countries during these actions 
(McGovern, 1964: 14-15; Berg, 1966: 193).
During World War II, we delivered extensive food 
supplies to all our allies. Of all United States relief 
efforts its efforts in occupied territories in Europe and 
Asia were the most extensive. By 1945, United States food 
aid was about $7 million per day.
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Following World War II, relief was provided for a 
recovering Europe. Initial efforts were carried out by 
voluntary agencies in the United States and the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. As if the war-torn 
nations had not suffered enough, drought plagued many European 
countries in 1946 and 19 47. In response to Europe's extreme 
plight. President Truman's Marshall Plan was adopted by a 
bipartisan congressional vote (McGovern, 1964: 15-16). The 
Marshall Plan, named after Secretary of State George Marshall, 
was initiated to provide impetus for economic recovery of the 
western European countries. This assistance was to enable 
these nations to become generally independent of exogenous 
assistance. A considerable portion of the assistance was in 
the form of food and fiber. Four years after the Marshall 
Plan began, agricultural production had risen 10 percent and 
industrial production had risen 35 percent. During the same 
period, trade among the participating countries increased by 
70 percent (Berg, 1966: 193).
Commodity Credit Corporation. In 1948, the Commodity 
Credit Corporation was incorporated as a federal corporation 
in USDA. Under this charter, the Commodity Credit Corporation 
could accumulate farm products to be sold to other government 
agencies, foreign governments, and voluntary agencies that 
were involved in domestic relief efforts. More important to 
United States foreign agricultural policy, the Commodity Credit 
Corporation was provided the powers to export food for the 
purpose of developing future markets (Stanley, 1973: 61).
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Even though the Commodity Credit Corporation continues to 
have the authority to promote exportation of agricultural 
commodities and products, no export payment program was 
operating in fiscal year 1978 and none was anticipated for 
fiscal year 1979 (U.S. Congress, 1979; 594).
Moving into the 1950s, the Korean War reduced much 
of our surplus stocks, but $190 million worth of food 
grains were authorized in emergency legislation for flood 
and drought-torn India.
By 1953, Commodity Credit Corporation stocks had 
become substantial, especially wheat and cotton. Potential 
importers of these stocks, however, did not have the United 
States dollars to purchase them. Pakistan, in particular, 
was in need. To accommodate Pakistan, special legislation 
was enacted that provided free food to Pakistan. Any 
Pakistani currency recieved by the United States was deposited 
in the United States. This Pakistani currency later was 
returned to the Pakistani government for food production 
purposes. In whatever manner the returned currencies were 
expended, their expenditure was based on mutual agreement 
between Pakistan and the United States.
Mutual Security Act of 1953. The Mutual Security Act 
of 1953 stipulated provisions similar to the 1953 agreement 
between Pakistan and the United States. This legislation 
provided an exchange of foreign currency for Commodity Credit 
Corporation commodities. Again, foreign currency was
103
deposited in United States banks, and dependent upon mutual 
agreement between the United States and a foreign country 
was spent on goods and services, military assistance, loans 
to increase food production, and development of United 
States markets. The legislation also insured private commer­
cial traders against interference with their trade. Soft 
28currency was accepted for food supplies. Food aid under 
the Mutual Security Act was discontinued after 1962. In fact, 
food aid declined under the act from 1955 to 1962, going 
from $452 million to $33 million respectively (Stanley,
1973: 62-63).
Advent of the Food for Peace Program. Today's Food 
29for Peace Program was originally enacted in 1954. Senator 
Hubert H. Humphrey (D MN) provided much of the leadership 
that provided legislation incorporating significant aspects 
of the food aid legislation entailed in earlier enactments. 
Initially, the Food for Peace Program was assumed to be a 
temporary aid program with the purpose to develop foreign 
markets for United States commodities (Stanley, 1973: 63). 
Specifically, it was to be a dumping ground for surplus farm 
products. Senator Humphrey and his followers felt the Food 
for Peace Program should be used to promote peace and security 
throughout the world. Increased production, according to 
Senator Humphrey, should have been the charge cry for the 
American farmer, not reduced output. To Senator Humphrey 
increased production meant a potential for opportunities, 
not pitfalls (Amrine, 1960: 229-230).
104
In its original form, the Food for Peace Program had 
three titles (McGovern, 1964: 19-20). Implementation of 
this legislation required administration by ten government 
agencies. For the first three years of its operation, $2 
billion was committed through the program (Stanley, 1973: 64).
Under the original Title I, governments receiving 
agricultural products could pay the United States by using 
their own currency rather than gold or dollars. Title II 
provisions permitted grants of food for disaster stricken 
areas. Title III enabled voluntary agencies and organiza­
tions to distribute food surpluses overseas. Also, this 
title provided for the barter of food for foreign strategic 
materials. Title IV, implemented in 1959, permitted long­
term loans for purchased food products. These were low 
interest loans (McGovern, 1964: 19-21). In 1961, President 
Kennedy created the Office of Food for Peace. He named 
George S. McGovern to be its first director (McGovern, 1964: 
xii-xiii). In the late 1950s, Senator Humphrey had 
proposed that there should be an agency to direct the distri­
bution of food aid. He said the head of this agency should 
be titled Peace Food Administrator (Amrine, 1960: 229).
Contemporary Food for Peace Program. The contemporary 
Food for Peace Program is still a food aid program, but it 
has been modified from the 1954 legislation. In 1976, the 
Food for Peace Program accounted for 4 percent of total 
agricultural exports (see Appendix B). The highest percentage
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of total agricultural exports that the Food for Peace Pro­
gram has contributed in recent years was 13 percent in 1972. 
Its portion of the total agricultural exports has been 
declining or holding steady since 1957, but there has been 
an especially sharp decline since 1972 (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, 1978: 51). Three titles make up today's legis­
lation: sales programs, foreign donations, and food for 
development.
Title I permits the direct sale of agricultural 
commodities to friendly nations. These sales are based 
upon long-term loans for 20 to 40 years, with payment in 
dollars or convertible currency the rule. To carry out the 
transactions, the Commodity Credit Corporation finances 
private exporters for the portion of the sales not covered 
by the foreign country's foreign importer's, or private 
trader's down payments (U.S. Department of Agriculture,
1978: 9). Beginning in 1966, local currency sales agreements 
were to be phased out. After 1971, no new local currency 
sales agreements could be made although agreements already 
in effect were honored (23). In 1977, Title I was amended 
to prohibit Title I sales to any country that consistently 
abused internationally recognized human rights unless the 
sales would directly benefit the needy of a nation (11).
Under Title II, United States nonprofit organizations 
and government agencies distribute agricultural products 
to foreign countries. About 70 percent of the Title II
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products are provided by the voluntary agencies. Generally, 
these agricultural products are disbursed through child 
centers, school lunch programs, maternal health centers, and 
food for work projects. Of the remaining 1977 Title II 
agricultural products, the World Food Program, a United 
Nations sponsored organization, distributed 21 percent, and 
direct United States-to-foreign-government food assistance 
amounted to 9 percent (39).
Title III was added in 1977. This title's purpose 
is to encourage development of foreign recipients and to 
provide better access to the rural poor. To carry out these 
objectives. United States assistance is to be used for 
activities conducive to rural development, nutrition, health, 
and population planning programs. Such assistance is to 
promote self-help projects for increasing agricultural 
production and improving storage, transportation, and distri­
bution of agricultural projects. Whatever projects are 
developed under this title, they must serve the country's 
overall development plans. Finally, these programs must 
complement and not replace local assistance (11-12) . Berg 
(1966: 207) already warned in the 1960s that food aid that 
replaces local sales merely displaces local purchasing 
power. The fact that the Food for Peace Program development 




Cochrane and Ryan (1976: 269) have pointed out that 
United States foreign agricultural policy has included more 
than just food assistance. Export subsidies have been used 
in the past. As early as 1935, cash subsidy payments were 
used to promote the export of farm products. Under Section 
32, from 1948 to 1954, the average annual export payments 
amounted to $20 million. Fruit exports accounted for two- 
thirds of the export payments. The remainder was about 
equally distributed among sorghum, wheat, peanuts, and eggs.
From 1948 to 1954, wheat received the highest export 
subsidies. Beginning in 1949, exported wheat had its 
subsidies based on the International Wheat Agreement. The 
International Wheat Agreement set prices lower than the 
United States prices. The difference between the prices was 
the subsidy to American exporters. The subsidies began in 
1950. For the first five years, the average annual subsidy 
payments totaled $120 million. Between 1960 and 1973, wheat 
accounted for half of all export payments (1976: 275).
To provide a better understanding of the past export 
subsidy programs, from 1955 to 1966, 30 percent (by value) 
of all exports had export subsidies. With the exception 
of 1964, from 1955 to 1966 export subsidies ranged from $500 
million to $600 million. In 1964, the export subsidies 
amounted to about $822 million. Because domestic prices 
contracted to near world prices in the mid-1960s, export
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subsidies decreased correspondingly. Consequently, export 
subsidies for 1967 to 1972 were less than $260 million. In 
1969, export subsidy payments were only $69 million. But, 
in 1973, they had risen to $405 million.
Subsidies also have been used for noncommercial 
exports. This occurred when farm commodities were exported 
under government programs. The subsidies were based upon 
the difference between the world price and the foreign 
recipient's price. The exporter of the commodity received 
the subsidy, or in the case of some Commodity Credit Corpora­
tion transactions, the Commodity Credit Corporation absorbed 
the subsidy as a loss (275).
International Commodity Agreements
Coffee, Cocoa, Rubber, and Sugar Agreements. Inter­
national commodity agreements also have been a means for 
conducting United States foreign agricultural policy or 
have affected our agricultural policy. In 1976, an Inter­
national Coffee Agreement was negotiated that provided for 
export quotas, thus insuring minimum prices. This agreement 
was operative for six years. There was also an International 
Cocoa Agreement designed to provide minimum and maximum 
prices through the use of export quotas and buffer stocks. 
Begun in 1976, this agreement was to be in force for three 
years. November, 1976, brought the signing of an inter­
national natural rubber agreement among Malaysia, Indonesia,
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Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Singapore. The rubber agreement 
has the purpose of stabilizing rubber prices by limiting 
production according to the demand levels, plus using buffer 
stocks to buy and sell rubber when prices move outside a 
price band (Canada, 1978; 157). Sugar is another commodity 
that has been involved in international negotiations. In 
1977, the United States and 71 other countries signed an 
agreement in Geneva that permitted sugar exporters to with­
hold exports to increase prices and to use buffer stocks 
to cushion price increases during sugar shortages. Despite 
the fact that the United States imported nearly 40 percent 
of its sugar needs, it felt that protectionism was not in its 
best interests in this case if developing nations were to 
get a leg up on international trade. The developing nations 
supplied 70 percent of all sugar imports in 1976 (Samuelson, 
1978: 160) .
1972 Russian Wheat Deal. Probably the one United 
States agricultural commodity that caused the greatest public 
interest during the 1970s was wheat. This interest was not 
generated because of wheat in and of itself, but because of 
where United States exporters shipped the commodity— to the 
Soviet Union. Of course, we are speaking of the 1972 Russian 
wheat deal when the Soviet Union bought huge quantities of 
wheat at bargain-basement prices, unbeknownst to American 
producers. After the sales, the price of wheat rose sub­
stantially, thus, short-changing the American producers.
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To provide better market information in the future,
USDA has stepped up its effort to predict Soviet crop 
production. Part of this effort includes using weather 
information, computer studies, and meteorological informa­
tion from satellites. USDA also requires more rapid grain 
sales reporting than in 1972. Today, grain firms must report 
any sale of 100,000 tons in any of seven grains. Included 
in these grains are corn, wheat, and soybeans. One major 
shortcoming of this system is that it applies only to 
exporters in the United States. Thus, trading companies 
overseas are exempt, and the Soviet Union can purchase 
grain through them without letting the United States know.
In fact, they have used these channels. To check this 
backdoor approach of buying grain, USDA must rely on confi­
dential reporting by large United States grain companies 
(Symonds, 1978: 165-166).
A United States-Soviet Union grain agreement was signed 
in 1975. The five-year agreement pertains to 12-month 
periods from October 1, 1976, through September 30, 1981. 
However, if United States grain production, plus carryover, 
amounts to less than 225 million metric tons in a 12-month 
period, the agreement is cancelled for that year. When 
the agreement is in effect, the Soviet Union has to import 
a minimum of 6 million metric tons of corn and wheat. The 
proportions of each grain are to be about equal. If the 
Soviet Union desires to import more than 8 million metric
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tons in a year, then the United States and the Soviet Union 
must negotiate the amount above 8 million metric tons they 
may import. Further, the Soviet Union is to make their 
purchases from private commercial dealers based in the United 
States. The purchases are to be made at equal intervals 
during one year. Any wheat and corn exported to the Soviet 
Union must be consumed in Russia.
The United States government considers this agreement 
a means to stabilize our domestic markets (Benjamin, 1977: 
318). This is important given that from 1957 through 1970 
the Soviet Union imported only about one million tons in 
any one year. From 1971 through 19 76, however, they averaged 
nearly 17 million tons of grain imports a year. Even more 
drastically, they imported about 5 million tons of grain for 
1974-1975, but 25 million tons in 1975-1976. Experts 
attribute this wide variance to differential crop production, 
Soviet Union's penchant to stabilize food prices, and 
Soviet Union's lack of surplus stocks (Symonds, 1978: 165).
1980 Grain Embargo. In January, 1980, President 
Carter unilaterally suspended the export of all United States 
farm commodities to the Soviet Union (about 98 percent of 
all United States-Soviet Union farm commodity trade is 
composed of feedgrains) (Wehr, 1980a; 199). The Carter 
administration's actions came as a response to the Soviet 
Union's invasion of Afghanistan (Wehr, 1980b: 56). To 
reduce the impact on United States export companies, USDA's
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Commodity Credit Corporation was directed to purchase 
export companies' contracts for grain sales to the Soviet 
Union at an estimated cost of $2.25 billion. The prices 
offered export companies were to be those paid by export 
companies to sources of grain, not the prices the Soviet 
Union would pay. Soviet Union prices would include trans­
portation, insurance, and other costs, plus profit. These 
purchases involved about 13 export companies who probably 
would have gone bankrupt had their contracts not been 
purchased (Wehr, 1980b: 58).
To cushion the impact of the embargo on American
farmers due to the potential for excessive amounts of grain
on the market, which would cause farm commodity prices to
31fall, feed grain loan, release, and callprices were 
increased. Farmer-held grain reserve feed grain storage 
payments also were increased. These payments were increased 
to provide an incentive for farmers to keep their products 
off the market (Wehr, 1980c: 58).
When the embargo was announced it was predicted that the 
total value of United States agricultural exports during 
fiscal 1980 would be $37 billion instead of $38 billion.
As of April, 19 80, however, USDA said United States agri­
cultural exports would achieve the pre-embargo estimate of 
$38 billion. Significant export volume gains of grains, 
oilseeds, and cotton have contributed to the most recent 
predictions (Milmoe, 1980: 7).
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
One of the primary channels available to promote 
agricultural trade policy has been the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade refers to a series of multilateral negotiations with 
the expressed purpose of reducing tariffs. Since 1947, when 
the first discussions began, until 1974, negotiations had 
been held in Annecy in 1949; Torquay from 1950 to 1951,
Geneva from 1955 to 1956; 1961 to 1962, "Dillon Round"
(Golt, 1974: 1-2); 1964 to 1967,"Kennedy Round" (Halcrow,
1977: 254); and Tokyo, beginning in 1973. By 1973, over 
100 countries were involved in the negotiations (Golt, 1974:
5). The original Tokyo talks were to have been completed 
by 1975. However, because the European community had 
difficulty finding agreement among its nine members, the 
process was slowed. United States political problems, 
the resignation of President Nixon, caused the negotiations 
to be impeded. Following the resignation, politics continued 
to plague the negotiations as the United States presidential 
election was in 1976, and the negotiations could not go on 
until the new President's view could be presented. This 
was not officially possible until January, 1977 (Golt,
1978: 1-3).
In February, 1979, the trade negotiations that had 
begun in Tokyo came to a conclusion. Relative to agriculture, 
agreements between the United States and the developed
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countries provided a reduction of trade barriers worth $3 
billion. Foreign nations made significant concessions to 
the United States on soybeans, our most important export 
commodity, beef, pork, citrus fruits, and tobacco. The 
Japanese and the European community made the largest 
concessions. Japan's concessions relative to United States 
exports amounted to $1.5 billion on such commodities as 
citrus, beef, and soybeans. The European community made 
concessions of $700 million on United States exports of beef, 
poultry, tobacco, rice, and fruit products.
Several international codes to provide freer inter­
national trade also have been agreed upon. One of the most 
important ones concerning the United States deals with 
export subsidies. The new code precludes using export 
subsidies to overtake the third world's market or to 
substantially undercut prices. Finally, any offenders of 
this particular code can have a case brought against them 
and have the case resolved in 120 days (Bergland, 1979; 5).
Other United States Foreign Agricultural Policy Entities
Export-Import Bank. One institution whose activities 
are related to agricultural foreign policy is the Export- 
Import Bank. Created in 1934 as an independent agency to 
promote foreign trade (268) , this institution has had little 
involvement in agricultural foreign policy in recent times 
(274). From 1948 to 1954, it was the only continuous program
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to provide credit for exports that would not be covered 
by commercial banks. During this period, the Export- 
Import Bank lent primarily for economic development purposes 
(268). After 1955, most of the loans were for cotton sales 
to Japan. Commercial banks and other lending institutions 
received guarantees from political and financial risk in 
1963; thus, the need for the Export-Import Bank became less 
and its use had diminished accordingly (Cochrane and Ryan, 
1976: 264) .
Office of the General Sales Manager. An Office of 
the General Sales Manager was created in 19 76. The General 
Sales Manager who heads this is responsible to the Secretary 
of Agriculture through the Assistant Secretary for Inter­
national Affairs and Commodity Programs. The General Sales 
Manager has direct responsibilities for commercial export 
sales. Food for Peace Program, any ad hoc programs established 
to support exports of United States agricultural commodities 
for monitoring the sale of export products by United States 
exporters, and for insuring prompt public dissemination of 
such data (U.S. Congress, 1979: 609, 612).
World Food and Agricultural Outlook Situation Board. 
Another cog in the United States foreign agricultural 
policy machine is the World Food and Agricultural Outlook 
Situation Board. This organization was created in 19 77.
The purpose of the unit (involving 14 full-time employees) 
is to serve as this nation's intelligence agency relative
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to domestic and international food and agricultural products 
concerns. As the intelligence agency for agriculture, it 
is supposed to provide objective, consistent, and reliable 
data to the public and policy makers (U.S. Congress, 1978d; 
498, 500).
Foreign Agricultural Service. Finally, the Foreign 
Agricultural Service serves to promote United States agri­
cultural exports. As a part of its activities the Foreign 
Agricultural Service works with nonprofit trade associations 
and state departments of agriculture in analyzing potential 
foreign markets. Any information that is gathered concerning 
foreign markets is transmitted to United States exporters.
The Foreign Agricultural Service also assists in 
carrying out agricultural policy relative to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Trade Act of 1974.
Its main purpose in dealing with international organiza­
tions, such as the Food and Agricultural Organization of 
the United Nations, is to remove trade barriers to insure 
maximum access to world markets for the United States.
Agricultural attaches are in 65 locations, covering 
100 countries to fulfill the Foreign Agricultural Service's 
responsibilities. The attaches are to provide information 
on world agricultural production, trade, and competition 
relative to the United States concerns. This information 
in turn is made available to the general public (U.S.
General Services Administration, 1978: 125-126).
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Summary
After reviewing some of the major approaches, policies, 
institutions, and agencies involved in United States foreign 
agricultural policy, several characteristics for future 
United States agricultural international trade seem to be 
prominent. Saylor (1978: 162) has described these character­
istics as being the United States's "total approach" to 
developing future markets. He referred to the developing 
countries, centrally planned economies, and the developed 
countries. No matter what type of country one refers to, 
Saylor states the United States will be there to open that 
market up and to develop it for long-term purposes. Mackie 
(1977) stated succinctly the future of our food assistance 
policies, plus their relationship to the American farmer's 
interest :
. . . Not all the agricultural imports by any 
of them [developing countries] will be from 
the United States. And some may not increase 
such imports from the United States at all.
But all will expand the world market for agri­
cultural production, increasingly so as their 
incomes rise to the point where they start 
shifting significantly toward higher quality 
diets. It is this potential for continuous, 
long-term expansion of the world market for 
agricultural products that answers the question:
'What is the economic interest of American 
farmers in the U.S. foreign aid program?' (34).
Couple the growth of developing nations' markets with
long term, liberal trade agreements with developed countries,
and one probably has a pretty good command of United States
future agricultural trade policies.
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Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed and analyzed a multitude 
of agricultural policies and programs, some relating to 
domestic agricultural policy, others directed toward foreign 
agricultural policy. From this research, we can make 
several statements about United States agricultural policy 
as it exists today, attributing no import to the order 
listed: First, the old adage that the agricultural industry 
is one of the last bastions of free enterprise is only 
partially true. Those who wish to cling to the belief that 
the agricultural industry is free of government involvement 
can easily give an example such as the Farm Credit System. 
However, this is countered by target prices, federal crop 
insurance, international trade agreements, etc., and the 
list goes on and on.
Second, we found evidence that the American farmer's 
prices are dependent upon international commodity production 
and agreements. In fact, the farmer's future may well be 
determined by the extent that potential markets are tapped 
in developing nations. For once, the American farmer may 
have to realize that a trade agreement is not a one-way 
street. Agricultural products, that is, may be imported 
into the United States; some may even be in competition with 
the United States farmer's commodities.
Third, the United States agricultural policy apparatus 
is overlapping in some areas, and is dynamic. Redundancy
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was noted in rural development efforts where the Depart­
ments of Labor; Health, Education, and Welfare; Housing 
and Urban Development; and USDA all were conducting rural 
development policy, and some of their efforts were duplica­
tive. Dynamism, or ability to change according to new 
demands, was reflected in changes in the Food for Peace 
Program and Rural Electrification Administration.
Fourth, there is presently a migration of people from 
urban areas to the rural areas, but not necessarily to farms. 
With this movement have come many new issues and problems 
concerning public services and employment.
Finally, to deal with all of these problems and 
opportunities, goals and objectives must be defined. It 
is fitting to end this chapter with Senator Humphrey's 
(1976) five goals for our future agricultural policy:
First, our policies must assure farm families 
of more stable incomes, so that lifetime investments 
will not be swept away by one bad year . . . .
Second, our policies must provide insurance 
for farm families against natural and economic 
disasters . . . .
Fourth, we must assure the nation's food con­
sumers that food markets will have a steady supply 
of food every week when they go to the store, and 
not only if they go early, or stand in long lines.
Finally, we must assure our foreign customers 
of stable grain and fiber supplies, at prices 
that do not bounce wildly from year to year. Other­
wise, when prices and supplies move sharply up and 
down, either the United States may be forced into 
a painful last resort action to protect its own 
supplies (the soybean export embargo) or foreign 
countries may resort to equally undesirable action 
to protect buyers (the recent cancellation of 
cotton contracts) (133).
120
The remainder of this manuscript will involve pro­
viding research into the making of agricultural policy 
applying theory to actual data, and analyzing the data.
As mentioned earlier, Chapter II will discuss interest 
group literature relevant to the research. The third 
chapter will develop the theory that will be applied, and 
hypotheses will be stated. In the fourth chapter, the 
methods chapter, there will be a discussion of how the 
data were gathered, and a relevant literature review will 
be presented. Chapters V and VI will apply Robert Salis­
bury's exchange theory to actual data, and Chapter VII 
will contain the conclusions.
NOTES
1. A thorough discussion of the difficulties in defining
what constitutes rural, nonrural, farm, nonfarm, urban, 
etc., can be found in Marshall (1976: 14-16).
2. These figures are based upon United States Census Bureau
and Department of Labor definitions. Urban was designated
as populations in towns of 2,500 to 10,000 outside metro­
politan areas. All other areas outside of metropolitan 
areas were defined as rural (Marshall: 15).
3. Price support policies are governmental efforts to
control agricultural commodity production and supplies. 
These policies include long term land retirement, short 
term land retirement, direct payments without controls, 
demand expansion, and marketing orders and agreements, 
etc. For a concise explanation of these policies see 
Tweeten (1969: 108-115). Also, for a detailed discussion
of how price support programs work, see Rasmussen and 
Baker (1972: 100-104) and Mehren (1968: 175-188).
4. Section 32 refers to legislation passed in 1935 to
provide more outlets for surplus agricultural commodities 
in order to provide price supports for farmers.
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Legislated was a continual appropriation of 30 percent 
of all import duties collected each year. About 80 
percent of Section 32 funds have gone toward domestic 
purchases and donation of surplus foods and for food 
stamp plans (Rasmussen and Baker, 1972: 115).
5. The 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act stated wheat, cotton, 
field corn, hogs, rice, tobacco, and milk and milk 
products were basic commodities. Amendments in 1934 and 
1935 expanded the basic commodity test by also including 
rye, flax, barley, grain sorghums, cattle, peanuts, sugar 
beets, sugar cane, and potatoes. Despite the expanded 
basic commodity list, allotment programs were only in 
operation for cotton, field corn, peanuts, rice, sugar, 
tobacco, and wheat (Rasmussen and Baker, 1969: 71).
6. For a thorough explanation of parity see Thomsen and
Foote (1969: 90-95).
7. An enlightening litany concerning high potato price 
supports despite their continual overabundance since 
the mid-1930s can be found in Matusow (1967: 125-132).
8. For a very provocative discourse on Ezra Taft Benson's
tenure as Secretary of Agriculture, read McCune
(1958: Chapter 6).
9. Due to the excessive stocks in January 1961, the cost 
of storing an additional bushel of wheat was greater 
than the original cost of the wheat (Cochrane and 
Ryan : 1976: 79).
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10. For a good review of the cost of the beekeeper 
indemnity program since its inception and President 
Jimmy Carter's attempts to eliminate it for budget 
cutting purposes, see Clark (1979: 362).
11. See MacDonald (1977: 642-658) for an excellent review 
of the food stamp program.
12. Bonus dollars or bonus food stamps were the federal 
transfer computed by finding the differences between the 
market value of the stamps (the allotment) and the 
amount paid for the stamps (the purchase requirement). 
These bonus dollars varied based on household size and 
net monthly income. For a hypothesized example, let us 
say the average monthly income of a family was $225 and 
the family paid $75 for $150 worth of stamps. The dollar 
difference between $150 and $75, $75, was the bonus 
dollars ("Efforts to Revise," 1976: 607).
13. In 1883, Harvey W. Wiley, who directed USDA's Bureau of 
Chemistry, used a group of healthy men to determine the 
effects of adulterated food. Called the Poison Squad, 
these men would eat contaminated food until their health 
began deteriorating (Baker and Rasmussen, 1972: 16).
14. Several characteristics were involved in the doctrines 
of the Law Merchant. First, the Law Merchant was based 
on mercantile custom, including the rule that informal 
agreements are legally binding. Second, since the 
mercantile custom was so intimately related to mercantile
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expertise, the administration of Law Merchant courts 
was by fellow merchants, not by lawyers or judges.
Third, mercantile disputes were resolved expeditiously 
and informally compared to the English common law 
system (Lurie, 1975: 1112-1113).
15. The farmers were wondering why prices were depressed 
since after 1885 there had been no overproduction; 
production had just kept pace with population growth. 
Farmers felt the answer was speculation. Brokers 
claimed it was proper to have an excess of commodities 
traded over the amount produced; anti-futures proponents 
used this as an indictment of the futures process.
To the farmer, this resale of the same unit of commodity 
(e.g., a bushel of wheat) could only lead to more money 
for the speculators and less for the farmers (Cowing, 
1965: 8-9).
16. Breimyer (1965: 175-176) has described two types of
vertical coordination. There is market exchange that
has been around for several hundred years. This vertical
coordination involves buying and selling of commodities. 
The selling can take place in a formal or informal 
marketplace. Generally inputs are bought at local 
outlets. On the other hand, vertical integration 
creates coordination through different means. With this 
kind of process, the production and marketing processes 
are based on something other than buying and selling—
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single managerial control. This single managerial 
control is accomplished through combined ownership or 
contracts. For an excellent description of vertical 
integration. Read Breimyer's case study on the broiler 
industry in the early 1960s (1965: 203-224).
17. Hugh Hammond Bennett of USDA's Bureau of Chemistry and 
Soils had proposed the soil erosion control plan. He 
had suggested that the program be administered jointly 
by the Division of Soil Erosion in the Bureau of Chemis­
try and Soils and the Division of Forage Crops in the 
Bureau of Plant Industry. As such, this plan was 
submitted to Secretary of Agriculture Wallace. At this 
time, however, approval of Bennett's plan came under the 
jurisdiction of the National Planning Board that expended 
funds of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public 
Works. The administrator of the Federal Emergency Admin­
istration of Public Works was Harold L. Ickes; he was 
also the Secretary of Interior. On August 23, 1933, Ickes 
wrote a letter to himself as Secretary of Interior in 
which he allocated $5 million for an emergency soil 
erosion program. Several days later the National Planning 
Board amended its minutes of July 17 to read that the 
Department of Interior, not USDA, was to administer the 
new Soil Erosion Service (Morgan, 1965: 9-10).
18. The close relationship between USDA's Forest Service and 
the Department of Interior is exemplified by the
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appropriations process. An amiable agreement has been 
worked out between congressional committees so that the 
Forest Service's appropriations are included with those 
of the Department of Interior, not with USDA's (Rasmussen 
and Baker, 1972: 16-97).
19. Thomas Jefferson illegally sent to the United States 
upland rice seed while traveling in Italy in 1787. The 
Italians prohibited such actions as a means to protect 
their producers from foreign competition (Moore, 1967: 4).
20. Tugwell had a personality that evoked either strong 
dislike or an abundance of loyalty (McConnell, 1953: 205).
21. Farm debt adjustment provided assistance to competent 
farmers who had their property mortgaged in excess of 
their borrowing power. The phrase "farm debt adjustment" 
is derived from "farm debt adjustment committees" that 
were created. These were composed of prominent citizens 
who tried to get creditors and debtors to agree on 
repayment terms so the debtor could retain his property 
(Benedict, 1953: 281-282).
22. McConnell (1953) provides an excellent discussion of the 
American Farm Bureau Federation for wanting the Farm 
Security Administration dismantled (Chapters 9 and 10).
23. USDA's rural development efforts include: farm and rural 
development loans and grants, agricultural credit, 
community and regional development, housing programs, 
electric and telephone programs, broadband communication
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systems, a federal programs information retrieval 
system, area development assistance, energy planning, 
assistance to small farmers, agricultural support pro­
grams, assistance for the American Indian, land use, 
resource conservation and development, rural fire pro­
tection, community forestry program, extension and 
research, and leadership and coordination training 
conferences and sessions (U.S. Congress, 1978c: 44-61). 
The Department of Labor's rural development programs 
are also extensive (180-112).
24. Discount notes are sold for periods of 5 to 150 days to
entities that have temporary excess funds. The 37 banks
began using this funding source in 1975. By the end of 
the first year of this program, the system raised $3.7 
billion and had $406 million outstanding at an average 
annual rate of 5.48 percent (Hoag, 1976: 43).
25. Some 20 years after the Depression of the 1870s the price
of corn and cotton had decreased 50 percent. .In 1860, 
farm income accounted for 30 percent of the national 
income, in 1900 for 20 percent of the national income. 
Agricultural wealth made up 40 percent of the national 
wealth in 1860, in 1900 for 16 percent of the national 
wealth (Morgan, 1970: 151).
26. There are two methods of taxing a farm corporation's 
income. Using the standard method, taxes are applied to 
corporate income. In 1958, another method was begun.
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In this case, the individual tax rate is applied to 
each person's share of the corporate income, even if the 
income is left in the corporation or received by the 
shareholder. The method can be applied only to farm 
corporations with 10 or fewer stockholders or 15 or fewer 
stockholders after five years as a tax-option corporation 
(Halcrow, 1977; 418-419).
27. Stanley (1973: 9-39) provides a historical and fairly
thorough review of United States efforts in voluntary 
relief of famine situations. He begins with Ireland's 
famine of 1848 and ends with Brazil's famine in 1962.
28. Soft currency is the foreign countries' national currency.
This currency is not gold backed (Stanley, 1973: 63).
29. "Food for peace" was officially not considered synonymous
with Public Law 480 until the 1959 legislation that 
extended Public Law 480 for two years (Amrine, 1960: 236). 
Senator Humphrey had suggested using food for peace since 
1954. President Dwight D. Eisenhower began in January 
1959 to express the idea of using farm surpluses for 
peaceful purposes (231). Interestingly, over Senator 
Humphrey's protests, the White House managed to get the 
words "food for peace" deleted from the title of the
1959 extension. Only a short time later in New Delhi, 
India, President Eisenhower made a plea for— incredulously- 
a "food for peace" program (236).
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30. Buffer stocks are surpluses of the commodities 
concerned. These stocks are accumulated by the nations 
that are parties to the agreement and produce the commo­
dity. When production of a commodity is high, reserves 
are built up; when production is down or there is a 
sharp increase in demand for the commodity, the stocks 
are released into the market to mitigate the price 
increase (Samuelson, 1978: 160).
31. If market prices rise to a "release" level, determined 
by a formula based on the loan rate, farmers can take 
grain out of storage and sell it. If market prices rise 
further, to a "call" level also determined by formula, 
the Secretary of Agriculture would call in all loans 
made on reserve grain. At that time, a farmer can either 
market his grain and pay off the loan, or forfeit the 




The material to follow is not intended to provide 
an exhaustive review of interest group literature. Rather, 
it is an introduction to certain aspects of research on 
interest groups and to the major agriculture interest groups 
themselves. Chapter III will expand on many points dis­
cussed here and especially on exchange theory as applied to 
the study of groups.
Historical Underpinnings
Traditional Approach to Groups
Before discussing the group approaches of Salisbury 
and Olson, the traditional approach to groups will be dis­
cussed. Latham.has stated the twentieth century group 
approach to politics had its origins in writings of the 
pluralistic philosophers Figgis, Maitland, Cole, and Laski. 
These philosophers declared that the state was just one 
association among many associations. This position was 
opposite to that taken by the Utilitarians of the same
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period who contended the political community was made up 
of only the individual and the state; all other associations 
were ignored. The significance of the pluraliste consider­
ing the state as but one association is that the state was 
no longer considered to contain or project all the needs 
and desires of the individual. Rather, the state was con­
sidered to be in competition with lesser associations or 
groupings such as clubs, unions, etc. for the loyalty of 
individuals. The pluraliste, thus, provided some basis for 
a group approach in understanding political occurrences 
(Latham, 1952; 378-380).
The real precursor of the group approach, however, 
was Arthur Bentley. In his seminal work of 1908, The 
Process of Government, Bentley stated the primary unit of 
analysis for studying political phenomena is the group. 
Furthermore, he defined a group as:
. . .  a certain portion of the men of a society, 
taken, however, not as a physical mass cut off from 
other masses of men, but as a mass activity, which 
does not preclude the men who participate in it from 
participating likewise in many other group activities 
(1935: 211).
To Bentley, as the above quotation discloses, the 
group notion emphasizes activity. In fact, Bentley says 
group and group activity are coequals. Furthermore, Bentley 
considers all groups to have an interest, and similarly, 
interest also means group (211). Finally, Bentley states:
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The group and the interest are not separate. There 
exists only the one thing, that is, so many men 
bound together in or along the path of a certain 
activity (211).
Pursuing the group approach from a somewhat different
perspective, David Truman described a group as " . . . any
collection of individuals who have some characteristic in
common" (1971: 23). Truman called these collections of
individuals categoric groups. For example, farmers,
alcoholics, insurance men, blondes, etc., would compose
categoric groups. However, Truman cautioned that it was the
"uniformities of behavior" produced by the categoric groups
that are critical, rather than the similarities among those
in the group. This is because the uniformity of behavior
is dependent upon the interactions or relationships of people
within a group rather than upon the homogeneity of a group.
Moreover, Truman noted the character and frequency of the
interaction are crucial in defining a group, much more so
than the similarities within the group (23-24). Truman
cited the following as an example of the importance of
frequency of interaction in determining a group:
If a motorist stops along a highway to ask directions 
of a farmer, the two are interacting, but they can 
hardly be said to constitute a group except in the 
most unusual sense (24).
Thus, it is apparent that Truman and Bentley have 
similar views as to what constitutes a group. Both Bentley 
and Truman refer to interactions within the group. Bentley 
describes this interaction as a "mass of activity" and
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Truman refers to the same as "pattern of interaction."
Bentley and Truman also have the perspective that a group 
seeks a common good (Bill and Hardgrave, 1973: 120-121).
Other Group Theorists
Mancur Olson and Robert Salisbury are two theorists 
who have expanded Bentley's original group approach, thus 
making the approach more adaptable. Each individual's 
model will be discussed below.
Salisbury's reinterpretation of the group approach 
is classic (1970). It should be pointed out that his work 
is oriented toward formal associations and is not considered 
as a new approach to studying political phenomena (33).
The primary theme of Salisbury's work is that interest 
groups' "origins, growth, death, and associated lobbying" 
are based on exchange relationships involving entrepreneurs 
and prospective members of groups (33).
The group organizer is an entrepreneur who has capital 
in the form of benefits to offer at a price to prospective 
members. The organizer provides benefits to insure there 
is a flourishing organization (57-58) . The "exchange" 
aspect of the theory refers to the requirement that a 
sufficient amount of benefits be accrued by the organizer 
and the organization's members, if the organization is to 
continue. Hence, there must be a "mutually satisfactory 
exchange" (58). Benefits for the organizer can be in the 
form of salary or organizational members' support (59).
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If sufficient benefits are not provided by the organiza­
tion's members, then the organization may go broke and the 
organizer could lose his job. However, in some cases where 
the organizer is not salaried he may not lose his position, 
but will lose his supporters (59-60). Salisbury says, thus, 
"'profit' to the leadership is a necessary part of the 
exchange with the members and without it the leaders cannot 
continue" (60).
Mancur Olson (1971) in The Logic of Collective Action 
has challenged a part of Bentley and Truman's group approach. 
Traditional group approach theorists have held that people 
join together to increase their chances of securing a common 
goal. Thus, the political system is seen as a web of 
competitive groups through which individuals seek common 
goals (Bill and Hardgrave, 1973: 130-131).
Olson contends that individuals are rational; there­
fore, members of large groups will not act to seek the 
group's common goal (Olson, 1971: 1-2). Olson explains the 
collective good is obtained when the circumstances involve 
a small group. According to Olson, the reason a small 
group is able to acquire its common interests is because 
individual members feel they can acquire enough of the 
total common interest to make it worth their effort to 
personally seek (33-34). Individuals will also join groups 
if they are coerced or may receive selective benefits (133). 
Compulsory membership in unions is an example of coercion 
to maintain a group (71).
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Despite Olson's effective argument against the main 
thesis of the traditional group approach, his theory is not 
considered a replacement for a group approach, nor does it 
escape criticism. Since Olson's collective good theory is 
principally more of a redefinition of the group approach, it 
cannot be construed as an entirely new, ground-breaking 
approach. One can also be critical of Olson's explanation 
since there is evidence that even in large groups individuals 
do contribute to common goals without receiving selective 
inducements or being forced. This occurs when an individual 
feels others will assist him in securing a common interest, 
and the end results of the joint effort will leave the 
individual better off than when he began his effort (Bill 
and Hardgrave, 1973: 133-134).
The essence of Olson's and Salisbury's arguments is 
that other forces beside social forces cause groups to be 
formed (Salisbury, 1975: 19 3). Olson states the individual 
must feel it is worth his effort; while Salisbury maintains 
in large groups it is the organizer exchanging benefits with 
the organized that causes groups to grow. Salisbury's work 
is important given its refinement of the group approach and 
because it permits the analyst to examine the development 
of groups, as opposed to that of Olson, who assumes there is 
an ongoing system (Salisbury, 1970: 54).
The traditional approach to the study of groups has 
carried its weight, but it is time to amend the seminal works 
if group theory is to be further developed. Using Olson
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and Salisbury's works to augment the traditional group 
approach is a step toward that end. Otherwise, researchers 
will continue to be faced with group theories and theories 
of groups— rather than a theory of groups.
Interest GZoup Structure 
Different kinds of groups may have more influence than 
other kinds of groups. For example, institutional interest 
groups perhaps are more likely to attain their goals than 
anomic interest groups. Several typologies of groups will 
be presented. Mass versus peak groups are the two categories 
that are used in this research and are fully discussed in 
Chapter III.
Interest Groups and Attitude Groups
To understand what an interest group is or is not, 
it is essential to critique the various typologies of inter­
est groups based on groups' structures. Castles (1967) 
stated pressure groups could be broken into two primary 
types: the interest group and the attitude group. An 
interest group is characterized as being formed to promote 
shared sectional interests. An attitude group would be 
established to achieve a specific objective or cause. 
Important to the definition of an attitude group is the 
requirement that the group be composed of members with 
shared attitudes. Finally, attitude groups cease to exist 
once the objective or cause has been achieved (2-3).
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Anomie, Nonassociational/ Institutional, and Associational 
Interest Groups
Almond and Powell (1966) said there were four kinds 
of interest groups. They defined an interest group as "a 
group of individuals who are linked by particular bonds of 
concern or advantages, and who have some awareness of these 
bonds" (75) .
The first type of group defined by Almond and Powell 
is the anomic interest group. These are generally considered 
to take impulsive actions on the political system. Such 
interest groups would undertake riots, demonstrations, 
assassinations, etc. Anomic behavior can be sponsored by 
organized interest groups which have not received represen­
tation in the system or by an incident or a leader. The 
anomic groups are considered to be poorly organized and lack 
continuity of support for the group (75-76).
The second kind are nonassociational interest groups. 
These represent "kinship and lineage groups, and ethnic, 
regional, status, and class groups" (76). Such groups have 
only occasional articulations of their viewpoints, little 
or no organizational structure for articulation, and their 
internal structure lacks continuity. An example of such a 
group would be an informal delegation of landowners 
discussing tariffs or grain with a bureaucrat (76-77).
Institutional interest groups are parts of organiza­
tions such as political parties, bureaucracies, churches, 
etc. These groups are formally organized, professionally
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staffed, and render services to the organization other than 
just interest articulation. Moreover, these groups may 
enunciate their own viewpoints or other groups' societal 
interests. An example of such a group would be a legisla­
tive bloc or an ideological clique of a bureaucracy (77).
The final and most sophisticated category of Almond 
and Powell is the associational interest group. Completely 
professionally staffed, designed to expressly articulate 
the interests of a particular group, and supported by formal 
procedures to seek their interests, these groups are typified 
by trade unions, ethnic associations, civic groups, etc.
The associational interest groups' tactics and goals are 
considered legitimate by society. Finally, these groups 
tend to dominate the other categories of groups because of 
their organizational sophistication, and they represent a 
wide range of groups and interests (78).
Almond and Powell's typology has been criticized as 
being somewhat parochial. It seems to indicate that certain 
group categories are more preferred than others. That is, 
Almond and Powell seem to believe the order of preference 
should begin with the associational interest group and 
extend in descending preference to anomic interest groups 
(Bill and Hardgrave, 1973: 123). Furthermore, this typology 
is criticized for stating that nonassociational interests 
have effective articulation (124). Finally, when Almond 
and Powell maintain that nonassociational groups may 
eventually develop into associational groups (1973: 77),
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Bill and Hardgrave contend there is no solid evidence for 
such a statement, and in fact, many associational groups 
eventually fragment into factions and informal groups 
(1973: 124).
Clientela and Parentela Groups
LaPalombara (1964) developed a classificatory scheme 
based on the relationship of groups to centers of policy 
making. The classifications include clientela and parentela 
groups. A clientela group's relationship to an agency is 
that of a client. A group seeks a close relationship with 
an agency because the group realizes the power^ that the 
agency has in relationship to the group's interests. In 
exchange for consideration of the group's interests, the 
agency requires that the groups be representative of a sub­
stantial number of its general membership. Finally, the 
group must provide expert assistance to the agency, generally 
in the form of information (333). Rourke also described 
interest groups vis-a-vis centers of public policy making 
in the same context as LaPalombara, and he too described 
them as clientele groups (1976: 47-51).
The second kind of group described by LaPalombara is 
the parentela group. Such a relationship exists when a 
group can expect to receive very favorable treatment from 
an agency. In fact, other groups that may have an interest 
in the agency are openly denied access to the agency. The 
group controls the agency to the extent that the agency fears
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intervention by higher officials if the agency does not 
concede to the group's demands (1974: 333-334). Rourke 
describes this same situation as a captive agency phenomenon 
(1976: 51-56).
Confident Solidary, Neutral Solidary, and Alienated Solidary 
Groups
Finally, Gamson (1968) organizes groups according to 
the means available to exercise influence. He defines a 
confident solidary group as a group which can use persuasion 
as a means of influence. The conditions for such a group 
include those being influenced being in agreement with the 
objectives of the group doing the influencing. In this 
situation, Gamson says, it is in the best interest of the 
influencing party to use persuasion rather than constraints 
or inducements. Persuasion could be in the form of 
information, argument, using the friendship of those being 
influenced, and promoting the commonalities between the 
group and the influenced. He feels constraints, any 
resource which creates disadvantages, would cause resistance 
in those being influenced, and in the long run, would reduce 
the probability that those being influenced would cooperate 
in the future. Gamson felt inducements would do more harm 
than good as a means of influence in this situation as they 
might be considered bribes if offered too overtly or the 
offering might breach the norms of friendship. That is, if 
this relationship is considered a form of friendship, then 
proffer by the influencer should not require a reciprocal
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action. In this situation, however, the party being influ­
enced may feel an obligation to provide a quid pro quo for 
the action of the influencer; thus, the relationship will 
have developed into something more formal than a friendship.
In the future, therefore, the group might not be able to 
have the same congenial relationship with those being 
influenced, clearly a cost to the party doing the influencing.
A neutral solidary group involves a circumstance 
where those being influenced do not favor or oppose the 
group's objectives. In this situation, more information 
will not suffice to cause the influencer to prevail. Instead, 
inducements must be used to persuade the influenced to side 
with the influencing party. The influencing party must 
offer the influenced something of value. Constraints are 
not to be used in this situation as it might cause the 
influenced to move from a neutral position to an adverse 
position.
Finally, Gamson describes the alienated solidary 
group. In this case, persuasion and inducements will not 
work as means of influencing the nonmembers. Constraints 
are the only influencing tactics available. The situation 
assumes there is little or no trust between the group and 
those being influenced. Furthermore, inducements, such as 
more information for the influenced, would only solidify 
even more the position of the influenced. • The primary 
resource of an alienated group, therefore, is resistance—  
to create trouble (164-171).
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Organizational Structure 
Organizational structure refers to organizational 
goals such as leadership skills, substantive and political 
process expertise, leader and group member unanimity, and 
degree of focus. Organization cohesion and coalition 
structure are also organization structure variables, but 
they are discussed in Chapter III and are the only organiza­
tion structure variables used in the research. According to 
Ornstein and Elder (1978), organizational structure enables 
a group to mobilize its membership for political action (74).
Leadership Skills
Leadership skills is an important organizational
structure variable. This permits the group to manage other
resources of the group, to set priorities, and to select
allies (Ornstein and Elder, 1978: 75). The importance of
leadership skills is indicated by the following statement:
A large part of Common Cause's influence is 
because of David [Cohen] and Fred [Wertheimer].
They know how to approach Congress and they know 
how things work around here (75).
Substantive and Political Process Expertise
A group's Washington staff may reflect to a consider­
able degree whether a group will have influence. Milbrath 
(1963) stated that if a group has a small staff, then it is 
unlikely individuals will become specialists. If there is 
personnel enough available, each individual is assigned to
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a number of congressional offices (37). Zeigler and Baer 
(1969) found the longer a lobbyist had been around, the 
greater his chances of success (136) .
Leader and Group Member Unanimity
Communications from the main offices to opinion 
leaders and then to individual members of the group provide 
a potential to have influence. Thus, it is crucial for the 
primary lobbyists to make the linkages vertically to the 
opinion leaders. Following this, there must be horizontal 
communication among the opinion leaders. Ultimately, such 
communication can serve as a means to solidify the opinions 
of the general membership based on the dialogue initiated 
by the head offices of the group (Stedman, 1958: 129).
Degree of Lobby Focus
Bauer, Pool, and Dexter reflected on the fact that 
despite the voluminous amounts of money spent by pressure 
groups, thus giving the image of glutted groups, in reality 
most organizations work with tight budgets (1972: 345). 
Berry's research indicated the disparity between groups' 
total assets and the amount the Washington offices receive. 
For instance, the 1973 National Audubon Society income was 
more than $7 million, but its Washington office operated on 
$20,000 for the same year (1977: 60-61).
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Resources
Resources that groups use to influence policy makers 
are numerous. This section discusses only money, volunteer 
labor, information, and time. In Chapter III, group size 
and dispersion are presented as variables to be studied.
Money
Money is perhaps the most important resource a group 
can have to influence public policy. This resource enables 
a group to gather other resources such as substantive, 
political, and leadership expertise, plus public relations 
talent. If a group is denied access to policy makers through 
regular channels, with money available a group can select 
alternative communication channels such as newspaper, radio, 
and television advertisements (Ornstein and Elder, 1978: 70).
Money is also used by groups to give campaign contri­
butions to legislators via political action committees. For 
the 1978 U.S. House elections, 106 incumbents, 33 challengers, 
and 37 individuals running for open seats each received 
$50,000 or more from political action committees (Cook, 1979: 
1955) . Other groups give money to candidates as illegal 
bribes, though infrequently, lecture fees, and inkind con­
tributions (Ornstein and Elder, 1978: 72-73).
Volunteer Labor
Volunteer labor is a big boon to any group's efforts. 
These individuals generally work on special projects as when
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a critical bill comes before Congress. In other situations, 
a group may not generate a large number of volunteers, but 
will have one or two regular volunteers year round. There 
are cases where large numbers of volunteers are available all 
the time. For example, the League of Women Voters uses 
women who are trained in lobbying techniques to volunteer 
two or three days a week to lobby an issue (Berry, 1977: 65-66).
Another form of volunteer assistance being used more 
frequently than in the past and that assists groups in their 
potential to have an influence is called pro bono publico 
work. Pro bono publico work involves Washington law firms 
voluntarily providing legal aid, primarily to the indigent. 
However, the same firms also provide assistance to consumer 
and environmental groups. Such firms generally are well 
known, prestigious, and lucrative (Berry, 1977: 70-71).
Public Perception of the Group
Greenwald also cites a group's standing in the gen­
eral social environment as one of its most important resources. 
She states groups have two types of assets that make up 
social standing: tangible and intangible assets.
Tangible assets providing social status include a 
combination of educated members, sufficient lobbying person­
nel and techniques, and cultural status complemented by money. 
Groups that possess this attribute include the National 
Red Cross, American Legion, and the American Bar Association.
It should be noted that this aspect of social standing can 
be generated by a group's own efforts.
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Intangible assets involve what the group has to offer 
as goals and objectives relative to public opinion. In 
effect, a group can be said to have intangible assets if 
it is considered to be the legitimate source of information 
for the issues with which it is primarily concerned. 
Frequently, a group may not possess tangible assets, but 
does have intangible ones. Thus, what may appear as generally 
seamy groups may be acceptable in the public eye for issue 
purposes. Although permitting lesser groups to have 
legitimacy, groups having mainly intangible resources have 
the pitfall of being very dependent on public opinion and 
the general changes in the environment of the policy making 
arena (1977: 332-333).
Information
Bauer, Pool, and Dexter believe a required resource 
is adequate information. Without facts an interest group is 
impotent. Information provided through research is used in 
articles, speeches, and letters. Even more importantly, 
information is used to persuade congressmen. Thus, informa­
tion is power (1972: 346-347).
Time
Finally, time is a factor in determining whether a 
group can have influence. If an interest group is under­
staffed, all its personnel can do is to react to situations. 
When there are too few personnel, they are not given ample
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preparation time that could lead to long-range planning. 
Instead, understaffed groups are plagued by one individual 
being overwhelmed by many tasks (348-349).
Channels of Influence
Several tactics can be used by interest groups to 
influence a person or persons. Tactics here mean specific 
efforts used to fulfill a strategy plan; a strategy plan 
refers to "long-range purposes and objectives of a group's 
policy" (Milbrath, 1963; 41). Later in the research an 
examination will be made to determine the effectiveness of 
written and personal testimony and presenting testimony in 
a House of Congress. The categories of tactics which are 
discussed below include direct lobbying and indirect 
lobbying.
Direct Lobbying
Personal Recommendations. Personal presentation of 
arguments to officials is considered to be one of the most 
used means of persuasion. Berry (1977) , however, found that 
when direct lobbying was used, interest groups seldom 
engaged in conversation with White House staff members. 
Senators, or Representatives. Instead, the lobbyist gen­
erally ended up conversing with the staff of congressmen. 
Similarly, Berry found lobbyists having more access to 
bureau staff than to agency heads and Cabinet officers. 
According to Berry, the most crucial factor in determining
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whether one was permitted to discuss matters with agency 
personnel was the extent to which the agency sympathized 
with the group (214-216).
Two other findings of Berry must be mentioned. One, 
lobbyists do not always lobby their sympathizers and ignore 
their foes. Two, lobbyists tend to encounter many more 
"neutral" people (neither a friend nor a foe of the interest 
group) than has formerly been assumed (218-222). On the 
other hand, Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1972) found that 
"direct persuasion of uncommitted or opposed congressmen 
and senators was a minor activity of the lobbies" in 
their study of lobbying on the reciprocal trade controversy 
from 1953 to 1955 (442).
Berry's findings of lobbyists gaining access to 
agencies is supported by Rourke's (1976) contentions.
Rourke has stated that it is essential for agencies to have 
the support of interest groups who have "enduring tie[s]" to 
the agency. Furthermore, agencies do reciprocate interest 
group efforts by establishing sound relationships with a 
group, especially those groups that were responsible for 
the advent of the agency (46).
Congressional Hearings. Congressional hearings pro­
vide a forum for interest groups as well. Such hearings 
permit groups to provide information for and against legis­
lation. A lobbyist's paraphernalia will include charts 
and graphs that can serve to augment the oral arguments of a
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lobbyist (Turner, 1958: 66). Generally, congressional 
hearings are not an event where interest groups expend an 
overwhelming amount of energy to persuade people. Rather, 
testifying before a committee is more symbolic and used 
primarily as a means to gain access for influencing legis­
lation in the future (Berry, 1977: 223). When a group is 
considering an incipient issue and is willing to pursue the 
issue for more than one session of Congress, then a group 
will make a concerted effort to persuade a committee or sub­
committee (224-225). Zeigler and Peak (1972) also find 
little evidence of lobbyists having much influence on legis­
lation via congressional hearings. In fact, Zeigler and 
Peak candidly stated, "Most legislators have already made 
up their minds" (139). Zeigler and Peak, however, feel 
hearings do serve at least three functions for lobbying 
groups. First, hearings provide all involved an opportunity 
to determine what position various participants will take 
on an issue. Second, hearings provide interest groups with 
inexpensive publicity. Third, hearings provide individual 
lobbyists with a chance to demonstrate their knowledge about 
an issue; thereby, perhaps becoming more personally respected 
by legislators (140).
Legal Action. Litigation can be used as a channel 
of influence for interest groups. Groups frequently support 
individuals in cases because the individuals lack the 
required "time, money, and skill" (Vose, 1958: 22). Because
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litigation is so expensive, it is considered to be a last 
means of influence. In fact, it is generally used only 
after all other attempts before administrative agencies 
have been rejected (Berry, 1977: 225).
Critical to a group considering litigation as an 
alternative is the extent to which the group has the 
resources available to conduct such an effort. Primarily, 
this means the group must have resources allocated strictly 
for the purpose of litigation and, generally, in-house 
counsel, though legal assistance may be sought outside of 
the group (225) .
Two primary means of groups using litigation to 
influence have been the class action suit and the amicus 
curiae brief. The class action suit has been used to pre­
vent an official from enforcing a law. Class action suits 
permit a party who has lost standing to sue to be replaced 
by a party who has not lost standing, while not having the 
original litigation terminated. Such cases are critical to 
groups since they permit the group to maximize its resources, 
particularly the factor of timing when the issue should 
come before the courts (Zeigler and Peak, 1972: 200-201).
An amicus curiae brief permits groups to file briefs in 
support of litigants even though the groups are not actually 
parties to the suit (203). Though we do not know the exact 
effectiveness of public interest litigation, McFarland (1976) 
has noted it has been increasingly used since 19 66 (.18-19) .
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Indirect Lobbying
Campaign Money. Providing campaign money for a 
candidate may be considered a tactic. Money may be consid­
ered an indirect tactic since it may be used by the candi­
date to establish "candidate visibility, hire staff, and pay 
for early expenditures" (141). A classic example of an 
interest group using campaign money as an indirect channel 
of influence was when the Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 
pledged $2 million to Nixon's 1972 presidential campaign.
This perhaps resulted in $300 million worth of milk price 
supports at the behest of President Nixon (Greenwald, 1977: 3-9)
Releasing Research Results and Public Relations.
Another means of influencing officials includes publishing 
congressmen's voting records. For example, such tabulations 
can be released to the public to portray a congressman as 
a liberal if he has a high rating of liberalism by the 
Americans for Democratic Action or as a conservative if he 
receives a high rating of conservatism from the Americans 
for Constitutional Action (Berry, 1977: 240, 243; Greenwald, 
1977: 74-75). Releasing research results and providing the 
press with leaks are the channels an interest group may use 
when the group feels officials are unwilling to listen.
The purpose in these efforts is to generate public sentiment 
in favor of the interest group's position (Berry, 1977: 243- 
244). Also, a path of influence could be a public relations
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campaign conducted by established groups seeking public 
goals via massive advertisement campaigns (Greenwald, 1977; 
77-78). Press conferences also can be used most effectively 
by groups, especially when the group is led by a strong 
public interest figure such as Common Causes' John Gardner 
or Ralph Nader (Berry, 1977: 245-246) .
Whistle-Blowing. A group may urge people to become 
whistle-blowers. Whistle-blowers are either individuals 
who attack an institution while still employed at an insti­
tution or soon after leaving an institution (Peters and 
Branch, 1972: 4-5). A prime example of whistle-blowing was 
the exposure of Senator Thomas Dodd's financial corruption 
by a former staff member, James Boyd (22-29). There are 
several possible consequences of whistle-blowing which could 
benefit a group. Policy might be changed. Whistle-blowing 
may induce people to be less gullible about the "protector 
of the public" image projected by certain self-serving 
agencies, e.g.. Pentagon, General Motors, etc. Furthermore, 
whistle-blowing makes each successive whistle-blower more 
acceptable to the public. The general public, thus, becomes 
less likely to consider the whistle-blowers as traitors, 
but rather as a necessary factor in balancing loyalties 
(1972: 296-297).
Political Protest. Political protest has as its main 
purpose the express act of gaining publicity for a group. 
Historically, political protest has been used as an avenue
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of influence because other channels were perceived as 
closed (Berry, 1977: 731). Lipsky (1968) has made a dis­
tinction between two types of groups that protest. Protests 
can involve relatively powerless groups that activate third 
parties to enter into the political arena, thus creating 
bargaining resources (1145-1146) . On the other hand, there 
are the protests involving the group protesting, the party 
being protested against, and at least one invited third 
party. The third party is generally considered to be in 
alliance with the protesting groups and to possess sufficient 
resources with which to bargain (1146) . In the first 
situation, ad hoc groups are generally lacking in-house 
skilled professionals such as lawyers and financial resources. 
The effectiveness of such protests, therefore, will depend 
on volunteers and financing by outside sources. Finally, 
much of the effectiveness of these ad hoc groups will be 
determined by their policy goals. That is, a protest may 
be more effective when it is obstructive in nature than if 
the group's effort is concerned with positive policy changes 
(1150-1151) .
Letter Writing. Groups try to persuade congressmen 
by having their general membership write letters to policy 
makers (Berry, 1977: 233-237). Concerning contacting 
congressmen, Dexter (1956) has found that "mail outweighs 
every other form of communication" (17). Also, he found 
that older congressmen are much less concerned with mail
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than younger congressmen (17). He went on to state congres­
sional mail was meaningful because of the amount of time 
the staffs spent handling it; it keeps congressmen in touch 
with their districts, and it represents one activity that 
the congressmen can do without being hamstrung by rules or 
regulations. It provides the congressman with an outlet 
for rational academic communications (18).
Influential People. A final form of indirect lobbying 
is the use of influential group members or constituents to 
contact officials. It has been found that generally 
friends or constituents of officials have greater accessi­
bility than lobbyists. However, lobbyists generally use 
constituents rather than friends of congressmen because they 
are more frequently available to lobby a congressman (Milbrath, 
1963: 244).
Measuring Influence 
Influence or power (see note 1 of this chapter) is 
very difficult to define and measure. This section only 
briefly deals with influence. Chapter III provides an 
extensive discussion of power and power relative to exchange 
theory. Dahl's (1970) five ways of comparing influence is 
the primary focus of this section.
Difficulties of Determining Influence
One of the most difficult aspects of analyzing groups 
is to determine their influence on outcomes. That is, it
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all comes down to "actually 'proving' that the interest 
group caused government officials to change their behavior 
in some manner" (Berry, 1977: 274). The problem group 
theorists wrestle with at this point in their research is 
called "parallelism." Researchers assume that when groups 
seek a policy alternative, engage in activities to attain 
that policy, and decision makers decide on the policy that 
the group has sought, then a causal linkage can be made 
between the group's actions and the outcome. In other words, 
the group has had an influence. In some situations there 
could have been a cause and effect, while in other cases 
what the group wanted may have perchance been what the 
policy makers felt the situation required. Research based 
on testimony of participants to determine the impact of 
groups is suspect because the data are dependent on the 
reputation of the respondent rather than on direct observa­
tion. Even when direct observation is used to determine 
the influence of groups, such observation may not indicate 
cause and effect conclusively, but may indicate parallelism 
instead (Salisbury, 1975: 207). Thus, it is not clear at 
this time whether the influence of a group can be measured; 
however, several researchers have attempted to develop 
schemes for determining influence. These schemes are 
considered in this section.
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Dahl's Five Ways of Comparing Influence
Dahl (1970) believes it is possible to measure 
influence in a fashion similar to using the concept of force 
in mechanics. Thus, he employs vectors as a measuring 
device of influence. He believes influence can be measured 
by the following: determination of the amount of change of 
individuals who purportedly have been influenced, determina­
tion of how costly it is for an individual to change, 
determination of the differences in probability of compliance 
of those influenced, determination of the differences in 
scope of the individual's influence, and the number of per­
sons who respond to an individual's influence (19-25).
The Amount of Change in the Position of the Actor 
Influenced. When we consider the change in position of an 
actor in determining influence, we make assumptions that 
are not necessarily reasonable to make. This measure of 
influence assumes one knows what the original position of 
the observed actor was. Frequently, in dealing with 
political phenomena, the actor merely portrays one position 
of wants, but in reality is seeking another goal. For 
example, a labor union may present an extreme position in 
negotiation, but its real wants are more moderate— the idea 
being that compromise will eventually attain what the labor 
union's true position was in the first place (21).
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The Strength of A's Influence Measured by the Costs 
to B of Complying. Measuring influence by how much com­
pliance costs those who are being influenced is a psycholo­
gical measure. In this instance, an attempt is made to 
determine whether there is more at stake when A is being 
influenced than when B is being influenced. This case could 
involve the scenario in which the President is trying to 
influence congressmen to pass a welfare package. Obviously, 
it would take more influence to sway the rural congressmen 
than the urban congressmen to the side of the President.
The primary problem is measuring the costs of those being 
influenced (21-22) .
The Amount of Difference in the Probability (Or 
Frequency) of Compliance. Dahl also said influence could be 
calculated by using differentiations in the probability of 
compliance. In other words, if a Democratic President 
receives support from 50 out of 60 Democratic senators and 
10 out of 40 Republican senators, the President has more 
influence with the senators of his own party. The frailties 
of this measure are glaring. First, probability should be 
based on random events using a coin or die. Second, and as 
a corollary to the first, such probabilities would have to 
be based on equivalent political events observed over time. 
Third, it would be critical to ascertain the original 
positions of those influenced. In this example, how many 
of the senators would have been in favor of the President's 
position without his influence (.22-23)?
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Differences in the Scope of the Responses. Another 
measure of influence is to refer to the scope of influence 
of an actor relative to other actors' scopes of influence. 
This, for example, would involve saying the majority leader 
in the Senate has more influence than a committee chairman 
because the scope of influence of the majority leader is 
greater than that of the committee chairman. A problem with 
this measure is comparing the overall influence of two more 
actors when the areas to be influenced are dissimilar (23-24).
The Number of Persons Who Respond. Finally, Dahl says 
influence can be measured by the number of people who respond 
to an actor. Take a situation where actor A received 10,000 
votes and actor B received 5,000 votes. Logically, it can 
be assumed A has more influence than B. However, despite 
the logical explanations for the differentiation in votes, 
other statements can be made given the same results. It 
could be said that B has more influence than A if those who 
voted for B did so when voting for A was a much more accept­
able act than voting for B. B could also have more influence 
than A if his followers are more definite than A's 
followers (24-25).
Caveats When Measuring Influence
Wooten (1970) states the influence of actors can be 
measured using the same techniques cited by Dahl (76-79) , 
but he also expands on some aspects of Dahl's measures.
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Concerning Dahl's discussions of influence relative to the 
scope of actors, Wooten said in order for measurements to 
be possible, comparisons of groups could only be made at 
the same level. Furthermore, assuming the same level, one 
can only compare the groups which have a common "target." 
Applying these guidelines, researchers could compare a 
national trade union and a national trade association, but 
not a national trade union and a corporation. Using the 
second criterion, it would not be appropriate to compare a 
trade association's influence over a government department 
with a trade union's influence on a legislature. Instead, 
an appropriate comparison would be the trade union's 
influence and trade association's influence on the legis­
lature (79-80).
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) warned about ignoring the 
"other face of power" when analyzing power, the other face 
of power being a person or association whose actions limit 
decision making to noncontroversial situations. This is 
an especially critical insight since most pluralist litera­
ture states analysis of influence should only focus on what 
is specific and observable (948-949).
Recent Works Measuring Group Influence
Some recent works have approached an estimation of 
group influence by using empirical techniques. Meier and 
Van Lohuizen (1978a) used content analysis to determine the 
impact of interest groups on USDA budget appropriations
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from 1971 through 1976 (449). They found that USDA bureaus 
that had stronger group support had greater "growth rates" 
in congressional appropriations (459-460). Intensity of 
group support for a bureau, however, did not "influence the 
budget process positively" (461). Wanat (1975) did an 
empirical analysis of agencies' budget requests to the Depart­
ment of Labor for fiscal years 1959 through 1968 (198). He 
used analysis of variance to determine which was the most 
powerful— Bureau of the Budget, Department of Labor, or the 
Department of Labor's agencies testifying before Congress.
He determined the Bureau of the Budget was the most power­
ful, the Department of Labor the weakest (210-211). Empiri­
cal studies such as these two do not fully measure the 
power of groups, but they do provide solid background for a 
better theory of influence of groups.
Summary
Historical underpinnings of the group approach 
involved a discussion on Bentley's, Truman's, Salisbury's, 
and Olson's works. Bentley and Truman both define interest 
groups as interactions of individuals. Salisbury augments 
the traditional works by stating groups develop and die 
because of exchange relations between group leaders and 
group members. Olson contends that individuals will only 
join groups that are small, if selective benefits are offered, 
or members are forced.
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Other variables discussed were group structure, organi­
zational structure, resources, and channels of influence.
A brief discussion on power was presented. This section 
was dealt with because exchange theory as it relates to 
policy output is a main concern of this research. Review 
of agricultural interest group literature concludes this 
chapter.
Agricultural Interest Groups 
A brief historical review of traditional farm 
interest groups will be presented first in this section.
The primary concern of this section, however, will be to 
discuss those works that have dealt with agricultural inter­
est groups relative to subsystem politics. Following a 
review of agricultural interest groups relative to sub­
system politics, there will be a discussion of agricultural 
interest group coalitions. Finally, a review of the case 
study literature concerning agricultural interest groups 
will be presented. The intent of this portion of the 
chapter is to provide some background on agricultural 
interest group studies, not to scrutinize the historical 
beginnings of each agricultural interest group.
Traditional Farm Interest Groups
Though some farm interest groups existed prior to 
the Civil War, the most active years for farm interest 
groups have been immediately after the Civil War and
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following World War I. This cursory review will deal with 
only the activity since the Civil War.
Grange. In 1867, the Patrons of Husbandry was 
formed. Today, this group is known as the Grange. Initially, 
it was a semi-secret organization composed of lodges that 
set out to improve the material and spiritual needs of the 
American farmer. In the last half of the 1800s, its impact 
at both the state and national levels appeared to be signi­
ficant.
Relative to state legislation, the Grange has been 
given credit for playing a substantial role in setting 
interest rates and regulating elevators and railroads. At 
the national level. Grange influence was used to secure 
creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 and 
passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890. Though the 
Grange was supposed to be a nonpolitical group, it obviously 
was political. To conduct political meetings, the Grange 
simply adjourned the formal meetings and then came to order 
again as a political unit.
Grange activities extended to operating all types of 
cooperatives: flour mills, implement businesses, grocery 
stores, and meat packing plants. It even sold fire and 
tornado insurance. Membership in 1875 was estimated to be 
858,000, but in 1880, membership had plunged to 65,000. By 
1910 it had risen to 224,000. Much of the decline of the 
Grange has been attributed to the failure of its cooperatives.
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Greenback and Free-Silver Movements. Other groups 
that flourished during the late 1800s were the Greenback 
Movement and the Free-Silver Movement. The Greenback Move­
ment's heydays were from 1876 through 1884. Supporters of 
the Greenback Movement wanted credit in the form of paper 
money. Following the Greenback Movement, the Free-Silver 
Movement came on the scene seeking the same. Eventually, 
the Populist Party took up the increased-credit-for-farmers 
cause. Ultimately, William Jennings Bryan supported the 
demands of the original Greenback Movement (Talbot and 
Hadwiger, 1968: 90-91).
National Farmers Union. In 1902, the Farmers Educa­
tional and Cooperative Union of America began in Texas 
(today it is referred to as the National Farmers Union).
This farm interest group spread to neighboring states and 
became a national organization by 1905 (Crampton, 1965: x) . 
Presently, the National Farmers Union has membership in 44 
states (Yakes and Akey, 1980: 279). Its largest memberships 
are in Oklahoma, Colorado, Montana, the Dakotas, and 
Minnesota.
The initial efforts of the National Farmers Union 
were to establish cooperatives and to withhold commodities 
from the marketplace to gain higher prices for products. 
Today, the group is considered the most liberal of the 
established general farm interest groups. Depictive of 
these liberal tendencies are causes that the National
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Farmers Union favors: higher minimum wages, expanded social 
security coverage, and increased foreign economic aid 
(Crampton, 1965: x-xi). In sum, the group believes "that 
a nation shall be so governed that the benefits of society 
are as widely distributed as possible and that civil liber­
ties receive their due" (ix).
Society of Equity and Non-Partisan League. The early 
1900s brought the development of the American Society of 
Equity in 1902, American Farm Bureau Federation in 1911, 
and Non-Partisan League in 1915. Shortlived was the 
American Society of Equity, as it was absorbed by the 
National Farmers Union. Today, in North Dakota, the Non- 
Partisan League still exists, but only as an appendage of 
the National Farmers Union (Talbot and Hadwiger, 1968; 92).
American Farm Bureau Federation. American Farm Bureau 
Federation beginnings were in Binghamton, New York. Serving 
as a counterradical group, the group developed bureaus at 
the local level. These bureaus were sponsored by the local 
Chambers of Commerce. Then in 1914 passage of the Smith- 
Lever Act provided the support to catapult the American Farm 
Bureau Federation's membership. The Smith-Lever Act 
created a federal-state Agricultural Extension Service pro­
viding agricultural education for farmers. State Agricultural 
Extension Service directors urged and many state legislatures 
mandated that the agricultural education services be provided
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by county agents working through local farm bureaus 
(Campbell, 1962; 4-5). Given the state and national govern­
ment support, the American Farm Bureau Federation had 
developed extensive state organizations by 1920.
Politically, the American Farm Bureau Federation 
has been very active. The group played a significant part 
in the formation of the "Farm Bloc" in the 1920s. This 
bloc was a bipartisan effort by 25 to 30 senators and about 
90 representatives to insure rural America's interests were 
being represented. Success during the 1920s was typified 
by passage of the Packers and Stockyards Act, Grain Futures 
Act, and Capper-Volstead Act (Talbot and Hadwiger, 1968: 92)
Farm Holiday Association. A group called the Farm 
Holiday Association was formally organized in 1932. This 
was a short-lived protest group that eventually evolved 
into the National Farmers Organization in 1955 (Talbot 
and Hadwiger, 1968: 92). From 1929 through 1931, a pre­
cursor of this group had undertaken to thwart government 
efforts to test cattle for tuberculosis. If the cattle 
were found to be diseased, farmers were compensated at a 
rate of two-thirds the value per animal. Farm Holiday 
Association sympathizers felt that was ridiculous in light 
of low cattle prices at that time, and some farmers thought 
the test was meaningless.
Over time. Farm Holiday Association efforts extended 
to using blockages of commodities being sent to market in
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order to secure higher prices via reduced supplies. Another 
cause was to preclude mortgage foreclosure auctions of farms. 
Through intimidation, Farm Holiday Association members would 
cause banks to buy farms for as small amounts as $5.35 
When the bank eventually resold a farm, the Farm Holiday 
Association would buy the farm for a nominal price and return 
the farm to the original owner (Brandsberg, 1964: 60-63).
By 1934, with the development of better farm credit and farm 
prices, plus a scare by an attempt by Communists to gain 
the group's leadership positions, the Farm Holiday Associa­
tion dissipated (Halcrow, 1977: 218).
National Farmers Organization. As was mentioned 
earlier, the National Farmers Organization came into being 
in 1955. Several conditions prompted the development of 
this farm interest group. First, the agricultural policy 
of President Eisenhower's administration opposed government 
controls to maintain farm prices. Second, the Midwest, 
especially the corn belt states, were suffering from 
drought plus low beef and cattle prices. In effect, 
farmers were in severe financial straits. Third, the worst 
conditions existed in those areas where the American Farm 
Bureau Federation was the strongest, and the American Farm 
Bureau Federation favored Eisenhower's farm policy of no 
government regulation. Although the National Farmers Union 
believed in government controls to support farm commodity 
prices, it was organizationally weak in the Midwest states
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where farmers were financially hurting. To fill this farm 
interest group void, the National Farmers Organization was 
established (Brandsberg, 1964: 65-66).
The primary goal of the National Farmers Organization 
has been to withhold farm products from markets to diminish 
supplies. Once supplies have been reduced, theory would 
have prices rise as a result of decreased supply. Before 
the National Farmers Organization members will sell after 
prices have gone up, however, they have sought contracts 
with markets. These contracts are to guarantee farm pro­
duct prices at a certain level. The National Farmers 
Organization has had withholding actions for swine, cattle, 
soybeans, grains, and milk since the organization's 
inception.
Results of the National Farmers Organization efforts 
have been mixed. Their withholding undertakings have been 
the most successful in the dairy industry, and when their 
efforts have been supported by labor organizations. Over­
all, however, it appears they simply do not have the organi­
zational strength to have sustained withholding actions that 
would have significant effects on prices (Halcrow, 1977: 
219-225).
Agricultural Subsystems
Definition of Agricultural Subsystems. In 1969, Lowi 
described the politics relative to USDA as involving "at 
least ten separate, autonomous, local self-governing
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systems" (110). He said these systems were composed of mem­
bers who had a triangular relationship, each member 
"complementing and supporting the other two." The members 
were defined as a USDA agency, a congressional committee or 
subcommittee, and local or district farmer committees. The 
local or district farmer committees were affiliated with a 
national interest group (111). Already in 1955, Freeman 
had defined a subsystem as a "pattern of interaction of 
participants, or actors, involved in making decisions in a 
special area of public policy." Freeman, although not 
specifically referring to agricultural policy, had preempted 
Lowi by ten years by stating a subsystem was made up of an 
executive bureau, a congressional committee, and interest 
groups whose concerns were closely related to the bureau's 
and the committee's concerns (5). McConnell (1966) also 
had discussed the relationship of executive branch agencies, 
congressional committees, and associations representing 
the agency clientele. He did identify one other partici­
pant in agricultural politics— a "homogeneous" constituency 
usually composed of local elites (244).
Examples of Agricultural Subsystems. The classic 
case of agricultural subsystem politics has been the 
relationship of the American Farm Bureau Federation, Extension 
Service, and Congress. Beside the American Farm Bureau 
Federation, the Association of Land-Grant Colleges and 
Universities and the National Association of County 
Agricultural Agents also have been involved in this subsystem.
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Another instance of a subsystem has been the relation­
ship of the Soil Conservation Services, the Subcommittee on 
Agriculture of the House Committee on Appropriations, and 
the soil conservation districts. Interest groups that have 
contributed to this subsystem have been the National 
Association of Soil Conservation Districts, Soil Conserva­
tion Society of America, and the Izaak Walton League.
Historically other subsystems developed around the 
price support system. USDA's Agriculture Stabilization and 
Conservation Service has been united with the House Agri­
culture Committee's various commodity subcommittees (Lowi, 
1969; 111-112) (there were six commodity subcommittees as 
of 1977 [U.S. Congress, 1977d: 276-277].) Each commodity's 
interest groups, in turn, have been the third 
point of these triangular relationships. Examples of these 
interest groups are the National Cotton Council, American 
Wool Growers Association, and American Cranberry Growers 
Association (Lowi, 1969: 112).
Lowi stressed that these subsystems were nearly 
impregnable to democratic political responsibility. These 
subsystems were characterized as being almost immune to 
executive branch control via the Secretary of Agriculture. 
Within the legislative process, their power caused vetoes 
or stalemates of legislation. Disproportionate influence 
was provided these subsystems in the legislative branch 
as a result of their being insulated from the public eye.
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For instance, during the 1950s the only non-farm congress-
(D NY) of Brooklyn (1969: 112).
Weakening of Agricultural Subsystems. Evidence has 
begun to appear that indicates the traditional agricultural 
policy subsystems are no longer as dominant as in the 
past. Meier (1978a) examined interest group support of 21 
USDA bureaus. He found that since the mid-1960s the aver­
age number of interest groups testifying for USDA bureaus 
concerning appropriations legislation has declined con­
currently with the significance of agriculture (63). Meier 
was referring to the migration of people from the rural 
areas to the cities when he spoke of the diminished 
importance of agriculture (58).
Traditionally, the federal dairy policy's subsystem 
has involved the National Milk Producers Federation, dairy 
industry and farmer organizations. House and Senate Agri­
culture Committees, and USDA. According to Guth (1978), 
this subsystem was maintained from the 1930s through the 
late 1960s (123). With increased milk prices in the early 
1970s and abuse of price setting powers by interregional 
cooperatives (for example, the Associated Milk Producers, 
Inc.), however, came a movement to check the subsystem 
policy powers. By 1973, consumer groups such as the Con­
sumer Federation of America had become involved in federal 
dairy policy debates (.124) . Guth also observed that
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although the consumer groups had possibly made a dent in 
the federal dairy policy subsystem, there appeared to be an 
antithesis to the consumer groups' attitudes— the original 
subsystem actors had begun to close ranks (126-127).
Another crack in USDA's subsystems' politics involves 
the food stamp groups. Berry (1979) stated that historically 
food stamp groups had met opposition from USDA, but in 
recent years, the food stamp advocacy groups have "become 
welcome partners in food stamp policy making" (3). He said 
that the food stamp groups had their origins between 1967 
through 1971 (4). Among other reasons, earlier food stamp 
groups were not possible because the poor, the food stamp 
program's recipients, had not had the resources to develop 
groups (6). Eventually, however, hunger in America became 
a controversial issue and food stamp groups were developed 
such as the National Council on Hunger and Malnutrition and 
the Citizen's Advocate Center (9-10). Today, the two 
dominant interest groups supporting the food stamp program 
are the Community Nutrition Institute and the Food Research 
and Action Center (15).
What accounts for agricultural subsystem no longer 
monopolizing agricultural policy? Hadwiger (197 8) provides 
five factors for the breakdown of the traditional subsystem. 
First, there is a greater public awareness to such things 
as advocacy research and television documentaries (91). 
Bedford (1969) had noted that "substantial changes in the
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balances among interests served by subsystems" could only 
occur if the issue was raised to a macropolitical level of 
discussion (105). He defined macropolitics as the discus­
sion that occurs "when the community at large and the 
leaders of the government as a whole are brought into the 
discussion and determination of issues" (107) . Second, 
Hadwiger stated subsystems' negligence caused subsystems 
to be dominated by other groups. For example, as early as 
1962 caveats concerning chemical pesticides were being 
issued, and in the late 1960s, three government reports 
charged USDA's pesticide regulatory agency with failure to 
act. Third, legislative entities outside the traditional 
subsystem have acted when the subsystem should have 
responded. Concerning food stamps, the Senate Select 
Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs was developed and 
was composed of both subsystem congressmen and critics from 
the Senate Labor Committee. Fourth, Hadwiger said the 
development of regulation guidelines and monitoring them 
by select committees has undercut the subsystem. Fifth, 
the strength of subsystems has been diminished as a result 
of group's access to courts (91-92). Berry, referring to 
food stamp groups, says the USDA does not want to create 
"meaningful channels of citizen participation" (1979: 22). 
He attributes this attitude to USDA's internal culture.
That is, USDA feels its confidants are farmers, not welfare 
recipients (22).
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Farm Interest Group Coalitions
The study of coalition formation among agricultural 
interest groups has come into more prominence recently. 
Barton's research examined the coalition involved in the 
1973 farm legislation. This coalition was composed of a 
feed grains-wheat-labor alliance. Barton felt the coalition 
came into existence primarily because the total votes by 
rural congressmen could not have made up a majority of 
the votes, plus labor needed support on labor issues such 
as minimum wage legislation (1976b: 144-145).
Passage of the 1977 agricultural legislation found 
not only the traditional intracommodity vote trading, but 
also coalition voting as described by Barton concerning the 
197 3 legislation. In 1977, it was a metropolitan-rural 
coalition that secured passage of legislation. Rural 
commodity supporters were seeking such things as higher 
sugar subsidies and price supports for sugar beets. Urban 
congressmen supported the farm legislation as a trade-off 
with rural congressmen to insure the food stamp program 
was generally left intact. Urban congressmen favored new 
legislation that would enable participants to receive food 
stamps without purchasing them (Peters, 1978: 30-31).
Peters has predicted that intra-agricultural commodity 
trading will continue (1978: 33). This strategy involves 
passing the agricultural legislation as one piece of legis­
lation rather than having each commodity's legislation, such
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as price support levels, passed separately (24). Peters 
believes this strategy will be used until urban sentiment 
begins to oppose the cost of high price supports, especially 
price supports of peanuts, cotton, and rice. When the high 
price support commodities become a burden to passage of 
farm legislation, then wheat and feed grain representatives 
will have to adjust accordingly.
Peters also foresees a continuance of the urban- 
rural coalition. He feels this will continue even if USDA 
is eventually stripped of the food stamp program. If the 
food stamp program is removed from USDA, Peters thinks vote 
trading will continue between rural and urban representa­
tives on common issues involving a consumer-urban-labor 
coalition (1978: 33-34). For example, a future position 
that could involve a consumer-urban-labor coalition would 
be opposition to grain embargos that could cause sharp 
price fluctuations of farm commodities. The price fluctua­
tions could eventually impact on labor in terms of unemploy­
ment of dock workers, for example, and consumers possibly 
would face higher market prices.
Recently Formed and Emerging Farm Interest Groups
Three farm interest groups deserve special mention.
The National Farm Coalition, with its extensive farm interest 
group representation; the American Agriculture Movement, a 
nascent and aggressive group; and an incipient farm move­
ment will all be discussed.
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National Farm Coalition. The National Farm Coalition 
must be mentioned because of whom it represents— a coalition 
of farm groups that began as an ad hoc group in the 1960s 
and became the National Farm Coalition in 1970 (Youngberg,
1979: 4). The impetus for the development of this group 
came from the decline of farm representation in Congress, 
therefore, decreasing the power of individual farm groups.
In response to agriculture's ever-weakening position in 
Congress, USDA officials, congressional farm leaders, farm 
editors, and agricultural economists pleaded with farm 
interest groups to begin to speak with one voice whenever 
possible (3). Farm groups that provided the initial support 
were the Missouri Farmers Association, National Grange, 
National Farmers Organization, National Farmers Union,
National Wheat Growers Association, and National Milk Pro­
ducers Federation (4). (The National Farmers Union withdrew 
its membership in 1975 [7]). Of the 36 members of this 
coalition, the National Wheat Growers Association, National 
Farmers Organization, and National Milk Producers Federa­
tion have been the coalition's major financial contributors (7)
As was noted earlier, the National Farm Coalition 
was created to provide a unified position on farm issues.
In order to accomplish this. National Farm Coalition members 
must support pre-legislative policy compromises (12). Al­
though this conflict avoidance approach provides for stability 
within the group, it also deprives the group from taking
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stands on many issues. For example, the National Farm 
Coalition may be able to agree on supporting the concept 
of a grain reserve, but coalition members cannot agree 
on the size of the reserve. The National Farm Coalition's 
influence, therefore, is limited by the factor that permits 
it to continue to exist— compromise (15-16). Youngberg 
concludes that the National Farmers Coalition has met with 
mixed success (1979: 24-25).
American Agriculture Movement. No other farm interest 
group has been more prominent in the last two years to the 
general public than the American Agriculture Movement.
Begun in 1977 in Campo, Colorado, this farm interest group 
has developed from a grassroots effort to an effective 
protest group. The group's bottom line demands include 
"100 percent parity in all areas of consumption and trade 
as well as a ban on meat and livestock imports" (Browne,
1979: 2-3).
Adopting the organizational beginnings of the Ameri­
can Farm Bureau Federation, the American Agriculture Move­
ment developed local level interest first and then expanded 
to the state level. By January, 1978, representatives from 
40 states attended the national American Agriculture Move­
ment convention in Denver. At that time, about 1,100 local 
offices were in place (4-5) .
Techniques used by the group to draw attention to 
their cause have been encircling state capitals with tractors.
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releasing goats on the steps of our United States Capitol, 
and generally tying up traffic (5). The people involved in 
this movement believe that lessons can be learned from 
black, student, and union political movements. That is, 
confrontation is necessary to get the American Agriculture 
Movement's causes on the public agenda; hence, the use of 
the tactics just mentioned (1).
Some think the American Agriculture Movement's efforts 
have achieved results. The group's officers point to USDA 
officials' inclusion of additional parts to the 1977 farm 
legislation as an indicator of their success. Also, the 
American Agriculture Movement supported a flexible parity 
plan; though defeated eventually in the House of Representa­
tives, the plan did pass the Senate (16). Finally, the 
public and many federal policy makers feel the American 
Agriculture Movement is now dominating the debate on farm 
policy (17).
Alternative Agriculturists. A movement that is astir 
in agriculture today involves alternative agriculturists. 
Alternative agriculturists shun conventional agricultural 
techniques, especially the using of synthetic chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides. They also resist large-scale, 
mechanized farming, especially corporate farms.
There is actually a dichotomy within the alternative 
agriculture movement. Organic farmers are small, labor- 
intensive operators who strongly favor the use of compost
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and manure as opposed to commercial soil fertilizers. Eco- 
farmers, on the other hand, are not opposed to natural soil 
amendments such as rock product minerals, seaweed deriva­
tives, and bacterial soil activators. Besides farmers and 
gardeners, the alternative agriculture movement includes 
consumer groups, university researchers, and publishers 
and authors sympathetic to the movement's causes (Youngberg, 
1978; 227-228).
Undergirding their approaches to farming the soil, 
the alternative agriculturists believe that today people 
have simply lost touch with nature. Alternative agricultur­
ists contend man must pay closer attention to nature's laws, 
and must live within those laws rather than trying to con­
quer nature's ways. They believe that nature is capital, 
not income. Man should be conserving nature as capital 
rather than easily expending nature as if it were income 
(2 30-231). Finally, alternative agriculturists believe that 
by using fewer mechanized ways and less synthetic materials 
man can more easily remain independent; the independent per­
son, they believe, will live better no matter what happens 
to the remainder of society. Independence, for example, 
could be gained by eating organic foods that provide better 
health. This, in turn, would free a person from society's 
frequently indifferent health system (234-235).
Success of the alternative agriculture movement in 
terms of a national organization is handicapped by the
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movement's ideological positions. The movement opposes 
centralized control that would curb individual freedom, 
localism, and smallness. In fact, there is no umbrella 
organization and very little conventional lobbying for its 
objectives. This is not to say that there is no communica­
tion within the movement. Newsletters and contact groups 
do exist to provide some continuity and communications.
It is estimated that there are about 15,000 organic farmers 
in the United States (235-237) .
Youngberg feels the movement's future growth will 
depend upon the cost of synthetic fertilizers and energy 
for the farmers not within the movement. If costs for the 
conventional farmers' inputs make it economical to move 
toward organic farming techniques, then the movement will 
grow. If this scenario does not occur, then it is unlikely 
the movement will develop rapidly (1978: 242).
Summary
In this section, we have briefly reviewed some of 
the traditional farm interest groups, discovered that the 
traditional subsystems of agricultural policy are no longer 
the sole guardians of agricultural policy, and identified 
farm interest group coalitions and protest groups that are 
recent developments. What does this portend for future 
agricultural interest group activities? There could be new 
types of participants in the traditional and other farm 
interest groups given the migration of urban dwellers to
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the rural areas of this country. Schwarzweller has said 
that old political alliances and social rankings will be 
disturbed by the influx of nonrural migrants. He also stated 
the rural communities "may be threatened by conflicts over 
goals, rate of development, and allocation of community 
resources" (1979; 17).
Lewis-Beck's research provides evidence that groups 
like the American Agriculture Movement or other potential 
farm groups that have young farmers as a primary member­
ship base will probably survive. His research on 1972 
election data indicates farmers are now one of the most 
politically active groups in the United States. They are 
especially active in letter writing and voting, exceeded 
only by urban professionals (1977: 545-546). Lewis-Beck's 
analysis determined that it was the young-to-middle-aged 
farmers' strong activism that provided the high voting 
effort by farmers in general (553-554). On the other hand, 
Lewis-Beck's study also provides some disappointing findings 
for organizers of farm interest groups— the contemporary 
farmer is much more likely to participate in an individual 
political act than to become involved in group political 
activities. Since farm interest groups are developed to 
serve the political and economic needs of farmers, Lewis- 
Beck's analysis seems to indicate that the farmer will 
resist participating in farm interest groups (559). Finally, 
to leave the topic of what will happen to farm interest
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groups in the future even more obscure, Tontz found that 
from 1910 to 1960 there was a strong (.60) inverse correla­
tion between the parity ratio (prices received versus prices 
paid) and membership of the general farm organizations 
(1964; 151). This information provides evidence that farm 
prices may dictate to some degree the strength of farm 
interest groups, assuming there is strength in numbers.
Conclusion
The two-pronged approach to reviewing interest groups 
in this chapter can now be merged. We found in the general 
interest group discussion that there is no one accepted 
group theory for explaining the beginnings, growth, and 
development of groups. Some would profess Truman's theory 
that certain events cause interest groups to form, and 
these individuals could point to the advent of the National 
Farmers Organization when farm prices were low and drought 
had decimated many areas of the Midwest. But for the same 
group, believers of Salisbury's exchange theory would 
quickly point to Brandsberg's discussion of the former 
Iowa Governor Dan Turner and Jay Loghry, a feed salesman 
(1964: 67-69), as the founding sources of the National 
Farmers Organization— the organizers.
This chapter has provided information on the kinds 
of groups that are involved in our political process and 
the routes and resources that groups have available for 
impact. Impact, or power, or influence we found to be very
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difficult to measure. Testimony abounds that this group 
or that group was influential in passing this legislation 
or that legislation, but little has been done to substantiate 
or deny such claims of power. In the final analysis, we 
still do not have a group theory; instead, we have group 
theories (for example, Truman, Salisbury, and Olson) and 
theories of groups (for instance, why the American Agriculture 
Movement began, according to Browne).
NOTES
1. Unless otherwise specified in this chapter and succeeding 
chapters, the terms "power," "influence," "force," etc. 
will be used interchangeably.
2. Brandsberg (1964), especially chapter 3; Tontz (1964); 
and Halcrow (1977), chapter 6, have good overviews of the 
traditional farm interest groups since the Civil War. 
Wesley McCune (1956) provides an extensive coverage of 
all types of farm interest groups. Talbot and Hadwiger 
have provided the following typology of all farm interest 
groups: general farm, commodity, marketing and trade, 
clientele, programmatic, allied business and labor, pro­
motional, educational and research, special state, and 
national and state public bureaucracies (1968: 94-98). 
Finally, see Talbot and Hadwiger (1968: 1968: 93) and 
Halcrow (1977: 240) for extensive reading lists on the 
history of farm organizations.
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CHAPTER III 
POWER, EXCHANGE THEORY, AND POLICY OUTPUT
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the 
theoretical background for the discussion of the use of 
Salisbury's (1969) exchange theory to understand policy 
making. In Chapter II, the concept of power^ was introduced 
(Dahl, 19 70) as well as exchange theory. Both the concept 
of power and exchange theory are more fully discussed in 
this chapter. Chapter IV will explain the methodological 
aspects of collecting the data used to test the use of 
exchange theory.
This chapter begins by examining the concept of power 
and power's relation to exchange theory. After exchange 
theory has been discussed in terms of power, viewpoints are 
presented on how Salisbury's exchange theory can be used as 
interest group theory. Next exchange theory (i.e., exchange 
theory incentives) is discussed as an independent variable 
acting on congressmen, who in turn act to provide policy out­
put. Following the discussion of exchange theory in relation 
to policy output, several clusters of variables (structure,
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organizational structure, resources, and channels of 
influence) are reviewed as they relate to exchange benefits. 
Policy output (accomplishment of organizational goals) is 
reviewed after the variables acting on exchange benefits. 
Discussion of committee hearings as a focus of study for 
exchange benefits precedes the final section. Finally, 
several hypotheses concerning exchange theory incentives and 
policy output are stated.
Power and Exchange Relations 
The concept of power is not easily defined, Cart­
wright (1965) has indicated that any person dealing with 
social power must be ready to sift through a wide and heter­
ogeneous body of literature. Power literature is heter­
ogeneous in the sense that contributions to the literature 
come from such disciplines as political science, psychology, 
sociology, anthropology, etc. Also, the works on power are 
heterogeneous since there is no one body of literature on 
power, but rather discussions of aspects of power such as 
leadership, persuasion, communication, etc. (3). Dahl (1970) 
stated "the first and most salient fact one needs to know 
about 'power' is that neither in .ordinary language nor in 
political science is there agreement on terms and definitions" 
(15). This section of the chapter provides several observa­
tions on power and on power relative to exchange relationships, 
In summing up social science use of power terms, Dahl 
(1968) stated that generally power terms referred to
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"subsets of relations among social units such that the 
behaviors of one or more units (the responsive units, R) 
depend in some circumstances on the behavior of other units 
(the controlling units, C)" (407). Dahl's statement indi­
cates near consensus among social scientists of the asym­
metrical character of power. Curry and Wade (19 68) provide 
support for Dahl's observation when they say "power pre­
sumably refers to some unidimensional or asymmetrical action 
involving at least two parties" (118). The asymmetrical 
character of power poses a problem for the use of exchange 
theory to explain power, as exchange theory assumes there 
is a symmetrical relationship between the two parties (Cart­
wright, 1965; 16). Baldwin (1978) considers power and 
asymmetricalness versus exchange and symmetricalness as the 
"most important obstacle to analyzing power in terms of 
exchange" (1234). Baldwin rightfully should consider this 
dilemma serious since the authors of the two major works 
on exchange theory, Homans (1961: 4-5) and Blau (1964: 117- 
118), also agree that power is asymmetrical. Blau stated 
"power is conceptualized as inherently asymmetrical . . . ." 
(117).
In order to use exchange theory in terms of power, we 
must find a way to consider exchange theory as expressing 
power; that is, power must be considered as symmetrical. 
Baldwin (1978) helps us out by declaring power is not asym­
metrical in every instance, thus, providing support for the
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use of exchange theory to explain power relationships.
Baldwin contends that when power is considered as a causal
relationship, that is, when A causes B and B does not cause 
2A , that A's power over B is limited only to a certain 
scope^ of B's activities. B, therefore, can simultaneously 
have power over A relative to those activities that B's 
scope does not include (1235). In power relations where A 
has more power over B than B over A, mutual influence of 
equal strength is assumed and indicates lack of power.
Baldwin contends that one can also view such a situation as 
involving interdependence among the actors, thereby pro­
viding for an exchange situation. He maintains that in social 
science phenomena there is no common denominator of power 
such as money; therefore, it is not possible to talk about 
one power relation offsetting another power relation— what 
he calls independence. A symmetrical relationship must 
exist in mutual power situations (1235-1236). Finally, 
power relations are not asymmetrical if one considers that 
A in attempting to have power over B must consider opportunity 
costs in getting B to do X (1237-1238).
Another problem of relating power to exchange theory 
concerns exchange theory's medium^ of exchange— money. The 
question simply put is, does power equate with money?
Coleman (1970) notes that formal power such as that found 
in organization manuals and constitutions cannot be accumu­
lated nor destroyed. In this instance, therefore, power
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is not akin to money, which can be accumulated and spent.
But power involving future political exchanges can be 
accumulated and spent. The difference lies in role power 
as opposed to personal power. Accumulation of power occurs 
as a consequence of an individual having several personal 
roles simultaneously, possession of special information, or 
building a reputation over a period of time (1079). Cole­
man does indicate the lack of congruence between power and 
money when dealing with exchanges:
One final difference between modern money and 
political power is important. Money has a specific 
unit of measure, which is comparable from one trans­
action to another (1081).
Though power cannot be exactly equated with money, political 
debts are accumulated and paid (1081).
As indicated above by Baldwin's comments, some authors 
state that one cannot adapt exchange theory to authority 
situations (formal power); again, the assumption is that an 
asymmetrical situation exists. But this point can be con­
tended, too. Blau (1964) reflected that "dependence on the 
benefits a person can supply does not make others subject 
to this power but gives him only potential power over them" 
(124). Blau reasoned that if superiors tried to become too 
forceful, an individual could forego the benefits (125) .
An exchange, therefore, would take place even in an authority 
situation.
Still another concern in using exchange theory in 
relation to power is the conflict between the generally
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accepted notion that exchange relationships involve positive 
rewards whereas power involves negative rewards (Baldwin,
1978; 1238). In fact, Blau (1964) defines power as:
. . . the ability of persons or groups to impose 
their will on others . . . either in the forms of with­
holding regularly supplied rewards or in the form of 
punishment, inasmuch as the former as well as the latter 
constitute, in effect, a negative sanction (117).
On the other hand, Blau considers social exchanges to 
strictly involve voluntary actions of individuals. Can we 
adapt exchange theory to power relation phenomena given this 
apparent conflict? March (1955) said there were several ways 
in which power could be exercised. He included among the 
means to exercise power, not only the threat of sanction, 
but also the "promise of reward" and providing information 
(442) . Kelman (1958) said there were three processes of 
power, and that one of these was compliance. Compliance 
defines a situation in which an individual accepts power 
because he/she anticipates rewards or approval in order to 
avoid punishment or disapproval (53) . Even though a seminal 
work on exchange theory (Blau, 1964) identified the nega­
tive connotations of power and the positive connotation of 
exchange concepts, other social scientists have viewed power 
as using both positive and negative sanctions; therefore, 
power and exchange theory are not incompatible on this point.
Thus, there are analogies between power and exchange 
theory, even though the latter is usually based on economic 
concepts. The distinctions that appear in the literature—
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the asymmetrical character of power versus the symmetrical 
aspect of exchange relations, power versus money, authority 
versus exchange relations, and power's negative rewards, 
versus an exchange relation's positive rewards— do not 
rigidly separate the two ways of viewing relationships.
Individual Exchange Relations 
and Group Exchange Theory
The seminal works on exchange theory, Homans (1961) 
and Blau (1964),  ̂ focus on the individual. In order to use 
the assumptions of individual exchange relations for group 
exchange theory, there must be theoretical links to go from 
Homans and Blau to Salisbury (1969) and Olson (1971). 
Providing these links is the task of this section.
Homans (1961) indicates his study of exchange theory 
is focused on individuals in face-to-face contact. Even 
though his seminal work concerns itself with small groups, 
Homans says small groups are simply where social behavior 
takes place (7). Directly discussing exchange relations, 
Homans says the more valuable the return on a transaction 
between two individuals, the more often the individual will 
engage in exchanges, but at a decreasing reward per unit of 
exchange; therefore, the individual will decrease his involve­
ment in transactions of decreasing returns per exchange (62). 
Throughout Homan's seminal work, the focus is on individual 
exchanges, not on group exchanges. Blau (1964) also focuses 
on individual exchanges: "The aim of the book is to
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contribute to an understanding of social structure on the 
basis of an analysis of the social processes that govern the 
relations between individuals and groups" (2). Blau does 
indicate a desire to link individual interaction to "complex 
structures of communities and societies" (2-4), but his 
exchange theory is firmly grounded in the study of individual 
social exchanges; Blau, thus, uses an inductive approach. 
Social institutions, such as the form of government of a 
country, monogamous marriage, etc., are discussed in Blau's 
work (273-280). These institutions, however, are not con­
sidered to be developed and sustained by individual exchange 
relations; rather, value consensus is what sustains these 
complex social structures (253). Again, we find another 
leading author who considers exchange relations relying 
heavily on individual social exchanges rather than group 
exchanges. Can one use individually grounded exchange 
relations to explain group interrelationships?
The importance of this undertaking rests on the 
well-established role of groups in social life. Durkheim 
(1964) stressed group observation as opposed to individual 
observation to determine the roots of social facts. Social 
facts according to Durkheim were such things as "ways of 
acting, thinking, and feeling, external to the individual, 
and endowed with a power of coercion" to control the indivi­
dual (3). Social facts have as their source, not the 
individual, but rather society (3, 7). Durkheim stated a
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society could be "either the political society as a whole 
or some one of the partial groups it includes, such as 
religious denominations, political, literary, and occupa­
tional associations, etc." (3).
The role of the individual in relation to society, accor­
ding to Durkheim, is not that the individual has a "conscious­
ness," but that each individual's consciousness merely 
reflects a society's collective sentiment (9). Durkheim did 
allow individual manifestations to indirectly be considered 
social facts, but only in the strictest sense. Individual 
actions contributed to future social models; hence, indivi­
dual manifestations could indirectly be construed to be 
social facts (8). To deemphasize the significance of the 
individual's manifestations and to emphasize the study of 
groups to determine social facts, Durkheim contended society 
is not a reflection of its parts (102), and in fact.
When the individual has been eliminated, society 
alone remains. We must, then, seek the explanation of 
social life in the nature of society itself. It is 
quite evident that, since it infinitely surpasses the 
individual in time as well as in space, it is in a 
position to impose upon him ways of acting and thinking 
which it has consecrated with its prestige (102).
According to Durkheim, in order to explain social phenomena,
the main focus of study should be on groups.
Another sociologist, Mauss (1954), has stressed the
importance of studying groups rather than individuals to
explain social phenomena (3). But of more importance to our
research, Mauss' work contributes to using exchange
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relations to study social occurrences. Mauss researched 
exchange relations of groups in Polynesia, Melanesia, and 
North West America (2). Exchange relations between or among 
groups were characterized as overtly being voluntary, but 
in reality the exchanges were involuntary due to threat, 
private or public, of sanctions (3). Exchange relations, 
therefore, were in fact based on economic self-interest of 
the groups (1). This also is what Salisbury (1969) and 
Olson (1971) maintain about individuals involved in exchange 
relations. Finally, Mauss discovered that the exchange 
relations in the primitive societies were marked by a "con­
cern for morality" and that both morality and the seeking 
of economic self-interests also were a part of exchange 
relations in Mauss' contemporary societies (2). (Mauss'
The Gift was first published in 1925 [Mitchell, 1978: 166].)
Both Durkheim and Mauss point to the usefulness of 
exchange relation terms for describing, not only interactions 
between individuals, but also for describing group exchange 
relations. They, thus, provide theoretical underpinnings 
for an effort to apply the individual exchange relation 
approach of Homan and Blau to describe interest group 
activity via the exchange theory as developed by Salisbury.
Exchange Theory of Interest Groups
The importance of this section of this chapter to 
the entire research cannot be overstated. Previous sections 
of this chapter have dealt with adapting exchange relations
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to power instances and individual exchange relations to 
group interaction. The latter adaptation lent support for 
the use of exchange theory in examining group activity.
In effect, we have reviewed in Homan's, Blau's, Durkheim's, 
and Mauss's works, the classical precursors of this 
research's main concern— Salisbury's (1969) exchange theory 
of interest groups.
In this section, we will expand on points introduced 
in Chapter II concerning Salisbury's exchange theory, plus 
introduce new material related to exchange theory's incen­
tives (material, purpose, solidary, and coercive) as used 
in this research. Mancur Olson's (1971) contributions to 
Salisbury's exchange theory also will be elaborated upon.^ 
This discussion of Salisbury's exchange theory is important 
since his theory serves as the foundation for this work's 
undertaking— to use exchange theory to explain policy output.
Salisbury (19 69) uses economic concepts to explain 
the development, maintenance, and demise of interest groups 
(11). The main terms that are used in developing his 
theory are entrepreneur/organizer, benefits, group member, 
and exchange (12).
The entrepreneur/organizer (hereafter referred to only 
as entrepreneur) is central to Salisbury's exchange theory. 
Entrepreneurs are the creators of interest groups and the 
initiators of any exchange activity (12). Salisbury notes 
that "entrepreneur" can be used interchangeably with "leader" 
of ongoing groups (29). When entrepreneurs have benefits
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to offer to potential group members and when enough group 
members accept the benefits or purchase benefits, an interest 
group is formed. If entrepreneurs continue to receive enough 
benefits as compared to the costs to the entrepreneur to run 
the interest group, the interest group will remain viable; 
otherwise the interest group will collapse. On the other 
hand, an interest group may be terminated if the group mem­
bers do not receive enough benefits relative to the costs 
of belonging to the interest group (11).
Benefits are explained as "those experiences which 
[people] value, for whatever reasons, and in this sense only 
may be regarded as rational" (15). The assumption is that 
group members periodically reassess their own situations so 
that the benefits are greater than the costs of membership. 
Costs can also be considered as negative benefits as opposed 
to positive benefits (15) .
Salisbury (1969: 15-17) referred to Clark and Wilson's 
(1961) typology of organizational incentives to describe 
the possible categories of benefits. Clark and Wilson iden­
tified three categories of benefits that organizations could 
use to induce organization members to cooperate: material, 
solidary, and purposive. We will discuss these categories, 
plus another, coercive (Etzioni, 1961) , in order to develop 
Salisbury's exchange theory and to prepare our readers for 
a heuristic model that shows exchange theory benefits, and 
other related interest group variables, explaining policy 
output. The heuristic model will be presented later in this 
chapter.
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Material benefits are tangible rewards. They 
include anything that has monetary value or could be easily 
converted to money (Clark and Wilson, 1961: 134), and 
material benefits can be considered to be extrinsic to the 
group members that acquire material benefits (Salisbury,
1969: 15). Examples of material benefits are wages and 
salaries and fringe benefits obtained by group members 
(Clark and Wilson, 1961: 134).
Purposive benefits are intangible. They are reflected 
in a group's suprapersonal goals, and purposive benefits 
do not reward a group member in any direct or tangible 
way (135). These benefits generally cannot be divided into 
units of value per person, nor compared directly to the costs 
per unit of benefit. Also, individuals other than those 
seeking purposive benefits may acquire them. Examples of 
purposive benefits are "good government," "peace," and 
"civil liberties" (Salisbury, 1969: 16).
Solidary, like purposive benefits, are intangible.
This means that the benefits have no monetary value and 
cannot be easily converted into monetary value. Solidary 
benefits are derived by belonging to a group or associating 
with group members. Benefits acquired due to belonging or 
associating with group members include a "sense of group 
membership and identification," a sense of status, fun, 
and social distinctiveness (Clark and Wilson, 1961: 134-135).
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Coercive inducements (Etzioni, 1961) are the result 
of the use of coercive power. In their extreme form these 
incentives are a result of threats of or imposition of 
physical sanctions that could cause pain, death, or deformity 
(5). For our research purposes, these kinds of coercive 
inducements are not applicable. Coercive incentives that 
are based on the use of power to control the satisfaction 
of needs (5), however, are applicable to our research. For 
example, an entrepreneur could threaten to deny a group 
member insurance coverage if the group member's auto premium 
was not paid by the due date. This typology of entrepreneur 
offered benefits will be used to classify interest group 
statements in testimony before congressional committees.
Before we reach that point, however, the remainder of Salis­
bury's terms will be discussed.
Group membership is somewhat of an elusive term. 
Clearly, a group member is an individual who belongs to a 
group; or is that correct? This question will be dealt with 
later in considering Olson's (1971) remarks on group member­
ship. Another problem with group membership is determining 
who are potential members; this is the immediate task at hand.
Salisbury (1969) said traditionally two methods have 
been used for determining potential group members: imputing 
interests to categories of people and inferring preferences 
by observing behavior. An example of imputing interests is 
when we assume workers want increased salaries or farmers
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want increased prices per bushel of corn; the imputation is 
based on some theory, for example Marxism, on how individual 
values come into being and are given priorities. Using 
inference from observed behavior, we have traditionally 
located potential groups according to identified character­
istics of individuals that permits the development of 
categories of potential group members. For instance, by 
observation one could, within reasonable accuracy, identify 
potential Farmers Union or American Farm Bureau members (23).
By using the exchange theory, however, an entrepreneur 
can accurately determine potential group members by offering 
benefits (e.g., material, purpose) at a price or varying 
prices and then seeing what individuals offer as support, 
for example, membership to the group, votes, or whatever is 
considered to be valued for exchange.
Olson (1971) stated that just offering benefits to a 
potential group member by an entrepreneur will not always 
suffice to gain the membership of the potential group member.
In large groups, many potential members will reason that they 
can acquire benefits from a group at a lower price as non­
members than as group members and at the expense of other 
group members (33-35). This poses a problem for entrepreneurs 
who wish to maintain or develop interest groups. Olson felt 
that only through the use of selective benefits, those going 
directly to individuals, could entrepreneurs, in some instances, 
provide enough incentive to get potential group members to
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join. He indicated selective incentives could be either 
positive or negative; therefore, coercion could be an 
inducement used to gain or maintain membership (51). Only 
groups that have the "authority and capacity to be coercive" 
and resources can offer positive selective benefits (133).
An example of coercion is when labor unions sercure con­
tracts requiring compulsory membership (72). Olson assumes 
a rationality in dealing with potential group members:
The only requirement is that the behavior of 
individuals in large groups or organizations . . . 
generally be rational, in the sense that their 
objectives, whether selfish or unselfish, should 
be pursued by means that are efficient and effective 
for achieving these objectives (64-65).
An example of Olson's rationality is a farmer who will not
restrict production in order to raise prices for the good
of all farmers since the farmer realizes that personal
sacrifice would not bring significant gains to anyone (64).
Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young (1971) state that Olson's
definition of a rational individual cannot fully explain how
collective goods are provided for interest groups. That is,
they contend that it takes more than coercive mechanisms
or selective benefits to get a potential member to join an
interest group.
Frohlich, et al., maintain that contrary to Olson's
rational man, who seems disinterested in the impact the
rational man's actions will have on others, group members,
when providing collective resources to the entrepreneur,
will concern themselves with the expectations concerning
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the actions of other group members. According to Frohlich, 
et al., if their rational man determines that cooperation 
based on expectations of actions of others is worthwhile, 
the potential group member or group members will contribute 
to the collective good (20-22).
Salisbury's and Olson's conceptions of the group mem­
ber being a rational man in determining whether to become a 
member or not is not totally accurate according to Barry 
(1970). Barry concedes that selective benefits do make a 
difference in determining group membership involving collective 
goods, but he also notes that the absence of selective 
benefits does not eliminate groups (44) . Agreeing with 
Frohlich, et al. (1971) , Barry argues that when a group 
member or a potential group member decides to contribute 
resources to obtain a collective good that the individual 
considers "the decisions of everyone else, and their 
decisions in turn depend on everyone else's".(1970; 26).
Describing the process of entrepreneurs offering 
benefits to a potential group member and reaching a price 
through exchange, which is based on an individual's prefer­
ences, tells only how individual preferences are developed 
in relation to the entrepreneur. Factors outside of the 
entrepreneur/group member relation may cause an individual's 
preferences to change, to the advantage or disadvantage 
of the entrepreneur (23-24). An example of a variable that 
could influence a group member's preference schedule would
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be the cost of membership in comparison to cost of member­
ship in other groups.
Finally, we will discuss the last term involved in 
Salisbury's exchange theory— exchange. An exchange occurs 
when an entrepreneur, through experience or contacts, for 
example, determines a likely market for the benefits he/she has 
to offer to potential group members and/or group members, and 
provides the interested parties benefits in exchange for 
benefits (in economic terms— profit) from the members. Also, 
in order to have exchanges continue and thus maintain the 
viability of the interest group, the exchanges must be 
mutually satisfying to the entrepreneur and interest group 
members.
The benefits gained in an exchange by an entrepreneur 
must be sufficient in order to continue the interest group; 
otherwise, the entrepreneur will use the benefits for some 
other enterprising purposes. At a minimum, an entrepreneur 
must receive enough material benefits to cover his/her over­
head expenses and to keep the entrepreneur adequately satis­
fied. Since entrepreneurs of interest groups cannot transfer 
benefits as easily as money, if benefits are to be used for 
a different enterprise, they will probably be used for 
enterprises that are similar or in the same geographical area 
as the former enterprise. A farm organizer is simply not 
likely to take his/her profits and begin an agriculturally 
related organization in an urban ghetto (Berry, 1970: 24-25).
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An entrepreneur may receive benefits in the form of salary; 
if he is not a paid entrepreneur, the benefits may come in 
the form of support for personal beliefs in the cause he is 
working for. Whether the interest group members provide 
material or solidary benefits to the entrepreneur, he/she 
must maintain enough inducements (material, purposive, 
solidary, and coercive) going to the interest group members 
or face losing his/her job (26).
We have thus far discussed exchange theory concepts 
in relation to entrepreneur and group members or potential 
group members. We will next engage in applying Salisbury's 
exchange theory to the interactions between entrepreneurs 
and congressmen relative to seeking policy output.
Exchange Theory and Policy Output
Applying Salisbury's exchange theory to the lobbying 
of congressmen by interest group lobbyists (entrepreneurs) 
and relating the exchanges between the interest group lobby­
ists (hereafter referred to as lobbyists) to goal achieve­
ment of agriculturally related interest groups is the focus 
of this section and the crux of this research. Following 
this section, we will also discuss the relation of other 
independent variables to the exchange relationship between 
lobbyists and congressmen, that is, group and member structure, 
resources, organizational structure, and channels of influence 















FIGURE 1. A HEURISTIC MODEL OF INTEREST GROUP IMPACT ON PUBLIC POLICY
Source: Adapted from Kenneth J. Meier and Jeffrey L. Brudney, 
"Interest Groups and Organization Theory," in Joseph Cooper, 
et al., Political Science and Organization Theory (New York: 
Greenwood Press, forthcoming).
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Using exchange theory to describe interaction between 
lobbyists and congressmen has been suggested before. Curry 
and Wade (1968) indicated in A Theory of Political Exchange 
that "the politician participates in two exchange sets: the 
first with all voters, especially spectators, and the second 
with fiduciaries [entrepreneurs] of groups" (47). Meier 
and Brudney (forthcoming) also acknowledged the use of 
exchange theory to describe the interactions between lobbyists 
and policymakers (32-32) .
Using the typology of exchange benefits discussed 
earlier— material, purposive, solidary, and coercive— we 
will now relate what exchanges exist between lobbyists and 
congressmen. But first we must answer the question, why do 
lobbyists want to make exchanges with congressmen? The 
lobbyist seeks to make exchanges with policy makers in order 
to acquire enough benefits to satisfy his group members, 
maintain his organization, and serve his own personal needs 
(Curry and Wade, 1968: 41). In the public sector, the 
commodity that a lobbyist seeks from public policy makers 
to use as benefits for his group members, organizational 
maintenance, and his personal awards is public policy (3).
Material benefits that lobbyists can offer to policy 
makers are of two types: those that are used to permit the 
legislator to continue in office and those that can be used 
by the legislator to influence other policy makers (Meier 
and Brudney, forthcoming). A campaign contribution is an
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example of a material benefit that could be offered to 
a congressman in exchange for a vote on a policy issue 
(Ornstein and Elder, 1978: 73). Information is an example 
of a material benefit that could be used to "support a 
legislator's policy position, or to help him or her make a 
policy decision" (59). Lobbyists can also assist legislators 
with political strategy by surveying other legislators to 
determine legislative allies, by plotting legislative 
tactics, and by providing staff assistance (59). Other 
material benefits include generous lecture fees, free flights 
on corporate planes, and Christmas gifts for legislators 
and staff (72-73).
Purposive incentives will be used by lobbyists and 
accepted by congressmen because they, too, may want parti­
cular policies approved; for example, they may share with the 
group a desire for their constituents to have stable 
economic markets. In short, a congressman would be foolish 
not to agree with socially accepted goals (Clark and Wilson, 
1961: 140). Milbrath (1963) also confirms that purposive 
benefits are important when a "given measure is in the 
public interest or would serve the cause of justice . . . "  
(221) . Examples of purposive benefits that could be offered 
are "sound economy" or the "good of all farm families."
Solidary benefits acquired by a policymaker would 
affect him/her intrinsically. Zeigler and Baer (1969) , 
studying state legislators, found that legislators were more
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likely to accept interaction with lobbyists whom the 
legislators had a favorable attitude toward, but legislators 
did "not like to think of themselves as subject to manipula­
tion" (82-83). When a lobbyist uses a solidary benefit he 
may offer comradeship, general friendliness, or even praise, 
as when the lobbyists state that "Congressman Doe is consid­
ered one of the most respected legislators on the House 
Agriculture Committee." In statements such as this members 
of a congressional committee are praised for their expertise, 
dedication, and overall stature (Meier and Brudney, forth­
coming) .
Coercive inducements are not used very often to get 
policy makers to cast their votes for a policy measure.
Many works have indicated that this benefit should only be 
used as a last resort. Zeigler and Baer (1969) said three 
conditions would have to exist in order for coercion to be 
effective. First, the coercion has to create in the policy 
maker an emotional pitch to cause him to act. Second, the 
legislator must have substantial evidence that compliance 
will lead to a reduction of the tension. Third, the reduct­
ion in tension must come shortly after the coercive act has 
been made. Generally, these conditions do not exist between 
a lobbyist and a legislator, so it is not likely such 
charges will be made. After all, if a legislator is told 
he/she may face electoral defeat at the next election, what 
evidence does the lobbyist have to indicate the threat will
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become fact? (120). Milbrath (1963) said the lobbyist can 
plead, but not demand, and above all, had better not 
threaten a congressman (225). However, Zeigler and Baer 
(19 69) did concede that state legislators considered an 
electoral threat as possible (120).
It is now clear that Salisbury's exchange theory can 
be applied to the interaction between lobbyists and congress­
men. The benefits offered by the lobbyist are associated 
with congressmen's legislative initiatives— policy output. 
After discussion of the remaining variables in our heuristic 




Interest group structure is composed of group structure 
and member structure (see Chapter II for a broader discus­
sion) . Group structure has to do with the basis of group 
goals. That is, groups are classified according to the 
method of forming goals (based on the logic of the situation—  
interest groups, versus expressive groups— those based on 
generalized beliefs) (Castles, 1967: 15-16). Group structure 
is also classifying groups according to how the group's 
goals compare to those of policy makers. These include con­
fident, neutral, and alienated groups (Gamson, 1968: 164-171).
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Member structure refers to what composes the member­
ship of an interest group. For example, is it individuals 
who join a group or not? In our research, we have attempted 
to see if peak associations or mass associations are more 
successful in attaining their goals. A peak association is 
a sector-wide organization that is composed of smaller, 
constituent groups, for example, the National Association 
of Manufacturers. Mass associations are groups that have 
individuals as their basic elements and generally serve 
the local needs of members. A local union, American Farm 
Bureau, or Farmers Union are exemplary of this kind of 
group (Brady, 1943: 8-13; Wooton, 1970: 37-38; Salisbury, 
1975: 187-188) J
Organizational Structure
Acting indirectly on exchange benefits, a second 
cluster of variables is organizational structure. This 
group includes leadership skills, substantive expertise of 
a group, political process expertise, degree of lobby focus,
Qorganization cohesion, and coalition structure. Several 
of these variables were mentioned in Chapter II. Here 
attention is limited to two that will be explored in some 
depth below: organization cohesion and coalition structure. 
These two are important to the exchange process, and can be 
readily examined with data in hand.
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Organization cohesion refers to the intensity of 
support of group members as determined by the ability of 
the group to mobilize its members for political action. 
Generally, groups that have narrow based interests (e.g., 
a farm commodity group) will have greater political success 
than will larger, broader interest groups (a general farm 
interest group such as the American Farm Bureau (Ornstein 
and Elder, 1978; 74). The measure of cohesion explained in 
more detail below is based on this knowledge that groups 
with narrow interests are generally more cohesive.
A lobbyist's impact via organization cohesion is made 
possible by the degree of support that he receives from his 
group members. The group members base their intensity of 
support on their perceptions of how satisfied they are 
with their lobbyists (Luttbeg and Zeigler, 1966: 655-656). 
Interest groups are more successful when they portray to 
policy makers congruence between group members' viewpoints 
and a lobbyist's issue orientation (Ornstein and Elder,
1978: 75). This research measures organization cohesion 
by identifying interest groups as economic commodity 
producer (narrow interest polar position), economic middle 
man, economic general farm group, economic consumer, or 
general interest group (broad interest polar position).
Interest group coalition development is the other 
organizational structure variable this research considers. 
Common interests of interest groups are ascertained from
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written and oral presentations before congressional committees. 
Milbrath (1963) stated there are two major bases for forming 
coalitions. First, groups may collaborate with other groups 
concerning marginal policy concerns; this is called log­
rolling and is apprehensively viewed by policy makers. The 
policy maker's skepticism of coalitions based on log-rolling 
stems from the policy maker's disbelief of lobbyists who 
lobby for policy not at all central to the primary interests 
of the lobbyist's group. Second, groups may collaborate 
based on interests central to an interest group's policy 
goals. Coalitions based on central interests have more 
credence with policy makers since policy makers believe the 
lobbyists are sincere and concerned (170). Coalitions also 
exist without any organizational interaction (i.e., leaders, 
strategies, meetings, and whips). Brady and Bullock (19 80) 
found that the Conservative Coalition in Congress, which 
has existed for the past 40 years, is based on shared policy 
objectives rather than interaction among the political 
groups involved (549-550). This research uses Brady and 
Bullock's explanation for the existence of the Conservative 
Coalition to operationalize coalitions.
The success of coalitions is greatest when the inter­
est groups are seeking a policy that is closely associated 
to the central purposes for which the interest groups were 
created (171). Whether the policy being sought is broad 
or specific has a bearing on the success of a coalition's 
efforts :
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. . .  If the problem is general but confined to 
a single industry, the chances for success by a united 
front are very good; however, if a given industry 
appears to be asking for special consideration on a 
problem that is common to many industries, the chances 
are less good. A broad general policy that affects 
many kinds of groups is less likely to be advanced 
significantly by a united front because such policies 
generally attract strong opposing coalitions. And 
some policy proposals are so specific in application 
that a coalition would look unnatural and forced (171).
One can expect coalitions to succeed in many instances
because the involved groups should be able to gain grass
roots support that can be brought to bear via communications
on policy makers (170-171). However, at other times.
coalitions may antagonize key legislators, and then individual 
efforts would be more effective (171). Tied directly to 
the organizational structure variables are interest group 
size and geographical dispersion, the next variables to 
receive extensive attention (Greenwald, 1977: 330-331).
Resources
A third cluster of variables that impacts on tactics, 
which in turn act on the use of exchange benefits, are 
resources (e.g., money, political reputation) of an interest 
group. Resources were more fully addressed in Chapter II, 
and attention is directed there.
For this research, two kinds of resources are of 
particular interest: size and the related dispersion of a 
group. According to Ornstein and Elder (1978) size and 
geographical dispersion of the group's members permit the 
group to present an electoral threat to a policy maker;
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these two variables can provide legitimacy to an interest 
group's demands if the group has enough members or dis­
persion (73). Greenwald (1977) stressed size as a proportion 
of potential members. On such a scale, Common Cause would 
rate low because anyone can join; everyone is a potential 
member. Greenwald also stated that size was important in 
terms of voting potential (330). But Zeigler (1964), in 
discussing the ability of interest groups to deliver their 
members' votes, said that "the hard facts of political life 
do not coincide with a simplified model of human motivation" 
(241). That is, it is beyond the ability of group leaders 
to determine with much certainty that group members will 
vote for a certain policy maker (241) .
Channels of Influence
Channels of influence is a cluster of variables that 
includes the multitide of tactics and techniques that can 
be used by lobbyists to influence policy makers. Examples 
of channels of influence are the courts, releasing a congress­
man's voting record, and leaking information to the press.
This research deals only with one particular channel; 
presentations before congressional committees. The data 
collected reflect both oral and written presentations before 
committees. Both forms of the presentations, oral and 
written, can be observed in printed hearing reports (Milbrath, 
1963: 229).
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Though testifying at hearings is considered of 
lesser impact than personal presentations and constituent 
contact as means to influence a policy maker, lobbyists 
feel that committee presentations are a must; otherwise, 
an interest group's members may criticize the lobbyist for 
not taking the opportunity to present the interest group's 
policy positions (Milbrath, 1963: 228-229). In this 
research, we want to determine if a group presenting oral 
or written testimony, or both, achieves higher success in 
goal attainment— disired policy output. Similarly, the 
research attempts to determine whether location of testimony 
(U.S. House or U.S. Senate) affects goal achievement of 
interest groups.
Summary
Summarizing this section, we have discussed four 
clusters of variables that impact indirectly and directly 
on the exchange relationship between lobbyists and congress­
men: structure (group and member structure), organizational 
structure, resources, and channels of influence. From 
these clusters of variables and referring to the above 
clusters of variables, we have chosen to focus on mass and 
peak associations (member structure), organization cohesion 
and coalition structure (organizational structure), size 
and geographical dispersion of interest groups (resources), 
and oral and/or written testimony and whether testimony was
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presented in the United States Senate and/or United States 
House committee hearings (channels of influence). The next 
sections turn to what and where the lobbyist's exchange 
benefits are focused— on policy and committee hearings.
Organizational Goals and Policy Output
The previous sections of this chapter provide the 
reader with descriptions of the variables that act upon the 
exchange benefits as offered by lobbyists to congressmen.
As was earlier mentioned, the major purpose of this research 
is to demonstrate the use of exchange theory to explain a 
lobbyist's interaction with a policy maker.^ But going a 
bit further, this research will also consider the relation­
ship between use of exchange benefits and interest goup 
goal attainment^® in Congress. Viewing goal attainment as 
a product of congressional action, we measure interest group 
success in Congress in terms of policy output (see Figure 1). 
Information to determine policy output or goal attainment 
(or nonattainment) was derived through content analysis of 
fiscal 1976 and 1977 agriculture legislation, appropriations 
and substantive, respectively. Methodological details are 
in the next chapter.
Mohr (1973) said organizational goals were of two 
kinds; transitive and reflexive. Transitive goals are goals 
that, when attained, will provide rewards to individuals 
external to the organization. For example, if the goal is 
good health for those that drink inspected milk, this is a
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transitive goal since the goal's attainment rewards those 
outside the organization of which inspectors are a part.
On the other hand, attainment of reflexive goals rewards 
the members of the organization, for example, increased 
profitability of a firm (475-476). Groups with reflexive 
goals include trade associations, marketing associations, 
labor unions, and political interest groups (480) .
Even if Mohr's or someone else's typology or organi­
zational goals is accepted, how does one identify the 
important goals? Warriner (1965) cautions against the use 
of an organization's statement of purpose to identify an 
organization's goals, as frequently the statement of purpose 
is incongruent with what an organization actually does (141). 
Mohr (1973) states there are two ways to identify relative 
importance of goals. One is to survey members of an organi­
zation and use considered informants to corroborate the 
survey's finding. The second is to use library research to 
determine the goals of an organization. Mohr warned that 
no method was infallible (478-479). Our research, as 
mentioned earlier, relies on information gleaned from records 
of congressional hearings and substantive and appropriations 
legislation, all government documents.
The link between exchange benefits (offered by lobby­
ists) and organizational goals or potential policy outputs 
(actions of congressmen) is based on the fact that lobbyists 
work to achieve governmental decisions that will further the
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group's interests; simultaneously, policy makers are seeking 
support from interest groups. The support from the interest 
groups comes in the form of exchange benefits such as infor­
mation or electoral support for the policy maker. The 
interaction between lobbyists and congressmen, thus, results 
from mutual need (Greenwald, 1977; 190). The relationship 
of interest group members, lobbyists, goals, policy makers, 
and policy output is summed up by Key (1964):
The policies and programs of groups— and the 
shared attitudes on which they are based— are shaped 
by the interactions within the group, the experience 
of its members, the environmental circumstances 
affecting the group, and other factors. Interest 
group activity is not, thus, to be regarded as a 
simple reflex action. Rather, group objectives take 
shape from the deliberations, the debates, the 
strivings, and all the internal processes leading to 
group action (126) .
This section has provided a guide to a portion of this 
process, the importance of group goals and their relation­
ship to policy output through use of exchange benefits.
The next considers where the lobbyist engages in interaction 
with policy makers. This research focuses on one site. 
Congress, and more specifically, on congressional committee 
hearings.
Legislative Branch and Lobbyists 
Lobbyists may focus their efforts on an assortment of 
political arenas, including the legislative, judicial, and 
executive branches of governments— including the bureaucracy. 
Our research is concerned with lobbying of the federal legis­
lative branch, more specifically, committee hearings.
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Morrow (1969) stated "committees are undoubtedly the 
most important power centers in the legislative system . . . ' 
(63). Clapp (1963) said "committees remain the kiln in 
which the stuff of legislation is baked, the important point 
of entry to the congressional power elite, a major route to 
attainment of the respect and deference of colleagues that 
members eagerly seek" (279). Both Morrow's and Clapps's 
statements clearly indicate the importance of the committees 
and suggest the importance of their hearings.
We chose to focus our research efforts on congres­
sional committee hearings, not only because of their impor­
tance in the political process, but also for practical 
reasons. Committee hearings provide readily accessible 
records of individual's and group's testimony concerning 
policy issues, in our case substantive and appropria­
tions legislation on wheat and feed grains. The recorded 
oral and written testimony serves as a record of a group's 
goals as well as an expression of the benefits the lobbyist 
uses to gain support from the policy makers. Consistency 
between a lobbyist's policy positions and group members' 
policy positions has been examined. Browne (1977) found 
that lobbying was not unrestrained. That is to say, 
lobbyists, when they lobbied, sought congruence between the 
lobbyists' policy positions and group members' policy 
positions (51-52) .
This is not to say the committee hearings as means 
to identify goals and measure exchanges are without their
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pitfalls; they have them. First, even though there are 
oral and written communications, there is no guarantee that 
the policy makers are listening. Second, many policy makers 
are predisposed against or for certain legislation; there­
fore, they may ignore testimony that is contrary to their 
policy positions (Milbrath, 1963: 229). Finally, it is 
very difficult to tap the psychological and social psycholo­
gical processes involved in interactions between lobbyists 
and policy makers (Zald and Jacobs, 1978: 417). We, how­
ever, chose to focus on committee hearings for this research 
because of the importance of the committee hearings in the 
political process and because the hearings provide easy 
access to and substantially accurate measurement of a group's 
goals and a lobbyist's exchange benefits. The concluding 
portion of this chapter presents specific hypotheses about 
relationships among the variables discussed above.
Hypotheses
Based on previous discussion in this chapter and 
Chapter II, hypotheses about exchange benefits and relation­
ships between those benefits and goal attainment hypotheses, 
can be presented. Variables representing structure, organi­
zational structure, resources, and channels of influence in 
relation to goal attainment will also be included:
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Exchange Benefits and Goal Attainment;
The most frequent type of inducement will be 
material information benefits.
Coercive exchanges will be the least frequent 
benefits.
Hg The most successful benefit in attaining interest 
group goals will be information-based material 
exchanges. [Clapp (1963) said that the interest 
group that provides relevant research material 
to congressmen will be rewarded (.166) . He 
quoted a congressman: "On numerous occasions I 
have called on the Farm Bureau and said, 'I 
feel this way about legislation. Would you give 
me some material on it?' They perform a very 
valuable function" (1967).]
Purposive benefits will be frequent but less 
effective than information benefits in attain­
ing goals.
Hg Solidary benefits will be relatively ineffective
in attaining interest group goals.
Hg Coercive benefits will not achieve goal attain­
ment.
Structure (Member Structure):
Mass associations will be more successful than 
peak associations. [Wilson (1973) concluded 
that large, heterogeneous groups such as the
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National Association of Manufacturers or the 
United States Chamber of Commerce do not 
"prosecute" issue positions vigorously (310). 
Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1972) added that "the 
broader and more heterogeneous the organization, 
the greater the probability that some subgroups 
will dissent on a given issue" (339).] 
Organizational Structure;
Hg The narrower the scope of the interest group,
the more successful the group should be.
Hg The larger the coalition supporting a particular
position, the more likely the policy position 
will be attained.
Resources;
All other things being equal, larger groups will 
be more successful in attaining their policy 
goals.
All other things being equal, geographically 
dispersed groups will be more likely to attain 
their policy goals.
Channels of Influence:
H ^2 Interest groups having a person appear to pro­
vide testimony will be more successful in
attaining their goals than interest groups 
providing only written testimony.
Groups will be more successful in the chamber 
of Congress where they testify.
221
These hypotheses will be tested using both appropria­
tions and substantive legislation outcomes as presented in 
Chapter V and VI.
Conclusion
This present chapter has the theoretical underpinnings 
for this research. To that end, it has identified the link­
ages between power and exchange theory so that exchange theory 
could be used to demonstrate how interactions between lobby­
ists and policy makers are associated with policy output. 
Certainly, there are some weaknesses in using exchange theory 
as a means to examine lobbyists— policy makers' interactions, 
but the strengths of the use of exchange theory for this 
purpose outweigh the pitfalls. The following chapter will 
provide an extensive discussion of the methodological aspects 
of this study.
NOTES
1. Unless otherwise specified in this chapter, the terms 
"power," "influence," "force," etc. will be used inter­
changeably.
2. See Dahl (1955: 436-437) for a good discussion of causal
versus influence relationships.
3. Dahl (1968) said "power need not be general; it may be
specialized. In fact, in the absence of a single world
ruler, some specialization is inevitable; in any case, it 
is so commonplace that analysts of power have frequently 
insisted that a statement about the power of an individual, 
groups, state, or other actor is practically meaningless 
unless it specifies the power of actor C with respect to 
some class of R's activities. Such a class of activities 
is sometimes called the range or the scope of C's
power" (408) .
4. Baldwin (1971) makes a distinction between medium and means
of exchange based on whether one is talking about pur­
chasing power, money, political power, or symbols of 
legitimately political power.
Now we see why it is important to distinguish 
between money and purchasing power. Whereas pur­
chasing power is a relation, money is but one of 
several means by which a relation can be created.
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It is one thing to conceive of power as a kind of 
exchange; it is quite another to conceive of it as 
as a medium of exchange. Those who define power 
as a relation may find it more useful to compare 
political power with purchasing power rather than 
with money. (586).
But later Baldwin states " . . .  the nearest political 
equivalent to money is a set of symbols of legitimate 
political power, the possession and use of which facili­
tates the exercise of political power" (592). In this 
research, the phrases "medium of exchange" and "means of 
exchange" will be used interchangeably unless otherwise 
specified.
5. Excellent critiques of Homan and Blau's seminal works can 
be found in Barry (1976) and Mitchell (1978).
6. Olson's (1971) ideas on large and small groups were 
briefly introduced in Chapter II of this research.
7. Wooton (1970) distinguished between peak and non-peak 
groups as follows:
. . . Local, regional, and occupational bodies 
and Federations (including the trade unions as well 
as the national, or industrywide, trade associations, 
but excluding the "peaks").
. . . The "peaks"— e.g., the Associated Cham­
bers of Manufacturers, Australia; . . . the Canadian 
Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian Manufacturer's 
Association; . . . the National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM) and the United States Chamber of 
Commerce; . . . . (37).
8. For a good discussion of consensual coalitions versus 
conflictuel coalitions and their relation to congressional 
action or non-action be sure to read Hayes (1978).
9. Jones (1977) refers to the approval of specific proposals 
as the processes of legitimation (91). Jones' discussion
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is rich and concise; readers should benefit from his 
discussion (91-100).
10. Mohr (1973) provides a very thorough summary of the 





Preceding chapters have discussed agricultural policy, 
interest groups, exchange theory, and the hypotheses for 
this research. This one presents the methodology of this 
study. Research design will be given attention first. Once 
the procedure for selecting research samples is described and 
the composition of those samples presented, attention will 
turn to the major data collection technique— content analysis 
of committee hearings. Finally, the statistical procedures 
applied will be presented. Chapters V and VI will discuss 
the findings of the data analysis, with Chapter V applying 
exchange theory to oral and written testimony before a 
congressional committee dealing with appropriations legis­
lation, and Chapter VI applying it to a congressional 
committee acting on substantive legislation. Agricultural 





The data included information on 68 interest groups
having 593 goals^ that gave testimony on fiscal year 1976
agricultural appropriations legislation and 44 interest
groups having 429 policy goals relative to the substantive
2portions of the 1977 agricultural legislation. A total of 
107 interest groups testified on the 1977 general farm 
legislation while the 68 groups were all the groups that 
testified on the agricultural appropriations legislation. 
With the exceptions of major farm groups (e.g., American 
Farm Bureau) and groups presenting only written testimony 
(7 groups), which were chosen outright, interest groups that 
testified on substantive agricultural legislation were 
selected sequentially from government documents' indexes 
until a sufficiently large number of cases was obtained.^
The sample, therefore, of groups testifying on substantive 
legislation was not randomly selected; however, this sample 
does represent a broad cross section of interest groups 
testifying on the substantive portions of the 1977 general 
farm legislation. Interest groups that testified on 
appropriations and substantive agricultural legislation 
included narrow interest commodity groups (e.g., Iowa Corn 
Growers Association), general farm interest groups (e.g.. 
National Farmers Union), and a broad public interest group 
(Bread for the World).
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Appropriation legislation for fiscal year 1976 
(U.S. Congress, 1975c; U.S. Congress, 1975d; U.S. Congress, 
1975e) was singled out for study for a couple of reasons. 
First, appropriations legislation can be used to compare 
with the analyses of interest group interaction relative to 
substantive legislation. Second, agricultural appropriations 
legislation for fiscal year 1976 was chosen because the 
lobbying for fiscal year 1976 occurred in 1975; this helped 
to insulate the lobbyists' interactions with policy makers 
from the 1976 election year politics— an external validity 
threat (Cook and Campbell, 1976: 235).
Selection for study of interest group testimony and 
goal attainment relative to the Food and Agriculture Act 
of 1977 (U.S. Congress, 1977k) was based on the comprehensive 
nature of the 1977 legislation. The legislation dealt with 
a range of interests, including dairy and beekeeper pro­
grams, upland cotton, rice, peanuts, sugar, food stamps. 
Public Law 480, agricultural research, rural development, 
etc. (U.S. Congress, 1977c: 1-6).^ Because of the wide 
range of topics covered by the 1977 legislation, a broad 
range of interest groups were expected to participate in 
the discussion of the legislation.
As was indicated above, all group testimony on 
fiscal year 1976 agricultural appropriations legislation 
was content analyzed. Although random sampling was not 
used to select groups that testified on the wheat and feed
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grains portion of the 1977 substantive legislation, a large 
and diverse selection of group testimony was content 
analyzed. The research conclusions, though not generaliz- 
able (Warwick and Lininger, 1975; 8) to other substantive 
policy areas, do provide confidence that the findings are 
reliable relative to the universe of agricultural interest 
groups that testified on fiscal year 1976 appropriations 
legislation and the 1977 farm legislation concerning wheat 
and feed grains.
Content Analysis 
Content analysis was the research technique used to 
collect the data for this study.^ This section discusses 
what content analysis is and how content analysis was 
applied here.
Holsti (1969) said "content analysis is any technique 
for making inferences by objectively and systematically 
identifying specified characteristics of messages" (14). 
According to Holsti, his definition implies that content 
analysis must be objective, systematic, and undertaken for 
some theoretical reason (14).
North, et al. (1963) support Holsti's statement:
Content analysis research usually involves 
the following stages. First, the research question, 
theory, and hypotheses are formulated. The sample 
is then selected, and the categories are defined.
Next, the documents are read and coded, and the 
relevant content is condensed onto special data 
sheets. After coding, items placed in each category 
may be scaled, whereupon counts in frequency or 
intensity are made. Finally, interpretations of the 
findings are made in light of the appropriate theory 
(38) .
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Using North, et al.'s, stages of content analysis, 
previous chapters and the prior section of this chapter 
have already dealt with the research questions, theory, 
hypotheses, selection of samples, and definition of cate­
gories (material, purposive, solidary, coercion, member 
structure, group size, etc.). Below the step-by-step process 
of content analyzing for categories will be related. Before 
discussing each category that was content analyzed, cet- 
tain precautions that were taken to safeguard the systematic 
approach to the study should be noted. To this end, con­
sideration of reliability and validity of the process of 
doing the content analysis are presented.
Reliability and Validity
Lasswell (1949) said that the most important require­
ment for describing a set of characteristics " . . .is  
that the results have a high degree of reliability, i.e., 
that different observers report the same thing" (56). Though 
no statistical test was used here, reliability of the con­
tent analysis for the categories was considered and evaluated, 
That is, a second coder content analyzed a random sample 
of the groups' testimonies and goals that had already been 
content analyzed, using the same instructions for categor­
izing the data (Budd, Thorp, and Donohew, 1967: 66-67).
This second coder, an agricultural policy expert, concluded 
that the initial coding was accurate and acceptably reliable.
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Inter-coder reliability was not problematic in this research 
since only one coder did all of the content analyzing 
(Holsti, 1969: 141).
"Validity is usually defined as the extent to which 
an instrument is measuring what it is intended to measure" 
(Holsti, 1969: 142) . In content analysis, direct validity 
(face validity) is frequently assumed by the content analyzed. 
The content analyst, therefore, believes that if the 
categories are clearly defined and there is a high degree 
of reliability, validation has been achieved (Budd, et al., 
1967: 69). But face validity is not always enough to 
assume the validity of categories when using content 
analysis.
A method similar to the jury method was used to 
establish the validity of the categories. Jury method uses 
experts to judge the choice and definition of variables 
(69). This research relied on an expert of interest group 
theory and agricultural policy to peruse the selection and 
definition of the vairables. It is to these variables 
that attention now turns.
Exchange Theory Benefits
Berelson (1971) said there were five major units of 
analysis for content analyzing: words, themes, characters, 
items, and space-and-time measures (136). This research 
focuses on the theme as the unit of content analysis. A
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theme can be "a sentence (or sentence-compound), usually 
a summary or abstracted sentence, under which a wide range 
of specific formulations can be subsumed" (138). Using 
exchange benefit categories— material, purposive, solidary, 
and coercive--this research classified themes to fit the 
categories:^
[Material (tangible rewards)]: I would invite 
this committee to come to Montana on March 21 . . . 
Any of you who can come, get in contact with me 
and I will be glad to make arrangements to put you 
up on the ranches and keep you out of the hotels 
(U.S. Congress, 1977è: 98).
[Purposive (intangible rewards and broad general 
goals)]: By and large the membership has concluded
that less government in their operations, not more, 
is in the best interest of livestock operators and 
the consuming public (U.S. Congress, 1977f: 127).
These factors have caused the membership to conclude 
— rather reluctantly on the part of many members—  
that sudden termination of the farm program would be 
risky for both farmers and the general public (128).
[Solidary (intangible rewards; reference to a 
sense of belonging or associating with group members)] 
In closing, may I thank each of you distinguished men 
for holding these hearings, and try to impress upon 
you how important your past efforts have been for 
soil and water conservation (U.S. Congress,
1975a: 348). . . .  I thank you very sincerely
for the privilege of appearing before you and 
encouraging you and the men who have done so much to 
continue your efforts to see the program is carried 
out in the manner in which the Congress of this 
Nation has so instructed (348) .
7[Coercive (use of power to control needs):
An example of a farm interest group spokesperson 
using coercion would be]: Congressman, if you don't
support increased target prices, our group will 
make sure that the folks back home know how you 
voted come election day.
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Interest Group Goals
Statements of interest group goals were content analyzed 
in order that inferences could be made about the use of 
exchange benefits in relation to the goals. According to 
Holsti (1969) the most systematic research that had consid­
ered making inferences about the "effects of messages" upon 
the receiver had been done to measure the readability of 
texts (35). He further stated that researchers should pro­
ceed with caution when linking messages to effects on 
individuals. Evidence exists that indicates people interpret 
and assimilate messages based on personal beliefs about the 
"credibility of the source, situational [sic], personality, 
and other factors" (36). This research acknowledges the 
weaknesses involved in making inferences about messages and 
their effects (in this study, exchange benefits explaining 
policy output).
Berelson (1971) stated that one distinction in doing 
content analysis is the differentiation between the record­
ing unit and the context unit. Recording unit refers to 
"the smallest body of content in which the appearance of 
a reference is counted (a reference is a single occurrence 
of a content element)" (135). A context unit is "the 
largest body of content that may be examined in character­
izing a recording unit" (135). A sentence, therefore, could 
be a recording unit and the paragraph the context unit, and 
in this instance, a researcher could take into account the
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context from which the sentence is extracted (135-136).
For content analyzing group goals in this research, we used 
a derivation of the recording unit/context unit distinction. 
Some goals were recorded verbatim, others were summarized 
based upon the context unit:
[Verbatim]: . . . President should be prohibited 
from involving export emgargoes on anything but 
military and other strategic material, unless there 
is a clear case of national security involved 
(U.S. Congress, 1977f: 353).
[Summarizing: The following group goal was con­
tent analyzed as] $195,000 for ARS at Peoria for 
wild rice research. [This goal was derived from the 
following testimony]: We understand now there is in 
the President's budget $195,000. This money is 
directed to the Agricultural Research Service at 
Peoria. We are, of course, in support of that [and 
other contextual material identifying the amount 
with wild rice research (U.S. Congress, 1975a: 96).
Once all the group goals had been determined, each 
goal, whether concerning appropriations or substantive legis­
lation, was compared to what had passed in the congressional 
committees, U.S. House and U.S. Senate, and conference 
committee. A group's goal was coded as a 1 for complete 
achievement, .5 for partial achievement, and 0 for no achieve­
ment of a goal. These codes were recorded for the five 
decision points for both 1977 general farm and the fiscal 
year 1976 agricultural appropriations legislation.
Member Structure 
Classifying groups according to member structure 
involved identifying groups as either mass or peak groups. 
Mass groups could be local, state, or national organizations.
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Examples of a local mass group are the Goehner, Nebraska 
Grange Farm Program (U.S. Congress, 1977f: 87) and an 
informal group of Texas farmers represented by Mrs. Jake W. 
Jones (269 farmers composed the Texas group (136). South 
Dakota Farmers Union is an example of a state level mass 
group (U.S. Congress, 1977h: 131). National groups that 
are considered mass groups are all major farm groups such as 
the National Farmers Organization, American Farm Bureau 
Federation, and American Soybean Association. Also, other 
national groups are identified based upon a description of 
how the national organization is composed. If the national 
organization is directly made up of other mass organizations, 
then the national organization is considered to be a mass 
group. For example, the National Cotton Council of America 
is coded as a mass group based on the following description 
of its organizational makeup:
. . . Delegates (290) from 19 cotton producing 
states, named by their respective producer, ginner, 
warehouseman, merchant, cooperative, textile manu­
facturer, and cottonseed crusher organizations in 
each state (Yakes and Akey, 1980: 70) .
On the other hand, the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives
is coded as a peak association since its organizational
structure is clearly composed of other organizations that
do not directly have mass memberships, even though the
organizations do serve large numbers of people:
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. . . Members; 160. Federation of national, 
regional and state associations of farmers' market­
ing, purchasing, and credit cooperatives serving 
total farm membership of 3,000,000. 'To protect 
the right of farmers to organize and operate their 
own cooperative associations. To assist agriculture 
to obtain a share of the total national income 
commensurate with the share obtained for the same 
productive and marketing efficiency by other segments 
of the nation's economy' (Yakes and Akey, 1980: 227).
Using the above classifying scheme, groups were coded as
either mass or peak.
Organization Cohesion and 
Coalition Structure
Organization cohesion, as related in Chapter III, is
measured by referring to organizations as either commodity,
middleman, general farm, and general interest groups.
This is justified by reasoning that narrow goal seeking
groups will have more organization cohesion and success than
broad goal seeking groups. On a scale identifying the
narrowest goal oriented groups to the broadest goal oriented
groups, commodity groups represent the former, followed
respectively by middlemen, general farm, and general interest
groups. The data were originally coded so that groups were
classified as economic commodity producer, economic middleman,
economic general farm group, economic consumer, or public
interest. Due to the small number of cases coded as
economic consumer and public interest, these two categories
were collapsed into one category called general interest
groups.
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Coalition structure is measured indirectly.
Coalitions are determined by the average number of groups 
that take particular positions. Since interest here requires 
comparison of successes and failures in achieving goals, 
these data are used to calculate the average number of groups 
favoring goals achieved with the average number of groups 
that favor goals not achieved. Coalition sizes are calculated 
for each decision point. For instance, suppose in the 
House committee relative to the 1977 omnibus farm legislation, 
five groups supported one achieved goal, three groups 
supported two achieved goals, and two groups supported three 
achieved goals. The average coalition size is 1.7 groups 
for achieved goals at that decision point (10 groups t 6 goals) 
Using content analysis, therefore, measurements of 
organization cohesion and coalition structure are derived, 
although for both variables, only a surrogate is possible. 
Nevertheless, these surrogate measures do, in themselves, 
represent important distinctions among types of groups and 
among decision situations.
Group Size and Geographical Dispersion 
Group size was originally coded as the approximate 
membership of a group based on testimony from hearings 
and/or information from the Encyclopedia of Associations 
(Yakes and Akey, 1980). Ultimately, the size is broken 
down into two categories, groups with fewer than 1,000 
and those with 1,000 or more members.
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Geographical dispersion of a group is determined by 
membership in states. As hypothesized in Chapter III, 
the more states in which a group has members, the greater 
success in attaining goals the group is likely to have.
This research divided dispersion into two categories. One 
includes groups with members in only one state, while the 
second is composed of groups with members in more than one 
state.
Group size and geographical dispersion are determined 
by a group's testimony before Congress and/or by using a 
source on organizations. The figures used are the most 
up-to-date available, and are considered reasonably accurate 
approximations of the groups' membership and geographical 
dispersion data.
Nature and Location of Testimony 
These variables are considered tactics. When used to 
explain policy output in this research, each is divided into 
two categories: oral/oral and written testimony versus 
written testimony only, House/House and Senate testimony 
versus Senate/House and Senate testimony. Coding of the 
variables is based strictly upon what appears in the 
hearing records.
Statistical Analysis 
Displayed in Chapter V and VI are frequencies and 
percentages for member structure, organization cohesion.
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group size and geographic dispersion, tactics, and exchange 
benefits. Also shown are the proportions of successful 
goal attainment for the following variables: exchange benefits, 
member structure, organization cohesion, coalition size, 
group size and geographical dispersion, and tactics. Success­
ful goal attainment is provided for each decision point 
along the decision continuum. That is, for substantive 
and appropriations legislation, successful goal attainment 
as a proportion of total goals is shown for the House 
committee. Senate committee. House floor. Senate floor, and 
conference committee.
For the most part, student's t is used to determine 
the statistical significance of the differences between two 
sample means (Blalock, 1972: 220-226). The exception is 
for testing statistical significance of sample means relative 
to group cohesion (the categories include commodity, middle­
man, general farm, and general interest groups). One-way 
analysis of variance is used to determine statistical 
significance of this variable (317-329) .
Conclusion
Summarizing briefly the material in this chapter, the 
research design, a brief consideration of content analysis, 
and statistical applications for the research have been 
presented. All groups were not selected at random, but 
large and wide-ranging samples of groups that testified on 
the fiscal year 1976 agricultural appropriations and 1977
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general farm legislation were used in the research. Given 
the large number and diversity of groups involved, the 
findings can probably be generalized to other groups testi­
fying on agricultural legislation for the same years. Since 
goals, not groups, were used as cases for the statistical 
procedures, the sample sizes of groups (44 groups and 68 
groups) pose no problem; the statistics we use rely on large 
sample numbers (the fiscal year 1976 appropriations and the 
1977 general farm legislation involved 593 and 429 goals, 
respectively). Though the reliability and validity of our 
categories are not justified by statistics, precautions were 
taken to insure both reliability and validity. Chapters V 
and VI will examine the research findings.
NOTES
1. The 593 goals do not refer to 593 different policy 
goals. Three groups, for example, could have the same 
goal per group. In this instance, there would be 
three goals among the three groups. Groups that testi­
fied on the agricultural appropriations legislation had 
374 separate goals; groups that provided testimony on 
substantive legislation had 120 discrete goals.
2. The data concerning farm interest group testimony on the 
substantive aspects of the 1977 omnibus farm legislation 
was solely derived from government documents (U.S.
Congress, 1977e; U.S. Congress, 1977f; U.S. Congress,
Part 1, 1977g; U.S. Congress, 1977h; U. S. Congress, 1977i;
U.S. Congress, 1977j). The 44 interest groups were:
Agricultural Trade Council
American Bakers Association
American National Cattlemen's Association
An Appeal to Congress and the President
Bread for the World






Farmers for Political Action Committee
Farmers Union, Iowa
Farmers Union, South Dakota
Farmers Union, National
Grain Producers Association, Nebraska
Grain Sorghum Producers Association
Grange, Farm Program, Goehner, Nebraska
Gregory, Gayle, Group of Farmers
Holstein-Friesan Association of America
Illinois Women for Agriculture
Independent Bakers Association
Interreligious Task Force





Linn County Farm Bureau, Iowa
Marion County Wheat Growers Association
Minutemen for Agriculture
National Corn Growers Association
National Farmers Organization
National Farmers Organization, Western Kansas
National Grain and Feed Association
National Livestock Feeders Association
National Organization for Raw Materials, Inc.
National Planning Association
North Carolina Poultry Federation
North Carolina Soybean Producers Association, Inc.
North Carolina State Grange 
Partners in Action for Agriculture 
United Egg Producers 
United Farm Wives
Women in Agriculture for Oklahoma Farmers 
Worthington, Wayne, Group of Kansas Farmers
We also used government documents to obtain the data on
the 68 interest groups that testified before Congress on
agricultural appropriations for fiscal year 1976 (U.S.
Congress, 1975a; U.S. Congress, 1975b). Listed below
are the 68 interest groups that testified on agricultural
appropriations for fiscal year 1976:
American Association of Nurserymen 
American Corn Millers Federation
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American National Cattlemen's Association
American Soybean Association
Association of Soil and Water Conservation Districts, 
Alabama
Bennett, Thomas, Group of Florida Farmers
Chase County Conservation District
Competitive Livestock Marketing Association
Concerned Farmers from Lake Michigan, James Drake
Cotton Council International
Council of State Community Affairs Agencies
Crop Quality Council
Eastern South Dakota Soil and Water Conservation 
Research Corporation 
North East Association of Farmer Elected Committeemen 
Federal Statistics Users' Conference 
Florists Transworld Delivery Association 
Forest Farmers Association 
Grange
Housing Assistance Council, Inc.
International Association of Game, Fish, and Conser­
vation Commissioners 
Kansas Association of Conservation Districts 
Louisiana Cotton Producers Association 
Malting Barley Improvement Association 
Michigan Bean Commission 
Mid-Atlantic Food Processors Association 
Mushroom Processors Association 
National Association of Conservation Districts 
National Association of Conservation Districts,
Recreation and Natural Environment Committee 
National Association of Farmer Elected committeemen 
National association of Home Builders 
National Association of State Foresters 
National Association of State Universities and Land 
Grant Colleges 
National Commission of Food Marketing 
National Cotton Council 
National Council of Farmer Cooperatives 
National Dry Bean Research Institute 
National Grain and Feed Association 
National Limestone Institute, Inc.
National Macaroni Manufacturers Association 
National Milk Producers Federation 
National Peach Council 
National Pork Producers Council
National Rural Electric Association Telephone Association
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National Rural Electric Cooperative Association 
National Rural Housing Coalition 
National Soybean Processors Association 
National Telephone Cooperative Association 
National Wool Growers Association 
Non-Profit Market Development Organizations 
Oklahoma Housing Development Corporation 
Pacific North West Potato Industry 
Rural Housing Improvement, Inc.
Society of American Florists 
Southern Animal Health Association
Southeastern Association of Game and Fish Commissioners 
Western Bean Dealers Association, Inc.
Wheat Growers Associations and Commissions; Washington, 
Idaho, and Oregon 
Wild Rice Association 
Wildlife Management Institute 
World Hunger Year
Wyoming Association of Conservation Districts 
Wyoming State Conservation Commission
3. Even though the government documents indexes containing 
testimony concerning substantive agricultural legislation 
were alphabetized, the sample of groups selected from 
these sources was not biased because of groups' names. 
Selection bias was controlled since each document contained 
names spanning the alphabet. For example, one source's 
index began with Bauman and ended with Zenishek. Further­
more, several documents were used.
4. Read Chapter II of this work for a more extensive dis­
cussion of the 1977 farm legislation.
5. The content analysis instrument appears in Appendix C.
The instrument used to content analyze the 1977 general 
farm legislation did not have categories "orally/House," 
"written/House," "orally/Senate," and "written/Senate"; 
instead, the variable telling how personal testimony was 
presented had the categories "yes" and "no."
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6. Read Chapter III for a complete discussion as to what 
constitutes material, purposive, solidary, and coercive 
incentives.
7. Only one coercive statement, an implied one, was made 
in testimony by lobbyists from the 113 interest groups' 
testimonies that were content analyzed. The one coer­
cive statement was made by a spokesperson for the Wheat 
Growers Associations and Commissions of the three 
Pacific Northwest states of Washington, Idaho, and 
Oregon (U.S. Congress, 1975b);
We would like to call your attention to the 
fact that the proposal is a joint effort between 
the three states of Idaho, Oregon and Washington 
involving the three Land Grant Colleges of the 
respective states, as well as ARS-USDA. We would 
also like to call your attention to the fact that 
other farm organizations other than the wheat 
grower groups have endorsed this proposal (2265).
CHAPTER V
DATA ANALYSIS OF INTEREST GROUP TESTIMONY ON THE 
FISCAL YEAR 1976 AGRICULTURAL 
APPROPRIATIONS LEGISLATION
Introduction 
Hypotheses for this research were presented in 
Chapter IV. The main focus is on the exchange benefits 
(material, purposive, solidary, and coercive) and the 
impact of exchange benefits on policy output. This chapter 
considers interest group testimony on the fiscal year 1976 
agricultural appropriations legislation. Chapter VI 
similarly treats data relating to the 1977 omnibus farm 
legislation. The order of presentation in each case will 
be a description of the independent variables, discussion 
-jof-JbJbLe_independent^jvariablas' impact on goal attainment.
and a conclusion.
Description of the Data 
The descriptive data for the independent variables 
relevant to this chapter can be found in Table 1. These 
data are based on groups. Data showing the relationship 
of independent variables to dependent variables are located
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in Tables 2 and 3. Findings in Tables 2 and 3 have the 
cases based on groups' goals.
Dependent variables concern decisions taken in the 
House and Senate. Analysis of the raw data discloses that 
House committee decisions are sustained 96.2 percent of 
the time by the House floor. An even greater consistency 
exists between Senate committee decisions and Senate floor 
actions. The U.S. Senate upheld the Senate committee decision 
point's actions 98.1 percent of the time. Overall, decisions 
were concurred with 90.6 percent of the time. Even though 
this study considers all decision points, a study could be 
made at any one of the decision points of the decision 
continuum and little information would be lost.
In terms of overall goals, the raw data show that 
groups' goals were attained 43.5 percent and 41.7 percent 
of the time in the House committee and House floor, respec­
tively. (That is, using goals identified in the hearings, 
committee and House action provided partial or full achieve­
ment slightly less than one-half the time.) Consistent 
with past findings, the U.S. Senate is more responsive to 
interest group appeals (Meier, 1978b: 14). Groups attained 
54.2 percent of their goals in the Senate Appropriations 
Committee. On the U.S. Senate floor, groups achieved 51.7 
percent of their goals. Compromising occurred in conference; 
groups' goals were confirmed 41.7 percent of the time.
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TABLE 1
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 







Type of Inducement Offered
Material Information 68 100





Mass Association 33 48
Peak Association 33 48
Not Determinable 2 2
Scope of Goals
Commodity Producer 20 29
Middleman 19 28
General Farm 6 9
Consumer 15 22
General Interest 5 7
Not Determinable 3 4
Membership Size
Less Than 1,000 25 37
More Than 1,000 37 54
Not Determinable 6 9
Geographic Dispersion
One State 15 22
More Than One State 50 74
Not Determinable 3 4
Tactics
Personal/Personal and Written Testimony 51 75
Written Testimony Only 17 25
House/House and Senate Testimony 22 32
Senate/House and Senate Testimony 7 10
Both 39 57
NOTE; The independent variable "coalition size" is not listed 
because its categories do not sum to 68 groups, thus, making 
its frequencies meaningless compared to the data shown in this 
table. For example, the House committee decision locus of 
successful coalitions involved 287 groups.
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Exchange Benefits 
Table 1 shows that material information was the most 
frequently offered inducement. This supports hypothesis 1. 
Material information was used by all 68 groups. Breaking
the information into categories, 25 groups offered just 
general information to policy makers; general and technical 
(e.g., soil stratification in western Oklahoma) information 
was submitted by 42 groups; one group gave general, political, 
and technical information. No groups used other material 
inducements.
Purposive incentives were used by 72 percent of the 
groups, thus, partially supporting hypothesis 4 that stated 
purposive benefits would be frequent. Solidary statements 
were the next most frequently used inducement as 25 groups 
integrated this type of incentive in their testimony.
Finally, supporting hypothesis 2 that coercive exchanges 
would be the least frequent incentive offered, only one 
group stated a coercive inducement— the Wheat Growers Associa­
tions and Commissions from Washington, Idaho, and Oregon.
Other Independent Variables
The independent variable "member structure" shown 
in Table 1 reveals groups evenly split between mass associa­
tions and peak associations. Organization cohesion— with 
categories commodity producer, middleman, general farm, 
consumer, and general interest— has the categories commodity
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producers and middlemen involving 39 groups (57 percent). 
General farm groups are conspicuously infrequent, only six 
groups. This may be attributed to where the testimony is 
presented— before appropriations subcommittees rather than 
before agricultural subcommittees. General farm groups 
probably feel their greatest success can be achieved by 
changing substantive legislation rather than the minds of 
members of the more prestigious House and Senate Appropria­
tions Committees. Consumer groups were quite frequent.
This category included groups such as the Association of 
Soil and Water Conservation Districts that seek to influence 
policy makers' annual appropriations on their associated 
USDA's agencies' budgets. Groups such as these are members 
of the subsystems that Lowi (1969) described (110-115). 
General interest groups composed only 7 percent of those 
testifying.
Resources as a cluster of variables is partially 
represented here by the variable group size and dispersion. 
Over half of the groups providing testimony represented 
more than 1,000 individuals. A large majority (74 percent) 
of the groups had members in more than one state.
Tactics used by lobbyists to influence congressmen 
are reflected in the variable indicating how the testimony 
was presented before the committees, either personal/personal 
and written or strictly written. A second variable provides 
information as to whether the testimony was presented in
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the U.S. House, or Senate, or both. Fifty-one groups gave 
only personal or personal and written testimony. Just 17 
groups testified using only written testimony. A large 
percentage of the groups presented testimony only in the U.S. 
House (32 percent) as compared to those presenting testimony 
only in the U.S. Senate (10 percent). Fifty-seven percent 
of the groups provided testimony to both chambers. The 
large number of groups presenting before only the U.S. House 
probably results from the appropriations' legislative process. 
Appropriations measures begin in the House; the Senate 
Appropriations Committee serves as an appeals body from the 
powerful House Appropriations Committee. Groups, therefore, 
probably feel that in order to attain their goals they must 
influence the primary legislative body— the House Appropria­
tions Committee.
Groups and Goal Attainment 
This section discusses the relationship between the 
independent variables— exchange benefits, member structure, 
organization cohesion, coalition size, membership size, 
membership dispersion, and tactics— and the dependent 
variables along the decision locus— House committee, House 
floor. Senate committee. Senate floor, and conference 
committee. Tables 2 and 3 present the findings of the data 
analysis. With the exception of coalition sizes, figures 
in Tables 2 and 3 can be interpreted as the probability of
TABLE 2
RELATIONSHIP OF TYPE OF EXCHANGE THEORY INDUCEMENT TO THE 













(N=133) General/General and Technical .50 .45 . 52 .57* .45
(N=395) Technical/General and Technical .44 .42 . 49 .48 . 46
Purposive
(N=438) Yes .46 .44 .50 .51 .47
(N=90) No .43 .40 . 45 .45 .40
Solidary
(N=231) Yes . 46 .44 .47 .48 .44
(N=297) No .46 .42 .51 .51 .48
Coercive
(N=4) Yes .50 .50 .62 .62 .50
(N=524) No .46 .43 .49 .50 .46
toin
This indicates statistical significance at the .05 level; calculation of significance 
is based on consequences of the probability figures of a variable's categories below 
a decision locus.
TABLE 3
RELATIONSHIP OF OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES TO THE 











(N=270) Mass .46 .43 .48 .48 .50
(N=35G) Peak .46 . 42 . 51 .51 . 42
Scope of Goals
(N=162) Commodity .48* .44* .54* .53* .45*
(N=120) Middleman .47 .43 .56 .58 .44
(N=108) General Farm .32 .31 .34 .33 .33
(N=126) General Interest .55 .52 .54 .53 .52
Coalition Size
Successful Coalitions 1.6* 1.6* 1.5* 1.5* 1.8*
Unsuccessful Coalitions 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.1
Size of Group
(N=123) Less Than 1,000 .51 .47 .54 .55 .48
(N=371) More Than 1,000 .44 .41 .47 .48 .45
Dispersion
(N=423) One State .46 . 42 . 50 . 50 .46
(N=78) More Than One State .46 .42 .49 .47 .46
Tactics
(N=390) Personal/Personal and .49* .45* .52* .53* .49*
Written Testimony
(N=138) Written Testimony Only . 38 . 36 .42 .42 .38
(N=176) House/House and Senate Testimony .43 .41 .45* .45* .41




*This indicates statistical significance at the .05 level; calculation of significance 
is based on comr,eqùences of the probability figures of a variable's categories below 
a decision locus.
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attaining any one goal or, if multiplied by 100, the percent­
age of goals attained.^ Figures pertaining to coalitions 
depict the average size of a coalition per policy at each 
decision point.
Exchange Benefits and Goal Attainment
None of the 68 groups used other material benefits; 
therefore, no analysis as to whether use or non-use of 
other material benefits increases goal attainment can be 
made. The only statistically significant relationship at 
any decision point indicates the particular success of 
groups presenting general/general and technical as opposed 
to technical/general and technical information.
Purposive statements were the next most frequently 
used benefits. Hypothesis 4 foretold that purposive induce­
ments would be frequent but less effective than information 
benefits. At no decision point did use of purposive benefits 
contribute in a statistically significant way to goal 
attainment. This finding supports the latter part of 
hypothesis 4. Solidary benefits were ineffective as pre­
dicted. Even though the number of cases is small the data 
confirms hypothesis 6 that coercive inducements do not lead 
to statistically significant differences in goal attainment.
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Member Structure and Goal Attainment
Contrary to what had been predicted, mass associa- 
tions were not more successful than peak associations. 
Statistical significance was not indicated at any decision 
point. Hypothesis 7, therefore, is rejected.
Organizational Structure and Goal Attainment
Organization cohesion (referred to as scope of goals
in Table 3) and coalition size were the organizational
structure variables studied. On balance, the analysis shows
that groups that have a narrower goal orientation are more
successful than broader goal oriented groups. This supports
hypothesis 8. A surprising finding and refuting hypothesis
8, however, is the success of general interest groups. This
category contains groups that are typically considered to
have a broad public appeal such as World Hunger Year (there
2were only five such groups) and economic consumer groups 
such as the National Association of State Foresters and 
the Council of State Community Affairs Agencies (15 such 
groups testified). These latter economic consumer groups 
are more narrowly focused than the typical general interest 
group; thus, one would assume that the economic consumer 
groups contributed heavily to the success of the combina­
tion of economic consumer and other general interest groups. 
When controlling for economic consumer groups, however, the 
success of the general interest group category (containing
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only the other general interest groups) increased to .60,
.60, .62, .62, and .60 for the House committee. House floor. 
Senate committee. Senate floor, and conference committee 
decision points, respectively. The high degree of success 
of these general interest groups may be atrributed to the 
kinds of policies they seek— distributive. For example,
the National Rural Housing Coalition sought grants for 
8,000 units of farm labor housing from USDA's Farmers Home 
Administration (U.S. Congress, 1975a: 167). As Meier and 
Van Lohuizen (1978b) indicated, interest groups prosper 
where distributive policies are channeling benefits to 
individuals seeking assistance. This is because the bureaus 
funneling the benefits (e.g.. Farmers Home Administration) 
can claim they are meeting needs of the people, thereby, 
providing legitimacy for their existence (489). At the 
same time, interest group lobbyists can bolster their group's 
future and their own positions by reminding their group's 
membership of the benefits received because of the lobbyist's 
efforts. Findings to this point provide equivocal support 
for hypothesis 9.
Data analysis revealed that successful coalitions 
are larger at all decision points, and the difference 
between the size of successful coalitions and unsuccessful 
coalitions is statistically significant. This clearly 
supports hypothesis 9.
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Group Resources and Goal Attainment
Hypothesis 10 is not supported by this data analysis. 
At every decision point, groups with less than 1,000 members 
were as successful as groups with more than 1,000 members. 
Similarly, and unlike what one would expect to find, groups 
with less dispersion generally were as successful as more 
dispersed groups. The data fail to uphold hypothesis 11. 
Explanation of these two unlikely findings may be found in 
the kinds of groups that have less than 1,000 members and 
have membership in only one state. General interest groups, 
the most successful category of groups, compose 60 percent 
of the groups with membership of less than 1,000 and 58 
percent of the groups with dispersion of membership in only 
one state.
Tactics and Goal Attainment
Table 3 displays probability figures supporting 
hypothesis 12. In every instance, groups that used personal 
testimony or personal testimony and written testimony had 
statistically significant greater success than those groups 
relying only on written testimony.
Hypothesis 13 is partially upheld. Groups that 
testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee did 
have greater success in the U.S. Senate than did those groups 
that testified before the U.S. House. But groups that 
appeared before the House Appropriations Committee did not
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have greater success in the U.S. House. This analysis indi­
cates that success is greater in the U.S. Senate than in 
the U.S. House regardless of whether testimony was presented 
in the House or in the Senate. This finding may be explained 
by the appeals role played by the U.S. Senate (Pressman,
1966; 49) .
Conclusion
Analysis of interest group testimony found a majority 
of the hypotheses presented in Chapter IV being supported, 
but exceptions did appear. These findings indicated mass 
associations were not more successful in attaining their 
goals than peak associations. This research had predicted 
mass associations would be more successful.
Hypothesis 8 stated narrower focused groups would be 
more successful than broader oriented groups. Though 
there is some evidence supporting this hypothesis, consider­
able weight can be given to the finding that the groups with 
very broad goals were the most successful.
Finally, hypotheses 10 and 11 were not upheld.
Groups with larger memberships were not more successful 
than small membership groups. Similarly, groups that had 
membership in multiple states were not more successful than 
those concentrated in only one state. This analysis 
atrributed the refutation of both of these hypotheses to 
the influence of the broader goal oriented interest groups; 
these groups dominated the less than 1,000 member groups
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and groups having membership in only one state. The next 
chapter, examining data on testimony associated with general 
farm legislation, provides another opportunity to test 
these hypotheses.
NOTES
1. Based on the assumptions of independent samples and 
samples of common variance, t-tests were used to test 
the significance of relationships between the two cate­
gory variables and success. Analysis of variance was 
used to determine the significance of the multiple, 
category variable organization cohesion, referred to
in the table as "scope of goals." See Nie, et al. for 
a fuller explanation of the t-test and n-way analysis 
of variance (1974: 267-275, 398-433).
2. The general interest groups were American Forestry Associa­
tion, National Commission of Food Marketing, National 
Rural Housing Coalition, Wildlife Management Institute, 
and World Hunger Year.
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CHAPTER VI
DATA ANALYSIS OF INTEREST GROUP TESTIMONY ON 
THE 1977 GENERAL FARM LEGISLATION RELATIVE 
TO WHEAT AND FEED GRAIN POLICIES
Introduction
In this chapter, the hypotheses are discussed in 
light of the analysis of data derived from content analyzing 
interest group testimony on the 1977 general farm legisla­
tion. As in Chapter V, first a descriptive presentation of 
the data is provided. Second, exchange incentives and other 
independent variables are discussed as they relate to policy 
output. Finally, a summary of the findings is presented.
Description of the Data
Table 4 presents the data in descriptive form and 
based upon groups. Later, Tables 5 and 6 will present the 
independent variables in relation to policy output, but then 
cases will be based on goals, not groups.
Before examining each independent variable, some 
observations will be made about the various decision points. 
The data indicate that the main decision points are the 




FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES RELATIVE TO HEARINGS ON THE 






Type of Inducement Offered
Material Information 44 100





Mass Association 38 86
Peak Association 5 11
Not Determinable 1 2
Scope of Goals
Commodity Producer 12 27
Middleman 6 14
General Farm 20 45
Consumer 1 2
General Interest 3 7
Not Determinable 2 4
Membership Size
Less Than 1,000 10 23
More Than 1,000 33 75
Not Determinable 1 2
Geographic Dispersion
One State 24 54
More Than One State 20 45
Not Determinable 0 0
Tactics
Personal/Personal and Written Testimony 37 84
Written Testimony Only 7 16
House/House and Senate Testimony 8 18
Senate/House and Senate Testimony 9 20
Both 27 61
NOTE; The independent variable "coalition size" is not listed 
because its categories do not sum to 44 groups, thus, making 
its frequencies meaningless compared to the data shown in 
this table. For example, the House committee decision locus 
of successful coalitions involved 264 groups.
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upheld on the U.S. House floor 94 percent of the time.
The U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry's decisions are upheld on the U.S. Senate floor 
98.7 percent of the time. Overall, 88.6 percent of all 
decisions are consistent. This indicates that any one of 
the five decision points (House committee. House floor. 
Senate committee. Senate floor, or conference committee) may 
be studied concerning policy output without losing much 
information.
The raw data also indicate that groups achieve 42.9 
percent of their goals in the House Agriculture Committee 
and 45.8 percent on the U.S. House floor. In the U.S. 
Senate, groups are more successful. Groups attain 57.9 per­
cent of their goals in the Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry and 54.6 percent of their goals on 
the U.S. Senate floor. This is consistent with the findings 
of Fenno (1966) when analyzing appropriations decisions 
(574-575).
Exchange Benefits
The first hypothesis suggested that material informa­
tion benefits would be the most frequent. In fact, this is 
the case as all groups supplied policy makers with material 
information. Of the 44 groups, seven used only information 
that was general in nature and no groups used only informa­
tion that was technical. Thirty-seven of the 44 groups
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presented both general and technical information. Coercive 
statements are absent from these data, thus, confirming 
hypothesis 2 that coercive exchanges would be the least 
frequent incentive used by lobbyists.
Material statements that did not contain information 
involved only 1 group— Minute Men for Agriculture. Hypothesis 
4 was partially confirmed with purposive statements being 
the most frequent benefit offered after material information 
inducements. Eighty-four percent of the groups used 
purposive statements. Solidary statements were the third 
most offered benefits.
Other Independent Variables
Most of the groups were mass associations (8 6 percent) 
and the largest category of groups that testified— and 
reflecting rather low organization cohesion— was general farm 
groups (45 percent). Commodity producers (e.g., Marion 
County Wheat Growers Association) was the next most frequent 
category that testified (27 percent). The large percentage 
of general farm interest groups testifying is easily under­
standable, not only because of the substantive policy area—  
agriculture— but also because the legislation that was 
being dealt with was substantive and general in nature.
General farm groups, therefore, could easily rationalize 
that testimony before Congress on general farm legislation 
would allow them to speak on many agricultural policies at
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one time. Also, because the legislation was substantive 
rather than concerning appropriations, general farm groups 
could assume their impact would be greater when testifying 
before agricultural committees as opposed to appearing 
before more powerful House and Senate Appropriations commit­
tees. Only 7 percent of the sample involved general interest 
groups (e.g.. Bread for the World). The Consumer Coalition 
was the only consumer group whose testimony was content 
analyzed.
Examining the two resource variables, membership 
size and geographic dispersion, the data indicate that 33 
groups represented 1,000 or more individuals while 10 groups 
provided testimony on behalf of less than 1,000 members.
A slight majority of the groups had membership in only one 
state, but 20 groups had members in more than one state.
Channels of influence are reflected in the tactics 
used by groups. Table 4 presents data that indicate personal 
testimony (in person, with or without presenting written 
material as well) is the tactic used most. Using written 
testimony alone to present a group's positions on issues 
was used only 16 percent of the time.
Groups presented their testimony in both the U.S.
House and Senate 61 percent of the time. Only eight groups 
presented testimony in the U.S. House. Similarly, only 
nine groups lobbied the U.S. Senate.
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Groups and Goal Attainment 
Tables 5 and 6 show the various independent variables- 
exchange benefits, member structure, organization cohesion, 
coalition size, membership size, membership dispersion, and 
tactics— as they relate to the dependent variables at the 
decision points along the decision continuum. With the 
exception of coalition size, a decimal number in Tables 5 
and 6 is the probability of achieving any goal. Coalition 
figures shown in Table 6 describe the mean number of groups 
supporting a particular policy.
Exchange Benefits and Goal Attainment
Since all 44 groups provided material information, 
no analysis could be done to determine the impact of informa­
tion on policy output. Likewise, since none of the groups 
offered coercive statements, the impact of coercive induce­
ments could not be determined. Using the categories of 
general/general and technical information and technical/ 
general and technical information, statistically signifi­
cant differences in success are found at all decision 
points, with those groups presenting general/general and 
technical material information being more successful.
Other material benefits are seldom offered. Even 
though the number of cases is small, the data support the 
implicit hypothesis that material benefits (non-informa- 
tional relative to the substantive policy area) are unsuc­
cessful. This is the finding at every decision point.
TABLE 5
RELATIONSHIP OF TYPE OF EXCHANGE THEORY INDUCEMENT TO THE 
PROBABILITY OF ATTAINING A GOAL BY DECISION LOCUS
Decision Locus
House House Senate Senate
Type of Inducement Cmte. Floor Cmte. Floor Conference
Material Information
(N=35) General/General and Technical . 80* . 78* .77* .80* . 78*
(N=366) Technical/General and Technical .53 .53 .61 . 61 . 58
Material- Other
(N=6) Yes . 33 . 33 . 50 . 50 .42
(N=395) No . 56 .56 . 63 . 63 . 60
Purposive
(N=360) Yes .54* .54 . 62 . 63 . 59
(N=41) No .67 .66 .65 .65 . 65
Solidary
(N=8 4) Yes . 48* .48* . 65 . 64 .55
(N-317) No .58 .58 .62 .63 . 60
cyi
(T l
*This indicates statistical significance at the .05 level; calculation of significance 
is based on consequences of the probability figures of a variable's categories below 
a secision locus.
TABLE 6
RELATIONSHIP OF OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES TO THE 











(N=317) Mass . 57 .58 . 62 . 63 . 60
(N=80) Peak . 52 . 49 . 63 . 63 . 56
Scope of Goals
(N=8 7) Commodity .53* . 52* . 57 .56 . 55
(N=68) Middleman .69 . 65 .67 .70 .67
(N=175) General Farm .59 . 58 .65 .64 . 60
(N=62) Public Interest .40 . 39 . 62 .61 .53
Coalition Size
Successful Coalitions 4.6* 4.3* 3.9* 4.4* 4.2*
Unsuccessful Coalitions 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.9
Size of Group
(N=316) Less Than 1,000 .51 . 53 . 57 .58 . 58
(N=17) More Than 1,000 . 57 .56 . 63 .64 . 60
Dispersion
(N=173) One State .56 . 56 . 60 . 60 . 58
(N=228) More Than One State . 56 . 55 . 65 ..66 . 61
Tactics
(N=34 6) Personal/Personal and .56 .56 .63 . 64 . 60
Written Testimony
(N=55) Written Testimony Only .56 .54 .57 .59 . 61
(N=70) House/House and Senate Testimony .54 .51 . 61 .63 .58
(N=331) Senate/House and Senate Testimony .56 . 56 . 63 .63 . 60
to
CTl
*This indicates statistical significance at the .05 level; calculation of significance 
is based on consequences of the probability figures of a variable's categories below 
a decision locus.
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At the House committee, groups that used no pur­
posive statements had greater goal achievement, at a 
statistically significant level than those that provided 
purposive incentives. This is contrary to what one would 
expect. Solidary appeals, the offering of status to members 
of Congress, are unsuccessful at a statistically significant 
level at the House committee and House floor. Again, this 
is consistent with hypothesis 5 that solidary benefits will 
be relatively ineffective in attaining interest group goals. 
In general, the exchange benefits hypotheses have been 
upheld for those that were testable.
Member Structure and Goal Attainment
Hypothesis 7 stated that mass associations would be 
more successful than peak associations. In fact, there is 
no statistically significant difference between the success 
of mass associations and peak associations. Hypothesis 7, 
therefore, is rejected.
Organizational Structure and Goal Attainment
Organizational structure is measured by organization 
cohesion and group coalition. Hypothesis 8 suggested that 
the narrower the scope of the interest group, the more 
successful the group would be. The data reveal statistically 
significant relationships at the House committee and House 
floor decision points. The hypothesis, therefore, is only 
partially supported since at all five decision points there
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is not a preponderance of evidence that indicates that the 
more cohesive groups are more successful than the less 
cohesive groups. Middlemen interest groups are the most 
successful. Even though the middlemen may not have the 
narrowest focus, they do have a relatively narrow one. 
Middlemen's goals generally seek to maintain the status quo 
concerning wheat and feed grains policies. For instance, 
five out of the six groups that had the 68 cases favored 
wheat and feed grain target and loan levels. Target and 
loan prices were not new concepts relative to interest 
groups testifying on the 1977 omnibus farm legislation. 
Success of commodity and general farm groups is relatively 
stable across the variance decision points. Success of 
interest groups (including consumer groups) varies the most, 
being particularly low at the House committee and House 
floor decision points. Success for general interest groups 
is greater at the Senate committee and Senate floor decision 
points. This difference in success by the public interest 
groups can probably be best explained by the makeup of the 
committees. The House committee was composed of few per­
sons in positions of influence with an interest in nutrition 
and consumer issues. Frederick W. Richmond (D NY) was an 
exception. On the other hand, the Senate committee had 
Senators Dick Clark (D lA), Hubert Humphrey (D MN), and 
George McGovern (D SD) who probably had more empathy for 
consumer appeals.
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Coalition size is the second category that involves 
the variable organizational structure. This research 
provides evidence that the larger the coalition supporting 
a particular position, the more likely the policy position 
will be attained (hypothesis 9).
Group Resources and Goal Attainment
Group membership and dispersion are the two resources 
this research used. Table 6 shows that hypothesis 10 is 
rejected because relationships are not statistically signi­
ficant. The same is true for hypothesis 11 regarding dis­
persion. In both cases there is a tendency in the expected 
direction, but it is too weak to be statistically signifi­
cant.
Tactics and Goal Attainment
Hypothesis 12 stated that those groups that had a 
person present testimony would be more successful than those 
groups that only provided written testimony. The data in 
Table 3 reject this since the relationships are not statis­
tically significant. Hypothesis 12 must be rejected. 
Hypothesis 13 was also rejected. Groups were not more 
successful in the House of Congress where they testified.
Two categories of groups that appeared were analyzed. One 
category was composed of groups that testified before the 
House subcommittee or House subcommittee and Senate sub­
committee. A second category contained groups that presented
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testimony before the Senate subcommittee or Senate sub­
committee and House subcommittee.
Conclusion
The usefulness of exchange theory for describing 
interactions between lobbyists and policy makers has been 
demonstrated in this chapter. The frequencies with which 
benefits were used supported the contention that exchange 
theory is adaptable for this purpose. Analysis of exchange 
inducements indicated that solidary inducements were some­
what ineffective in relation to goal attainment and that 
use of general information was particularly effective. 
Effective use of other exchange incentives was not related 
to goal attainment.
Other independent variables that have traditionally 
been used to describe group success were also analyzed.
Mass associations were not more successful than peak associ­
ations, and larger groups (more than 1,000 members) were 
not more successful than smaller groups (less than 1,000 
members). More geographically dispersed groups were not 
more successful than less dispersed groups, rejecting 
hypothesis 11. Both channels of influence hypotheses were 
rejected. Personal testimony was not more successful than 
presenting only written testimony, and groups were not more 
successful in the house of Congress where they testified.
In the concluding chapter, application of exchange theory 




This study concludes with a discussion of the major 
findings of the research. Exchange theory and its adapt­
ability for understanding political interactions between 
interest groups and congressmen is first related. Next, the 
failure of traditional variables to explain goal attainment 
is presented. Finally, the author presents an overall 
interpretation of the research findings.
Exchange Theory and its Use for 
Describing Political Interaction 
Between Lobbyists and Policy Makers
Throughout this research the primary focus has been 
on examining the usefulness of Salisbury's exchange theory 
(1969) to describe the interactions between lobbyists and 
policy makers. The findings indicate that exchange theory 
can be applied successfully in analyzing the give-and-take 
between lobbyists and congressmen. In both the U.S. House 
and the U.S. Senate, and related to hearings on both approp­
riations and substantive legislation that were content 
analyzed, various hypotheses were confirmed. Confirmation
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of these hypotheses involving large numbers of cases points 
to the applicability of exchange theory in explaining 
trade-offs between groups and policy makers. Further support 
was given to this research's main contention by the consistency 
between the appropriations and substantive legislative pro­
cesses. The frequency with which exchange benefits were 
used relative to the appropriations and substantive legisla­
tion processes were strikingly similar. In both processes 
all groups used material information. Other material bene­
fits were used by only 2 percent of the groups testifying 
on substantive legislation, while no group presenting 
testimony on appropriations legislation used other material 
benefits. Using purposive inducements during the approp­
riations and substantive legislation processes were 72 and 
84 percent of the groups respectively. Groups used solidary 
inducements in the appropriations and substantive legisla­
tion processes somewhat less frequently. During the approp­
riations process 37 percent of the groups used solidary 
statements; during the substantive process, 20 percent of 
the groups testifying used solidary inducements. Finally, 
during both the appropriations and substantive legislation 
processes, coercive statements were almost nonexistent.
Only in the appropriations process was a coercive inducement 
used; this statement represented 2 percent of the interest 
groups presenting testimony on appropriations legislation.
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In terms of how effective exchange benefits are in 
achieving goals, the analysis again shows strong similarities 
between the appropriations and substantive legislation 
processes. Relative to both, the most successful informa­
tion benefit was material information of a general nature. 
With the exceptions that in the substantive legislation 
process use of purposive inducements had a statistically 
significant relationship with success at one decision point 
and restraint from using solidary inducements atrributed 
to statistically significant goal attainment, all goal 
attainment is the same for all benefits, for both the 
appropriations and substantive legislation processes. Even 
though there was a tendency toward greater goal success 
because of use or nonuse of other inducements, none of these 
relationships are statistically significant. This research 
indicates because of the large number of cases involved and 
the consistency between analysis of data on both appropria­
tions and substantive legislation, that Salisbury's exchange 
theory can be successfully applied to describe interactions 
between lobbyists and policy makers.
Group Goal Attainment
Accompanying this research's examination of using 
exchange theory to explain political interactions has been 
an analysis of goal attainment in relation to independent 
variables, in addition to exchange benefits. In general.
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whether studying the appropriations or substantive legis­
lation process, variables used to explain group success did 
not have statistically significant relationships along the 
decision continuum. This indirectly supports several 
earlier works that have found the traditional assumption 
of interest groups dominating the legislative process, and 
thereby supporting the pluralist model, to be inaccurate 
and misleading (Matthews, 1960: 190-191, 193, 196; Milbrath, 
1963: 354-355; Bauer, et al., 1972; 454-456; Rieselbach, 
1973: 197; Meier and Van Lohuizen, 1978b: 493).
There were instances when an independent variable 
other than exchange benefits had statistical significance 
relative to the dependent variable— the decision of a 
particular decision locus.^ Several of these independent 
variables deserve further discussion. Interestingly and 
contrary to traditional thinking, general interest groups 
were the most successful groups to testify on agricultural 
appropriations. Even more unusual, when only the general 
interest groups with the broadest goals were included in 
the analysis, the success of the general interest groups 
was even greater.
A second variable, coalition size, when analyzed, 
had statistical significance at all decision points— for 
both appropriations and substantive legislation. Larger 
coalitions were more successful, as one might expect. 
Coalitions permit magnification of a group's individual
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efforts by having the issue being addressed supported by an 
assumed larger number of petitioners, thus, providing greater 
legitimacy to the group's demands (Hall, 1969: 66-68). As 
was expected, groups that presented personal or personal 
and written testimony were more successful relative to 
appropriations legislation, and at a statistically signifi­
cant level, than groups that provided only written testimony. 
Finally, testifying before the Senate or Senate and House 
found groups to be successful at a statistically significant 
level relative to appropriations legislation.
General Interpretation of 
This Study's Analysis
Mainstream literature on exchange theory (Salisbury, 
1969; Olson, 1971) has used the exchange of benefits to 
describe the interactions between group members and group 
leaders. This research set out to apply exchange theory to 
clarify the political interactions between lobbyists and 
policy makers— something suggested before, but never applied. 
What this research has shown is that generally the parti­
cular form of lobbying does not impact on policy output, 
exceptions to this generality notwithstanding. These 
findings are a direct refutation of Bentley's (1935) des­
cription of politics or government as being expressed in 
terms of only group phenomena (222, 258-262). Though 
Truman (1971) did not use it as the central thesis for his 
work on interest group activity, he acknowledged that
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political processes are not the pawns of interest groups
and that policy makers are factors to be reckoned with;
. . . The politician-legislator is not equivalent 
to the steel ball in a pinball game, bumping 
passively from post to post down an inclined plane. 
He is a human being involved in a variety of rela­
tionships with other human beings. In his role as 
legislator his accessibility to various groups is 
affected by the whole series of relationships that 
define him as a person (332-333).
As mentioned earlier, evidence presented in this 
research indicates that the exchange theory can be success­
fully used to understand relationships between lobbyists 
and congressmen. This evidence includes a high degree of 
consistency in the use of exchange inducements found when 
content analyzing both appropriations and substantive legis­
lation; these findings are further bolstered by the large 
number of cases involved in the data analysis.
The second section of this chapter disclosed little 
statistical significance of relationships between exchange 
variables used to explain lobbying success and goal achieve­
ment, further confirming this research's application of 
exchange theory. Matthews (1960) pointed out that tradi­
tionally journalists and academicians viewed lobbying as 
a process dominated by interest groups. In fact, however, 
Matthews states that the policy maker has considerable 
maneuverability and does not have to "meekly acquiesce to 
[lobbyists'] wishes" (196). Options, exchange benefits in 
this research, are available to the congressman to resist
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an interest group's offer of inducements. For example, a 
policy maker can be the source of valuable committee leaks 
or even bring to bear a damaging congressional investiga­
tion of a lobbyist’s group (196). Thus, the lack of group 
impact on policy output further confirms the adaptability 
of the exchange theory for explaining interactions between 
groups and decision makers.
Lack of variation in output across different lobbying 
techniques and group characteristics found in this study 
may be disconcerting to traditional interest group expounders, 
But findings such as those in this work and similar results 
in earlier mentioned undertakings do not mean that tradi­
tional interest group explanations should be discarded. 
Instead, as Eulau (1964) pointed out, social science 
academicians must escape from accepting "things are as they 
are" when discussing interest groups (27).
Accounting for the lack of differences in output may 
be several factors. The electoral control of a policy maker 
is not as possible as one would first assume. If a group 
supports a policy maker for an election and he/she wins, 
the group has a friend in power, assuming the group's and 
policy maker's issue positions are congruent. On the other 
hand, if a group backs a policy maker for election and loses, 
the group has not gained a spokesperson, and, in fact, 
probably will have strong opposition from the winning 
candidate the group opposed. Zero-sum electoral politics
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are seldom played for this very reason. Only a group that 
has no alternative access to the political process can 
afford to be openly backing a losing candidate (Truman,
1971; 301-302).
Lobbyists also know that partisan politics may 
threaten the general membership. Members may support a 
strike because they perceive striking as a part of belonging 
to a group, in this case a labor group. But, generally, 
unless the group has strong underpinnings involving partisan 
politics, group members will view support of one policy 
maker and not another negatively (298-299). Group partisan­
ship may also alienate potential allies for future coalitions 
(303-304) .
Groups also probably cannot marshall their membership 
to vote for a particular candidate. Campbell, et al.
(1960) have shown that party identification is developed 
in preadult years and is not easily changed. Cataclysmic 
national events, however, may cause realignment in political 
attitudes (147-149). Thus, to attempt to persuade congress­
men by issuing an electoral threat will probably lead to 
defeat and a waste of the group's resources. Even when 
groups do support a candidate, they generally back a candi­
date who has views that are similar to the group's concerns 
(Milbrath, 1963: 283). Changing a policy maker's position, 
therefore, is not generally attempted through the electoral 
process.
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Groups also attempt to influence policy makers through 
grass-roots campaigns— having group members write in support 
of an issue. But mail-in campaigns are easily spotted and 
most frequently discounted by policy makers and their staffs. 
Furthermore, most information generated by mail campaigns 
is never observed at any higher level than administrative 
assistants (Matthews, 1950; 184-187).
Even though this research found larger coalitions to 
be more successful than smaller coalitions, frequently 
attempts to form coalitions can lead to weakened support of 
an issue. The larger the coalition, the greater the 
potential for inter-group disagreement over issues and use 
of resources. Smaller coalitions will prove less effective 
since the homogeneity of the coalition will possibly mean 
groups forming it will make the same contacts— those in 
favor of the coalition's positions. Therefore, very little 
will have been gained by forming the coalition (186-187).
Compounding further the lobbying problems of interest 
groups has been their lack of financial resources to gener­
ate a strong campaign on behalf of their interests (Bauer, 
et al., 1972: 344-345). In a similar vein, groups are 
hampered by the lack of trained personnel. Frequently, the 
best lobbyists leave the profession for more stable profes­
sions (345). Finally, lobbyists must expend much time and 
energy attending to membership needs, thus, leaving less 
time to lobby policy makers (Milbrath, 1963: 160-161).
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Lack of impact by interest groups can also be 
atrributed to what exchange inducements the policy maker 
has to offer interest groups. These exchange inducements 
permit the lobbyist to maintain political independence of 
group influence. As was mentioned earlier, the policy maker 
that has been given many general messages from groups is 
given more latitude in his voting behavior than when the 
policy maker receives a few specific interest group requests. 
In the former situation, the congressman can more easily 
play one group off on another and appear to be doing what 
is best for all groups involved (Rieselbach, 1973: 201). 
Furthermore, with the exception of a few prominent issues, 
policy makers know that their districts' voters probably do 
not know what the congressman's issue positions are. More­
over, the policy maker can generally count on issues playing 
only a small role in his/her reelection efforts (201) .
Summary
Through the analysis conducted here the application 
of exchange theory to explain relationships between lobby­
ists and policy makers has been substantiated. Explanations 
have been provided for the general impact of lobbying 
techniques and group characteristics on agricultural policy 
output. One question still remains to be answered: Why 
lobby if interest groups exchange benefits and traditional 
techniques and group characteristics do not have an impact?
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First, interest groups lobby because congressmen ask them 
to. Since congressmen can offer benefits to groups, groups 
will generally agree to testify. Second, lobbying occurs 
to provide evidence to the group's membership that the 
organization is seeking the membership's interests. Third, 
group testimony at the committee level provides documentation 
of groups' positions. This printed testimony can be used 
later at other decision loci to support a policy maker's 
position without committing the policy maker to a group's 
issue position (Meier and Van Lohuizen, 1978b: 493-494). 
Fourth, interest group participation provides ligitimacy 
to the political process described as group dominated.
This study indicates that further research should 
be conducted in other substantive policy areas, e.g., wel­
fare, energy, defense, etc., to determine the similarities 
and differences among the areas. Finally, the findings of 
this work are limited by the techniques of research used—  
content analysis. Corroborative research using systematic 
interview research techniques should be conducted involving 
congressmen, agency officials, and interest group members 
and lobbyists. Once this has been achieved in various 
substantive policy areas, social science academicians may 




1. Statistical significance tells us only that certain
sample differences would not occur very often by chance 
if there were no differences in the population from 
which the samples were drawn (Blalock, 1972: 163). A 
cause-and-effect relationship is not indicated by a 
statistically significant difference. When a null 
hypothesis is rejected, one can only conclude that the 
observed differences between means (probabilities and 
mean coalition sizes as found in Chapters V and VI in 
Tables 2, 3, 5, and 6) would be unlikely if the null 
hypothesis were true. Random sampling variation alone, 
therefore, probably is not the sole factor for the 
differences between the means (Mueller, et al., 1977: 
427). In this research, the statistical significance 
observed at each decision point for the variable general 
material information (Chapter VI, Table 5) does not 
necessarily mean that submitting general material infor­
mation will cause increased policy output. Other rival 
explanations must be examined for differences between 
means, which we have done in this study, to increase
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support that there is a cause-and-effect relationship 
between use of general material information and goal 
attainment.
APPENDIX 'A
BUDGET REQUEST AND FINAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR 
FISCAL 1979 AS FOUND IN HR 13125
Agricultural Programs
Departmental Management 
Federal Grain Inspection 
Service
Agricultural Research Service 
Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service 
Food Safety and Quality 
Service!
Cooperative State Research 
Service 
Extension Service 
National Agricultural Library 




World Food and Agricultural 
Outlook and Situation Board^ 
Agricultural Stabilization and 
Conservation Service 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation 
Commodity Credit Corporation 
Subtotal, Agricultural 
Programs
Rural Development and 
Assistance Programs
Farmers Home Administration 
Rural Electrification 
Administration 
Soil Conservation Service 
Agricultural Stabilization 
and Conservation Service 







































Child Nutrition Programs $1,281,535,000 $1,285,535,000
Special Milk Program 142,000,000 142,000,000
Special Supplemental Food
Program (WIG) 555,000,000 569,500,000
Food Stamp Program 5,779,200,000 5,779,200,000
Food Donations Program 12,800,000 12,800,000
Food Program Administration 72,223,000 74,275,000
Subtotal, Domestic Food
P r o g r a m s ^  $7,842,758,000 $7,863,310,000
International Programs
Foreign Agricultural Service $ 51,663,000 $ 53,645,000
International Development Staff 199,000 199,000
Food for Peace (PL 480) 805,900,000 805,900,000
Subtotal, International
Programs $ 857,762,000 $ 859,744,000
Related Agencies




Agencies $ 322,092,000 $ 320,917,000
Foo ministration $ 306,288,000 $ 305,613,000
Comm s Trading
Total: Fiscal year 19 78 new
budget authority $18,090,152,000 $18,288,201,000
Section 32 Transfers 1,411,575,000 1,411,575,000
SOURCE: Wehr, Elizabeth. "$18 Billion Agriculture Funds Cleared."
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 41 (October 1978a): 
2943-2944.
^New service which inspects meat and poultry, formerly a 
function of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.
2
New service continuing the functions of the former Statistical 
Reporting, Economic Research and Farm Cooperative services.
3
Includes functions of old Packers and Stockyards Administration.
4
New entity created in 1977 by the secretary of agriculture.
5
The Elderly Feeding Program was transferred to the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare.
APPENDIX B
VALUE OF UNITED STATES FARM PRODUCTS SHIPPED UNDER PUBLIC LAW 4 80 
COMPARED WITH TOTAL EXPORTS OF UNITED STATES FARM PRODUCTS, 
JULY 1954 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 197?1 
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Fiscal years























1955 73 52 135 125 385
1956 439 63 184 298 984
1957 908 51 165 401 1,525
1958 657 51 173 100 981
1959 724 30 131 132 1,017
1960 824 38 105 149 1,116
1961 951 75 146 144 1,316
1962 1,030 19 88 160 198 1,495
1963 1,088 57 89 174 48 1,456
1964 1,056 48 81 189 43 1,417
1965 1,142 158 55 183 32 1,570
1966 866 181 87 180 32 1,346
1967 803 178 110 157 23 1,271
1968 723 300 100 150 6 1,279
1969 34 6 427 111 154 1 1,039
1970 309 506 113 128 1,056
1971 204 539 138 142 1,023
1972 143 535 228 152 1,058
1973 6 661 159 128 954
1974 (5) 575 147 145 867
1975 762 148 191 1,101
1976 650 65 192 907
19 7 7 (October-September) 760 92 250 1,102
July-September 1976 316 18 51 385
19 55 through July-Sept.






















1955 450 835 2,309 3,144 12
1956 355 1,339 2,157 3,496 28
1957 394 1,919 2,809 4,728 33
1958 227 1,208 2,795 4,003 24
1959 210 1,227 2,492 3,719 27
1960 167 1,283 3,236 4,519 24
1961 186 1,502 3,444 4,946 26
1962 74 1,569 3,573 5,142 29
1963 14 1,470 3,608 5,078 29
1964 24 1,441 4,627 6,068 23
1965 26 1,596 4,501 6,097 26
1966 42 1,388 5,359 6,747 20
1967 37 1,308 5,513 6,821 19
1968 18 1,297 5,086 6,383 20
1969 11 1,050 4,776 5,826 18
1970 12 1,068 5,650 6,718 16
1971 56 1,079 6,674 7,753 13
1972 66 1,124 6,922 8,046 13
1973 84 1,038 11,864 12,902 7
1974 76 943 20,350 21,293 4
1975 123 1,224 20,354 21,578 5
1976 216 1,123 21,024 22,147 4
19 77 (October-September) 419 1,521 22,492 24,013 5
July-September 19 76 138 523 4,832 5,355 7
19 55 through July-Sept.
1977 3,425 30,075 176,447 206,522 13
APPENDIX B (cont.)
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture. Food for Peace, 1977 Annual Report on Public Law
480. Washington, D.C.: Goverment Printing Office, 1978, p. 51.
^Export market value. Fiscal years 1955—76 end June 30, new fiscal year ends 
September 30.
2Annual exports have been adjusted for 1963 and subsequent years by deducting exports under 
barter contracts which improve the balance of payments and rely primarily on authority other 
than Public Law 480. These exports are included in the column headed "commercial sales."
^Sales for foreign currency, economic aid, and expenditures under development loans.
^Commercial sales for dollars include, in addition to unassisted commercial transactions, 
shipments of some commodities with governmental assistance in the form of short- and 
medium-term credit, export payments, sales of government-owned commodities at less than 
domestic market prices, and, for 1963 and subsequent years, exports under barter contracts ^
which benefit the balance of payments and rely primarily on authority other than Public oo
Law 480. "o
^Less than $500,000.
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